

LIPPINCOTT'S SOCIOLOGICAL SERIES

EDITED BY EDWARD CARY HAYES, PH.D., LL.D.

PROFESSOR OF SOCIOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

POLITICAL ACTION

BY

SEBA ELDRIDGE

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF SOCIOLOGY
UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS

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DEDICATED TO MY FRIENDS
ALBERT AND MARGARET DE SILVER

PREFACE

THE notable developments of recent years in the sciences of geography, psychology and sociology have supplied principles and methods of the highest usefulness in the elucidation of political and other social problems; but hitherto no very extensive use has been made of these principles and methods in the treatment of such problems, save in certain special fields, notably education and criminology. This is unfortunate both for the sciences yielding us these instruments of social investigation, and for the special social sciences where those instruments are not fully utilized.

It is unfortunate for the former group of sciences because they are denied indispensable aids in their progress away from the abstract, illustrational and even anecdotal stage of development where they are partially arrested at the present time; and for the latter group of sciences because methods of investigation whereby alone the problems of those sciences can be successfully treated are not utilized to that end, save to a limited extent. In short, the progress of geography, psychology and sociology is being retarded by the failure to apply, and thus to test and enrich, their principles and methods in the various special fields where they are both applicable and useful; while politics and other special social sciences are not making the progress possible to them in dealing with their own problems, nor contributing to the development of those sciences with which their own progress is bound up.

The present treatise represents an attempt to accelerate progress along these lines, particularly with reference to certain outstanding political and economic problems of

the time. These problems pertain to the relationships between economic classes, especially the capitalist and wage-earning classes in the United States; to the defects of representative government, especially in relation to divergent economic interests; and to the evaluation of the various factors in social and political development, especially the conflicting economic and liberalist interpretations of such development.

The point is emphasized throughout that social and political situations can be understood only through a systematic analysis of each specific situation; and that practicable programs for dealing with the problems incident to a given situation can be formulated only in the light of such analysis. An analysis of this type is undertaken for the particular situations and problems just indicated. What we have undertaken to do, in other words, is to identify and appraise the causal efficacy of the various factors in the situations given, *not* to formulate a philosophy of *values* with reference to those situations. We do not thereby impugn the validity of such philosophies, for we recognize the contributions often represented thereby toward an identification of the *desirable* changes in situations of this sort. But no such philosophy can in itself throw any light on questions respecting the *possibility*, *probability* or *certainly* of particular changes, whether desirable or undesirable, in the given situations. It is questions of the latter order with which we are concerned in this inquiry.

In carrying forward this investigation we have often been obliged to pick and choose among divergent opinions respecting the nature and influence of various social factors, and perhaps more frequently to arrive at judgments of our own on such questions, after duly weighing the evidence and opinions thereon. These judgments will

of course not be acceptable to all, even of a considerable number of, the investigators working on these various problems. Dissent from the opinions expressed herein is therefore to be expected and, for that matter, welcomed, as it is only through the clash and test of opinions on controversial questions that progress in the treatment of those questions can come.

The more fundamental differences between the opinions here represented and those of other investigators are dealt with briefly but systematically in our final chapter. These differences all pertain to the general problem of the relative influence on individual and social development, of hereditary mental characteristics, on the one hand, and customs, traditions, institutions, educational discipline and other "environmental" factors, on the other hand. We believe that our examination of divergent views on this general problem justifies the positions taken on related specific questions in the main body of the text.

One concession has been made to some prospective opponents. The bulk of the text was prepared before controversies on the general problem had become acute, as they recently have, and therefore before a certain school of social psychologists developed such marked antipathy to the hypothesis that human beings are born with tendencies toward more or less specific responses to environmental stimuli—especially when these tendencies are called instincts. I have thought it well to spare the feelings of these psychologists in regard to this matter so far as possible, and this I have done by substituting for the term *instinct*, which figured rather conspicuously in the original draft of the text, more pacifying terms (as I hope), such as *impulse*, *disposition*, *tendency*, and *instinctive*, the adjectival equivalent of the obnoxious substantive—but retaining in a few passages the term *instinct* itself. While this

concession pertains to form rather than substance, I trust that my anti-instinct friends will properly appreciate it. It is the best, under the circumstances, that I could do.

Others will complain that the outcome of the analysis offers no warrant that their several social and political ideals will be realized. I can only say to them that I am sorry this is the case, for I, too, wish that a naturalistic analysis of social and political situations gave greater promise that desirable changes in those situations might be realized. But facts are facts, and the guiding motive in the investigation has been to let the facts speak for themselves and support what conclusions they would, not other conclusions which we might wish to substitute for them. Yet such an analysis, as it may be corrected, elaborated and extended by other investigations, will put us on the road, if anything can, to a realization of those desirable changes in the situations considered which come within the realm of human possibilities.

Acknowledgements.—I am glad to acknowledge obligations to a number of friends who have examined this book in manuscript and offered suggestions and criticisms. I am especially indebted to Professor F. H. Giddings of Columbia University, Professors E. A. Ross and Selig Perlman of the University of Wisconsin, and Professor E. C. Hayes, the editor of this series, for their aid and encouragement while the book was in process of preparation.

Acknowledgements are also due the following publishers for their approval of quotations from copyrighted works bearing their several imprints: To D. Appleton & Company for a quotation from G. Stanley Hall's *Adolescence*; to Houghton Mifflin Company for quotations from G. T. W. Patrick's *The Psychology of Relaxation* and Ordway Tead's *Instincts in Industry*; to

The Macmillan Company for quotations from F. W. Taussig's *Inventors and Money-Makers* and Graham Wallas' *The Great Society*; to Mr. Fisher Unwin and The Macmillan Company for quotations from W. Trotter's *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*.

Of the several authors who granted permission to quote from their works, mention should be made of Professor William McDougall, who authorized quotations from *An Introduction to Social Psychology*; Professor E. L. Thorndike, who authorized quotations from *The Original Nature of Man*; and Dr. Wilfred Trotter, who authorized quotations from *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*.

SEBA ELDRIDGE.

Lawrence, Kansas,
November, 1923.

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

THE appearance of this volume in the present series is an evidence that here at least freedom of discussion is not suppressed. The book presents a careful and analytic statement of the obstacles that oppose the success of democracy. The editor takes a more hopeful view than the author expresses of the degree to which these obstacles may be overcome by legal and educational methods.

The hundred and fifty years not quite completed since the experiment of democracy on a great scale has been tried is but a brief period as history counts time; and the changes which that period has witnessed warn us effectually against thinking that the end of progressive change in social organization is in sight. When we recall the days when in the most advanced nations instead of holding an election it was the custom to decapitate the leaders of the opposition in some tower or dungeon or castle yard, or to have them hung, drawn and quartered, how again and again even in orderly England towns were laid in ashes and men, women and children butchered to punish the insubordination of some aspirant, how long and to how great a degree rational judicial procedure proved impossible in case of the wealthy and the strong, when we recall the almost forgotten and largely unimaginable horrors of Europe's not distant past, and the seemingly impregnable prestige of a traditionalism now outgrown, definite conclusions, based on the immutability of human instincts or the weight of tradition, and setting limits to the possibility of further progress, are largely robbed of their terrors. But such arguments are eminently worth while if they lay bare the specific obstacles that impede

us in the unfinished task of democratic progress. In this the present volume renders a distinguished service.

The orderly success of liberal democracy requires two things: first, leaders who tell the people what to do; second, that the people follow such leaders. The author of this volume notes the fact, and illustrates it in his own person, that the most ardent and effective of labors' leaders often come from the more privileged classes. This is evidence that the motive of justice is a dominant one with some individuals, and also that there is a class of men with whom the analysis of facts, and that loyalty to objective reality which is justice, form an habitual attitude. Such men—and their number is increasing—will furnish to democracy the necessary leadership. The more doubtful question is whether the other essential condition will be fulfilled: will the people follow such leaders and enforce a program of progress?

The author argues that hitherto the habitual and gregarious partisanship of the masses and control of "the suggestioning agencies" by a dominant class have enabled that class to make majorities to support its own interests. But it is an open question whether majorities can indefinitely be made to vote against their own interests and in the interests of their political manipulators.

The crux of the whole argument as to the practicability of liberal democracy is in the question, Can justice and expediency secure sufficient share in the control of "suggestioning agencies"—sufficiently voluminous iteration in the public ear accompanied by sufficient prestige? No one will deny that in spite of the power of tradition, mass suggestion, habit and prestige, nevertheless facts and logic, if adequately heard, do have a certain amount of influence over the mind, feelings and conduct of men, or that people on the whole prefer policies that are in their own interest if told clearly enough and often enough by accepted

leaders. Democracy does not in the least require that the mass be able to formulate wise policies, but only to recognize such policies when they are adequately presented. Granted that facts and logic are well able to win a certain number of leaders to the side of justice, can these leaders reach the public ear with sufficient volume and prestige of suggestion? This is the question, and it is a question of developing an adequate technique of democracy.

Formerly it was thought that an adequate technique of democracy was supplied when a free and universal and secret ballot provided the means for *expressing* the public will. Now we know that an adequate technique of democracy must provide for the *formation* of a public will in accordance with justice and expediency. The first step in developing a technique of democracy was comparatively easy. The second is difficult. To compel us, as the author of this book compels us, to realize that it has not been achieved, and to make us clearly see what stands in the way of achieving this essential of orderly democratic progress, is to render us a great, even if unpalatable, service.

And the solution of this second problem in the technique of democracy is by no means unthinkable. A constitutional requirement is conceivable to the effect that every newspaper attaining a given circulation should pay for the most valuable of all franchises and give a guarantee for its share in the exercise of the greatest of all powers, by placing certain space in every issue at the disposal of each of the four political parties that cast the largest votes in the preceding state election. It is likely that with such a law in force, each party would employ its ablest advocates to plead its cause before the bar of public opinion in the space thus placed at its disposal. Misrepre-

sensation would be checked because if it occurred, it would be exposed in parallel columns or in the succeeding issue. Men who now refuse to have an organ of the opposing party in their homes would be impelled by curiosity to read contrasting arguments. The deadliest of all monopolies—monopoly of access to the mind—would be overthrown, and a habit of the public would be developed which in itself might solve the unsolved problem of the technique of democracy, prevent revolution, and insure orderly progress.

The argument which this book contains is calculated to lead either to a pessimistic conclusion about the future development of democratic society, or to such a vivid conception of what must be done to forefend disillusionment and disaster that it will inspire men of courageous temper to vigorous efforts to set free those psychic processes which are the essence of democratic action.

The method of the book contributes towards the growth of the realization that in sociology, as in any other field of research, scientific explanation is nothing less than a description and evaluation and correlation of all the factors, that is of all the conditioning phenomena, that affect the result to be explained. If any reader grows impatient of such detailed analysis he may be asked to bear in mind that in precisely this patient detail consists the most distinctive merit of the book. Nearly every educated person gives some superficial recognition to the fact that such things as habit, tradition, instincts and the power of iterated suggestion exist, but it is necessary to dwell upon them if one is to understand the method of their working or have anything like an adequate realization of their overwhelming importance as terms in social problems.

E. C. H.

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POLITICAL ACTION

CHAPTER I

THE NATURALISTIC METHOD IN POLITICAL INQUIRY

A PHILOSOPHICAL friend in discussing the Allied policy (of 1919) toward Soviet Russia admitted sadly that when it comes to such an "acid test" as that, right and not right is apt to determine political action. Then reverting to the ante-bellum ideology which he saw crumbling about him, this friend deplored, as one most unfortunate result of the Great War, the disillusionment of high-minded people respecting the ideals of right and justice which had been cherished so tenderly prior to the War.

We have illustrated in this viewpoint, if I mistake not, one reason for the comparative sterility of our political discussion. For what was happening in my friend's case was not any fundamental reconstruction of his political philosophy, but a discovery that the world would not live up to the philosophy which he had espoused; and this discovery served only to make him less optimistic regarding the realization of ideals which he still deemed valid.

His outlook is typical of many who think and write on political questions. This ethical idealism, together with the belief in human capacity to attain ethical ideals which normally goes with it, not only explains the disappointments and disillusionments which so many reflective people are undergoing today, but it accounts in part for the difficulty of establishing a genuine political science—a science which shall serve to identify social ideals that

are really attainable, as well as the conditions requisite to their attainment.

If, instead of regarding the individual and the social group as *ethical agents* which *ought* to attain certain ends, and therefore as capable of attaining those ends, the individual and the group were viewed as *natural agents* which act in a more or less determinate fashion, a start would have been made in *understanding* human behavior, and in defining human capacities for the attainment of social ideals.

A second reason for the meagerness of the results yielded by political discussion is to be found in the nature of the questions discussed. Interest is often centered in general questions having "two sides" to them, and so much evidence can be adduced in support of either side that definitive solutions are 'virtually impossible. We have, for example, the economic interpretation of history competing with the ethical or spiritual interpretation; the theory of class struggle as a means of political readjustment in opposition to the theory of government by discussion and compromise; the advocacy by opposing schools of "direct methods" and of indirect political methods of furthering the interests of a subordinate class; the vigorous affirmation and an equally vigorous denial that representative government has broken down under the burdens laid on it by our complex civilization.

Such questions, to my way of thinking, are too general to be answered with any degree of finality. They do not refer to specific social situations which are susceptible of more or less exact investigation. If that be true, such questions must be broken up into more specific questions, or, what amounts to the same thing, these same questions must be considered in reference to specific situations.

What we need in any case is a resolution of general questions and situations into more specific questions and situations, and a definition of question and situation with reference one to the other.

A third reason for the futility of much political discussion is its failure to take into account the whole complex of factors which determine political events. Political writers emphasize, now one, now another, of these factors, but only on rare occasions is there a well-conceived attempt to give them all their due weight. The history of political philosophy is replete with these ill-conceived attempts to explain political events. The "great men of history," cultural factors transmitted by the past, racial traits, one or more instincts, pain and pleasure, reason, ethical ideals, economic interests, have all and several been invoked as *the* cause, or the chief cause, of political changes.

Such dependence on one or a few of the many factors operative in political life for an adequate explanation of political changes necessarily results in failure. For all are *veræ causæ*, and must all be given their due weight in any theory of politics that is to withstand criticism.

With a wholesome respect for the lessons carried by these failures, I am going to formulate and apply a naturalistic method in the elucidation and, so far as may be, the solution of certain outstanding social and political questions on which the whole world is seeking light. These are the problems of capital and labor, the future of representative government, the struggle of social classes for power, and the use of "direct methods" in the furtherance of group interests. The scope of our analysis will also make it convenient to examine, in addition to those problems, the rival doctrines of political liberalism

and economic determinism, with a view to determining how well they square with the facts of social life.

Essentials of the Naturalistic Method.—In formulating a method of dealing with these problems, we must be careful not to fall into the errors we have been discussing. The writers criticised have taken mere abstractions from human nature and made them explanatory of human behavior; or they have taken one or more, but less than the whole number of, factors operative in society and explained everything social by them; or they have attempted general explanations of social life, instead of dealing with specific situations or problems.

As stated, a sound method of dealing with social problems must give due weight to all the factors operative in the situation under examination. Operative in every social situation are (a) hereditary human traits and capacities, (b) a physical environment, and (c) culture, or tradition. We shall indicate presently the meanings denoted by these general terms. We may observe here that they stand for *genera* of natural social factors, each of which includes a large number of species and an indefinite number of individuals. In different social situations no class of factors will be the same or operate in the same manner. The hereditary traits, the physical environment or the cultural factors operative in one situation will be substantially different in one or more vital respects from the corresponding group of factors in any other situation. Although none of these factors operate independently of the others, they may still be regarded as independent variables. With certain qualifications which need not be stated here, any physical environment might be associated with any group of human beings and any complex of cultural factors in producing a social situation, and any group of human beings or any cultural complex

might be associated with any combination of factors from the other two categories in determining such a situation. In short, innumerable combinations of these factors are possible, and have actually occurred, all producing social situations no two of which were quite alike.

It should now be clear that political analysis which employs a naturalistic method must have reference to the particular situation if it is to result in an intellectual mastery of the problems involved, since the specific factors operative in one situation will never be quite equivalent to, nor produce the same results as, the specific factors in another situation. This is not to deny the possibility of a valid general theory of social activity, for, although the factors involved in different social situations are not specifically alike, they may and probably do have common elements upon which a general theory of society could be based.

We shall find it necessary to go even further in the direction of a specific analysis than has been indicated, for the social situation of a given time and place must be resolved into a number of more specific situations for the purpose of dealing as precisely as may be with particular problems. If representative government, for example, has broken down, as some writers have claimed, just where has it failed and where, on the other hand, has it succeeded? And why these failures and these successes? In the light of our answers to these questions, what functions may be safely delegated to representative political institutions in the future, and what functions must be dealt with through machinery of a different kind? Obviously, questions such as these can be treated adequately only by defining the situations which have specific reference to these same questions, and subjecting them to a naturalistic analysis of the sort indicated.

More precisely, our procedure will be to define with as much particularity as the present state of our knowledge permits the classes of factors operative in the social situations under consideration, then determine the nature and the magnitude of the effects produced by these factors in the given situations, and, in conclusion, focus the results of this analysis upon the several problems we are undertaking to elucidate.

Objections to the Method.—A number of objections might be urged against this procedure. It might be claimed, in the first place, that our knowledge of the factors operative in society is too incomplete to permit any decisive use thereof in the solution of social problems.

There is a good deal to be said for this objection. Our knowledge of the factors operative in society is incomplete, but it is the best knowledge we have, however incomplete, and far more serviceable in the investigation of social problems than are the abstract principles or the dubious "lessons of history" which have purported to serve this function in the past; more serviceable, too, than methods which represent a selection from the whole complex of factors operative in society. Moreover, our knowledge of social factors is less incomplete than may be supposed, for marked progress has been made recently in the investigation of these factors, and particularly in the study of mental traits and capacities. Indeed it may be said that our knowledge of these factors has now developed to the point where some fairly decisive applications thereof to social and political problems should be possible. Important applications¹ have already been made in certain outlying fields, notably in education and

¹ Cf., for example, Thorndike, E. L., *Educational Psychology*, and Healy, W., *The Individual Delinquent, Pathological Lying, and Honesty*.

criminology, while a beginning has been made in the field of politics itself.²

But, although Wallas,³ Ross⁴ and others have dealt in a realistic fashion with the defects of representative government, the struggle of social classes, and other political problems, they have not posed those problems in the form in which they are pressing on the world today. We might well emulate their example by employing the same naturalistic method in the elucidation of problems rendered acute by the Great War.

Finally, it is only through practical applications of this sort that our knowledge of the factors operative in society can be extended and systematized. For the further support of these claims we must rely on the results attained by our own use of the methods laid down.

It may be charged also that we are employing *a priori* methods in the consideration of questions which can be solved only by positive evidence. To this charge, if such there be, we enter a plea of not guilty. Our method is largely deductive, but it is not an *a priori* method. To those who have a prejudice against the use of deductive methods, I would say that the practical application of any principle or law previously established is deductive, and that the more such applications we have of useful knowledge the better. To take an example, the concept of an instinct is, in reality, an inductive law of human behavior based on observation and inference, and this concept is practically useful, therefore, only as it is applied deductively in the elucidation of unsolved behavioristic problems. And so with the laws describing the action of other social factors. We are obliged when investigating com-

²Graham Wallas, *Human Nature in Politics and The Great Society*, and Ross, E. A., *Social Control*, are outstanding examples.

³*Human Nature in Politics*, Part II, Chap. II.

⁴*Social Control*, Chaps. IX, XXVIII.

plicated social problems to employ deductive methods, because we have to do with situations which have not been, and perhaps could not be, subjected to an exhaustive experimental study.⁵ Even if they had been studied experimentally, we should still have to employ deductive methods in utilizing the experimental results to guide or forecast further developments in the situations given. The only difference would be that the deductive applications of laws or principles based on experimental study would be more exact than applications of laws or principles based on observation and inference.

Moreover, we shall test the validity of our deductive conclusions by an appeal to the facts, and reject as erroneous any deduction going counter to the facts. Perhaps a better characterization of our method would be to say that we assume an acquaintance on the part of our readers with the salient facts of the situations dealt with, and proceed at once to an interpretation of these facts from the standpoint of positive science.

It may be charged, again, that we are too much disposed to predict a future which only the events themselves can reveal. It is true that we shall attempt to forecast the outcome of the tendencies we are concerned to analyze; but any application of the naturalistic method in the solution of practical problems must of necessity deal in forecasts and predictions. For a naturalistic study deals with what *is* and, in the nature of things, *must be*, and not with what *ought to be*. Yet it is possible to make due allowance for unforeseeable combinations of the factors found to be operative in the given situations, and not claim a greater probability for our conclusions than they are really entitled to. This caution we shall observe throughout.

⁵ Wallas, *The Great Society*, pp. 30-31.

A fourth objection to the general method laid down will be that it commits us to a negative attitude toward the functions of reason and morality in social life. Our reply will be that we are undertaking to define the rôle actually played by these factors. This, we admit, is a far smaller, or rather a different, one from that imputed to them in the past. We do not deny the efficacy (to a degree) of rational and moral considerations. We would not even deny "freedom of the will" if only the term be properly understood. We shall venture, however, to regard these vaunted attributes of the *genus homo* as functions of a *natural* agent, as bound up with other functions of that agent—instinct, habit, pain and pleasure, etc.—and as *conditioned* by all other factors associated with them in real life. Human reason and will cannot achieve everything, as even their most ardent champions would admit, nor are they, on the other hand, to be put down as altogether impotent. The task of a naturalistic student of human problems is, therefore, to determine just what potency should be attributed to these factors. We shall not in our analysis give them a privileged position, but award them the recognition to which they can show themselves entitled.

The will is not in our analysis expressly treated as such, but is identified with instinct, habit and other elements in the will-organization of human nature. Nor is there any express recognition of human freedom. Rather, it is identified with the mental plasticity of the human organism and its capacity for adapting itself to changes in its environment. Reason, on the other hand, is expressly treated as such, and an attempt made to define explicitly its functions in social life.

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CHAPTER II

PRIMARY FACTORS IN HUMAN SOCIETY

WE HAVE subsumed under three general categories the factors operative in human society, to wit: hereditary traits and capacities; physical environment; and culture, or tradition. Before entering upon our detailed analysis of these factors let us orient ourselves toward our problems by sketching in broad outlines the characteristics and the interrelationships of these factors.

Hereditary Traits and Capacities.—Although the physiological processes of the human organism have a vital significance for social problems, we shall not deal with these processes as such, for the reason that their social significance comes out through our discussion of mental functions in which these processes are represented. Nor need we give any account of sensation, perception, memory, and other mental functions having but little immediate significance for our problems. Our task is, rather, to identify those mental functions which are specially significant for politics, and to assess their value for our problems.

Many psychologists begin their account of human nature with as accurate a description as may be of the *original* nature of man. Every type of behavior manifested from infancy to old age is assumed by such psychologists to have its roots in this original nature with which the individual starts in life.¹ To get the concept clearly before us, Thorndike's carefully constructed formula may be reproduced. "The original nature of man is roughly what is common to all men *minus* all adapta-

¹ Thorndike, E. L., *The Original Nature of Man*, p. 4.

tions to tools, houses, clothes, furniture, words, beliefs, religions, laws, science, the arts, and to whatever other in man's behavior is due to adaptations to them." ² The same author divides original tendencies into three sub-classes, namely, reflexes, instincts and general innate capacities.³

This general definition will be qualified and elaborated in due course. We may observe here that the original nature of man is to be regarded as a foundation of everything he may think, feel or do. A reorganization of this original nature is always going on, owing to its interactions with its environment. Indeed, original nature is *so* plastic that the later organizations thereof represent more or less accurately the particular environmental influences to which the individual has been subjected. There is, however, no occasion for raising the question whether heredity or environment is the more potent in man's mental development, for any genuine problem relative to that development is affected by both these groups of factors. And the more vital problems will concern, not heredity and environment in general, but specific hereditary characters and specific environmental factors.

The mental traits or functions specially significant for our inquiry are (*a*) instincts, (*b*) intellectual processes, (*c*) pleasant and unpleasant feeling tones, or hedonic factors, and (*d*) habits. These categories are, of course, not mutually exclusive, as instincts, habits, intellectual processes, pain and pleasure are all bound up together at every stage of mental development. It is not implied, therefore, that these functions operate independently of one another in practice. We are only resolving a functional complex into artificially simplified elements for

² *Op. cit.*, p. 198.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 5.

purposes of analysis. In philosophical terms, these are logical, not ontological, distinctions.

(a) The instincts need not detain us here, as this category is so important for our inquiry that we shall devote a special chapter to it further on. To get the concept clearly before us, Thorndike's definition of an original tendency may be quoted. "A typical reflex, or instinct, or capacity, as a whole, includes the ability to be sensitive to a certain situation, the ability to make a certain response, and the existence of a bond or connection whereby that response is made to that situation. . . . But the tendency to be sensitive to a certain situation may exist without the existence of a connection therewith of any further exclusive response, and the tendency to make a certain response may exist without the existence of a connection limiting that response exclusively to any single situation. . . . So, for convenience in thinking about man's unlearned equipment, this appearance of *multiple response* to one same situation and *multiple* causation of one same response may be taken roughly as the fact."⁴

A further observation by the same author regarding the action of original tendencies will be in order. "The original tendencies of man . . . rarely act one at a time in isolation one from another. Life apart from learning would not be a simple serial arrangement, over and over, of a hundred or so situations, each a dynamic unit; and of a hundred or so responses, fitted to these situations by a one-to-one correspondence. On the contrary, they coöperate in multitudinous combinations. . . . It is also the case that any given situation does not act absolutely as a unit, producing either one total response or none at all. Its effect is the total effect of its elements, of which now one, now another may predominate in deter-

⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 6, 7.

mining response, according to coöperating forces without and within the man." ⁵

These quotations refer to reflexes and general innate capacities as well as to instincts, and they will serve therefore to define, in a general way, the relationships of the instincts with the functions (derived from general innate capacities) now to be characterized.

(b) Intellectual processes are an exceedingly difficult category to define acceptably.⁶ They may be said to include every process of "putting two and two together," of inferring from some given fact or circumstance the presence, operation or connection of some other fact or circumstance. It is of cardinal importance, in considering man's political behavior, to determine just what part is played in human life by thought, or intellectual activity. Controversy over the subject has raged from the beginning of philosophy down to the present time, and one cannot therefore be too certain about it now. It should be possible, however, with the aid of recent psychological analysis, to define the limits within which the intellect functions in determining political behavior. This, again, is a task for a later part of the discussion.

(c) Hedonic factors include all the various species of pleasure and pain, pleasantness and unpleasantness, satisfaction and dissatisfaction, which human beings experience. Thorndike proposes to designate by the general terms, *satisfiers* and *annoyers*,⁷ this group of factors in behavior. The various species of *satisfiers* and *annoyers* help to determine, on all levels of mental development, the direction of wants, interests and motives. The specific

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 10.

⁶ See Dewey, J., *How We Think*, pp. 1-2, for different senses in which the term "thought" may be taken.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 123.

rôle played by this group of factors will be considered further on.

(d) Habit in the scientific sense of the term denotes every *acquired* mode of thought, feeling or action. It comprehends therefore all the specific mechanisms of thinking, feeling and acting built up after birth through the interaction of the individual with his environment. Habits constitute at every stage of development one group of factors or functions which, in combination with other factors and functions, determine future developments.

The Physical Environment.—The physical environment includes all external bodies with the movements thereof which condition man's behavior. This environment is obviously of the greatest significance, as man, being himself, in one aspect, a material body and continuous with his physicochemical environment, is intimately associated with that environment at every stage of his existence. Much, if not all, political behavior has to do, directly or indirectly, with the relation of man to the physical environment. This factor must bulk large, therefore, in any account of man's political behavior, particularly where economic interests are concerned.

Culture, or Tradition.—Culture or tradition includes all the products of past thought, invention, discovery or other human activity which have become current by being passed on from individual to individual and from generation to generation. One of our quotations from Thorndike⁸ has hinted at the range and variety of these products. They comprehend languages, economic systems, the industrial arts, religious institutions, philosophical principles, moral standards, legal codes, political institutions, educational systems, scientific knowledge, fine arts, literature, customs, manners, dietaries, etc.

⁸ *Ante*, pp. 11-12.

Culture more than anything else differentiates societies from each other, determining, for example, most of the differences between ancient and modern, backward and progressive, primitive and civilized societies. Culture also differentiates individuals in the same society from one another, as no two individuals assimilate quite the same kinds and amounts of the cultural material from which selections are made. As we shall see later, many of the conflicts and oppositions in a society are to be explained by these cultural differences between the individuals and groups constituting that society.

Let us pause, before entering upon our detailed analysis of these factors, to sketch, in broad outlines, their interactions in a society such as ours. This it will be convenient to do from the standpoint of individual development.

Man when born in the world is a bundle of instincts, reflexes and other inborn capacities organized in a quite plastic fashion, and capable of being steered in his development in any one of many different directions. He becomes organized, or rather is constantly reorganized, by living in and interacting with his particular environment. That environment is the sum of the specific situations or stimuli, as subsisting in their specific temporal and spatial relationships, which act on the developing individual. It includes not only a material environment, but also a social environment (other human beings and traditions of every sort). The constant reorganization of the individual resulting from this living in and interacting with the environment takes the form of habits—more specifically, ideas, sentiments and dexterities of all kinds. These habits are not something superimposed on the original tendencies, but are these tendencies themselves in a reorganized form.

The individual's intellectual processes contribute a great deal to this development, for they make possible elaborate processes of communication between individuals, and the rapid assimilation of cultural products transmitted by the past. A higher order of processes is manifested in original thought, invention and exploration, for these have made possible the achievements represented by our modern civilization. It is important to note, however, that almost no one during his early years, and very few ever, do original thinking of any very great social significance. The ideas, sentiments and attitudes absorbed more or less passively from our environment provide most of us the premises of our thought and action, especially in complicated matters, till the end of our days.

The hedonic factors, or satisfiers and annoyers of various sorts, operate at almost every point in our development, constituting, as they do, the rewards and punishments which bulk so large as determinants of behavior. It is not necessary for us to enter into the controversy over the specific functions of the hedonic factors in mental development. Perhaps all that need be said here is that hedonic sanctions can be attached to almost any kind of political behavior, so that an individual or a group, through the judicious employment of such sanctions, may be attracted or repelled by any particular mode of political behavior. Such sanctions are in fact attached (not always intentionally, however) to any kind of political behavior pleasing or displeasing to an individual or a group having these sanctions at its disposal.

The modes of thought, feeling and action thus developed will reflect more or less accurately the specific environmental situations which have contributed to their development. Any number of examples could be cited. A child brought up in a Roman Catholic family will

probably think, feel and act as a Roman Catholic after he grows up; children whose parents were affiliated with the Republican or the Democratic party are themselves apt to vote the Republican or Democratic ticket (as the case may be) after they have become citizens, and so on. Nevertheless, individuals depart from particular traditions, and traditions themselves, like every vital organization, decay or develop. The emancipation of the individual from particular traditions, as well as the modifications to which traditions themselves are subject, have important consequences for political behavior which must be taken into consideration.

Many of these traditions in which the individual is brought up have to do with man's relations to the physical environment. The industrial arts, the economic system, the law of property, and all the communicable ideas, sentiments and attitudes that sanction or run counter to the dominant traditions in these matters have a pretty direct reference to the physical environment. They are of the greatest moment to every member of society, since the satisfaction of any individual's wants or interests depends in some degree on his relation to the physical environment, and that relation is controlled or determined by these parts of the prevailing tradition.

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CHAPTER III

THE INSTINCTS

WE HAVE already offered a definition, borrowed from Thorndike, of instinctive and other innate tendencies in human nature. We shall now describe several peculiarities of these instinctive tendencies which must be borne in mind if the part which they play in social life is to be understood. Our account of these peculiarities should be taken as qualifying and elaborating, for our special purposes, the general definition which we have adopted.

(1) *Relation of Emotions to the Instincts.*—Although psychologists are not in agreement regarding the relation of emotion to instinct, it is obvious that many instinctive impulses have clearly defined emotional accompaniments which, in the subject's own consciousness, explain and justify the responses prompted by these impulses.¹ Emotional states popularly designated as fear usually accompany escape reactions; anger in some form accompanies fighting reactions; lust (a term which has fallen into disrepute, even among psychologists) goes with the stimulation of the sexual instinct; and similarly with the excitation of other instinctive tendencies. We shall follow McDougall in his account of this matter,² without, however, making emotional excitement a *necessary* concomitant of instinctive reactions, a position which McDougall himself tacitly abandons when he makes his

¹ We are not implying, of course, that a given type of emotion is always associated with the same motor response, nor overlooking the physiological concomitants of emotional excitement which have been demonstrated through the researches of Cannon, Crile and other physiologists.

² McDougall, W., *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, thirteenth edition, pp. 27-30.

inventory of the instincts.³ We shall also follow McDougall, himself a follower of A. F. Shand, in the view that "our emotions, or, more strictly speaking, our emotional dispositions, tend to become organized in systems about the various objects and classes of objects that excite them."⁴ To an emotional complex organized around a stable object, or class of objects, these authors apply the term sentiment, while transient emotional complexes are designated as complex emotions, or complex emotional states. Love and hate are typical sentiments, each composed of a number of emotions, while admiration, scorn, contempt, loathing and moral indignation are emotional complexes not necessarily implying the existence of sentiments. Patriotism, internationalism and "class consciousness" might perhaps be regarded as typical political sentiments. These emotional complexes correspond to, if they are not aspects of, similar organizations of the instinctive impulses around objects or classes of objects in one's environment.

(2) **The Organization of Instinctive Impulses.**—We have said that the original tendencies in human nature are always in process of reorganization, owing to their interactions with the environment. The complications (or reorganizations) to which the instinctive tendencies are subject have been classified by McDougall as follows: "(1) The instinctive reactions become capable of being initiated, not only by the perception of objects of the kind which directly excite the innate disposition, the natural or native excitants of the instinct, but also by ideas of such objects, and by perceptions and by ideas of objects of other kinds: (2) the bodily movements in which the instinct finds expression may be modified and complicated

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 84-92.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 126.

to an indefinitely great degree: (3) owing to the complexity of the ideas which can bring the human instincts into play, it frequently happens that several instincts are simultaneously excited; when the several processes blend with various degrees of intimacy: (4) the instinctive tendencies become more or less systematically organized about certain objects or ideas." ⁵

Practically all the instinctive reactions which we shall later identify and interpret have been modified or complicated in one or more of the ways specified. Under the first head will come instinctive reactions to objects or situations with whose specific types the individual has become *acquainted* in the course of his experience. Food-getting responses, for example, become attached to the articles of food procurable in, and constituting the dietaries of, the society in which the individual lives. Escape, fighting, self-assertive and all other classes of instinctive reactions are similarly modified or complicated.

The reactions themselves are modified also, some radically so, others only slightly. Fighting and escape reactions in our modern society, for example, have little in common, outwardly, with the personal encounters and the protective responses which were the primitive counterparts of these reactions. This is so, in the one case, because primitive fighting within the group has been outlawed by the group itself, and, in the other case, because situations which now provoke escape reactions cannot be dealt with merely by removing or concealing one's person from them.

Complications of the third class correspond roughly to complex emotional states of a transient nature, while complications of the fourth class correspond to sentiments organized around stable objects or ideas. The fourth

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 33.

class of complications are the more significant for our inquiry. Our entire discussion of instinctive impulses, in fact, has ultimate reference to certain complex systems of objects or ideas, and is designed to show how those impulses combine and sometimes war against each other, in determining modifications of the situations in question. It will be found that under these situations the various instinctive tendencies bear certain definite relationships, one to another, and that certain tendencies play a more influential rôle in bringing about changes than do the others. Under the prevailing economy, for example, acquisitive impulses will be seen to play a dominant rôle, especially with capitalists and entrepreneurs, although it may be subordinated during times of crisis to impulses dominated by gregarious tendencies. Similarly, as every one knows, the sexual and parental instincts dominate the interests which center in the family, although all the instinctive tendencies are involved therein in one way or another.

Interests of all kinds, taking the term in its popular sense, are more or less systematic organizations of instinctive tendencies having reference to the prevailing cultural and geographic conditions. Intellectual and other mental functions are, of course, associated with the instinctive tendencies in the organization and development of these interests.

(3) **Instinctive Impulses in Modern Society.**—The original nature of man, when viewed phylogenetically, is extremely stable. Although capable of indefinite modification in the individual, the hereditary mental traits of the species or racial stock remain practically the same generation after generation. This inertia of hereditary mental organization is most significant for our inquiry, as many mental traits apparently persist with undimin-

ished vigor after they are no longer well adapted to the environment. To illustrate what is meant—it is certain that a potential (innate) capacity for logical thought is one of the most useful hereditary capacities in present-day society, but it is not nearly as potent in behavior as an extreme sensitiveness to popular sentiment, which is certainly not as useful. Much political behavior cannot be understood without taking into account these more or less archaic traits of human nature functioning in an environment to which they are but ill adapted.

And although, as we have said, original nature is constantly undergoing modification in the individual, it nevertheless continues to be the driving force in behavior throughout life. While the instinctive impulses, with which we are now particularly concerned, become attached to the objects of experience and are oftentimes obliged, under social inhibitions, to express themselves in devious and hidden ways, they are as dynamic, as potent to produce changes, in the situations given as they were under the primitive conditions in which they were evolved. And, as we shall see, while a few individuals are capable of acting with some reference at least to the whole complex of interests in their society, the overwhelming majority of mankind are largely determined in their behavior by the immediate situations with which they are confronted. In other words, while the behavior of the former is guided mainly by rational and social considerations, the behavior of the latter is largely instinctive and irrational in nature.

(4) Repression of Instinctive Impulses.—Not only is original nature highly stable, it is, strictly speaking, irrepressible. The two terms are perhaps but different ways-of denoting the same fact. Original nature is the sum or the complex of instinctive and other innate ten-

dencies, and these we have found to be potent throughout life. They may be regarded as indestructible, like matter, except, possibly, as a result of neural lesions.⁶

But like matter, also, they take on many different forms. The instincts are organized under the stimuli of the given physical and social environment, and the organization thereof will be adapted in some degree to that environment. This organization of the instincts involves the exploitation, in particular situations, of one instinctive impulse by another, the specific organization being determined largely by the demands laid on the individual by his physical and social environment. In the last analysis, this organization is effected by playing the instinctive impulses off against one another, through the mediation of reason and of pain and pleasure. Some instinctive impulses stand to gain, while others will lose, in this process.

But those which lose will recoup themselves in some other way. The sex instinct, for example, is often obliged, because of the powerful social inhibitions which bear it down, to seek satisfaction in the dream, the neurotic symptom, or, it may be, in art or other forms of creative activity deemed to be "sublimated" expressions of this instinct.⁷

Often, however, instinctive tendencies inhibited from normal modes of expression will rebel against these same inhibitions and, so far as may be, break them down. We must remember that the human organism, being endowed with a measure of intelligence, may seek to

⁶ Instinctive impulses develop in various ways during the life of the individual, and certain types of impulses have what may be called definite functional periods in the developmental cycle, but the explanation of these facts is biological rather than sociological in character.

⁷ Freud, S., *A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*.

remove or evade obstacles which interfere with its activity, instead of tamely submitting to them. Moreover, a balked impulse may call to its aid other instinctive tendencies which will function to remove the offending obstacle or inhibition.

Social conditions which entail a serious repression of powerful instinctive impulses for any large class of people are apt, sooner or later, to be a target of attack for these people, even though the impulses inhibited find pathological or sublimated substitutes for the normal functioning which has been denied them. And the strength and determination of the attack will depend, other things being equal, on the number and potency of the impulses repressed as well as on the number of people in whom they are repressed. On the other hand, conditions inhibiting certain impulses may be supported or sanctioned by other impulses, and a sort of equilibrium maintained which is quite resistant to further change. The probable outcome of a situation where this is the case can be forecast only through a careful evaluation of the tendencies which are operative therein. It is just this sort of evaluation which we shall attempt for the labor problem in this country.

(5) *Individual Differences.*—Psychologists generally assume that there are sex, age, family and possibly racial differences in instinctive and other hereditary traits. Many of these differences are susceptible of exact measurement,⁸ but such measurements as have been made are rarely applicable to problems of the sort under consideration here, and where differences must be taken into account we shall have to rely, as a rule, on less exact observations of our own. Differences in capacity for

⁸ Cf., for example, Thorndike, E. L., *Educational Psychology*, Vol. III, Part II.

critical thought on political questions, or in the strength of parental, gregarious or other instinctive impulses manifested in political behavior, will be the sort of differences which we must specially allow for, and exact measurements of such differences have not as yet been made. I think it will be seen, however, that we shall be able, without exact data of this kind, to arrive at some probable conclusions which are quite significant for the problems under consideration.⁹

The Influence of Instinctive Tendencies in Politics.—Consideration of the instinctive impulses in relation to our problems will supply *clues* for an understanding of

⁹ Professor F. H. Giddings has criticised (in a private letter) my treatment of the problems here under consideration on the ground that insufficient weight is given to individual differences in responses to the same or similar social stimuli. I am prepared to concede the justice of this criticism, though the paucity of exact data on these problems rather than any failure to take such data into consideration is chiefly responsible for the defect. I do not believe this defect vitiates to any considerable degree the conclusions yielded by the discussion, though it has not been possible, of course, to present these conclusions in other than a crude quantitative form. It will be seen that differences in response to social stimuli *are* taken into consideration in our treatment, as it is recognized and even insisted that just these differences, taken together, have created the problems we are undertaking to elucidate. Moreover, differences in response between differentiated groups are not the only type of differences taken into account, for different responses within the *same* groups are recognized, and to those differences are attributed many distinctive features of the behavior exhibited by those groups. Where differences are not expressly recognized, there is no implication that such differences could not be distinguished. Indeed it is certain that no two members of a given group would make identical responses to all the situations by which the group at large found itself confronted. Where differences are not pointed out, the behavior recognized is assumed to be typical or modal for the group at large or, better stated, the dominant type of behavior for that group. It is desirable, of course, that quantitative studies of behavior of the types herein examined should be undertaken, so far as that may prove feasible. Professor Giddings' analysis of what he terms pluralistic behavior has provided, part of the requisite theoretical foundations for studies of this character. See his *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, Chap. XV.

man's political behavior and, together with the complementary analyses of other factors, will explain his reactions to the situations under examination. The instinctive tendencies constitute, so to speak, the *motifs* of the social symphony, but the symphony itself must be understood as a production, not of those tendencies alone, but of all the factors operative in social life.

Not to attempt a strictly uniform system of nomenclature, which would be somewhat awkward in practice, the more important instinctive tendencies operative in political behavior may be denoted as hunger, fear, repulsion, pugnacity, the sex instinct, the parental instinct, acquisitiveness, self-assertion, submissiveness, curiosity, constructiveness, gregarious impulses, and play tendencies.¹⁰

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¹⁰ I am fully aware of the objections to a classification of this type, as also to the treatment of constructive and play activities as motivated by simple original tendencies. For exact scientific work, classification on the basis of specific responses or specific situations is preferable. But difficulties of language make such classifications unsuited to the purpose in hand. The organization of original tendencies through their interaction with the environment, as well as with each other, so complicates them that they rarely act in simple primitive fashion. Moreover, the social situations to which the developed individual reacts generally excite a number of original tendencies, and this adds to the complexity of the actual responses. Such an analysis as that of Thorndike, therefore, although one of the most exact yet undertaken, cannot be used *directly* in such an inquiry as we are undertaking, except by way of providing initial definitions of the original tendencies operative in behavior. We require, rather, *generalized* concepts of original tendencies which can be applied to complicated social situations of the type with which we are to deal. The situations and the responses here under consideration cannot, as a rule, be represented in the terms of Thorndike's analysis.

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CHAPTER IV

HUNGER

THOSE interested in the original specialized tendencies involved in eating and food-getting may be referred to Thorndike's account of the matter.¹ Hunger and food-getting have no great immediate significance for our problems, but they have a more remote interest which is not unimportant. For a great part of the world's population is consciously engaged in procuring as satisfactory a food supply as may be, together with other necessities, comforts or luxuries included in the standard of living; and this obviously has its bearings on problems such as ours.

Discontent is engendered whenever the kinds and amounts of the food procurable fall seriously below the quantity and quality standards to which people are accustomed. Discontent likewise ensues if a considerably larger proportion than usual of one's income or one's effort must be spent in procuring food of the standard amounts and qualities, and other elements in the standard of living must suffer as a result. Some measure at least of the recent unrest among wage and salaried classes must be attributed to this factor. The incomes of a large proportion of these classes had not kept pace with the upward trend of prices, and dietary or other constituents in the standard of living were necessarily lowered.

In times of war or famine hunger may become the dominant political force, and governments be overturned or new classes brought into power because of an unrest in which want of food is the most potent factor. No

¹ *The Original Nature of Man*, pp. 50 et seq.

trained observer could have failed to recognize the operation of this factor in Europe during the War and post-War period. Normally, however, owing to the money economy under which we live, politics are more directly concerned with the distribution of money income than with the food supply.

Food-getting responses as considered here have become attached to objects of experience, that is to articles of diet included in the standard of living which the individual has adopted. Culture, habit, hedonic factors and a number of instinctive tendencies are, of course, associated with these responses in determining the dietary constituents of the standard of living.

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CHAPTER V

FEAR

NEITHER the fear emotions nor the motor responses associated therewith have as yet been subjected to anything like an exhaustive investigation, and psychologists are consequently not in agreement as to the function or even the nature of the tendencies properly denoted by this term. Most scientific writers on the subject assume a number of specialized instinctive fears, such as fear of "thunder, reptiles, large, suddenly approaching animals, darkness and strange persons," although they differ widely as to the nature and number of such fears, and one writer at least has denied the existence of specialized instinctive fears. Thorndike, in characteristic fashion, has attempted to "replace the vague single word [fear] by an objective account of actual responses," and distinguished as many as thirty-one specialized responses assumed to be associated with fear emotions.¹

These specialized instinctive fears and fear responses have but little bearing on our problems. The fears significant for those problems are attached to certain objects or situations of experience, as the fear of destitution, of unemployment, and the like. To get a concept of such fears clearly before us we cannot do better, perhaps, than begin with Thomas Hobbes' definition: "I comprehend in this word *fear*, a certain foresight of future evil; neither do I conceive flight the sole property of fear, but to distrust, suspect, take heed, provide so that they may not fear, is also incident to the fearful. . . . It is through fear that men secure themselves by flight indeed, and in corners,

¹ Thorndike, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-59.

if they think they cannot escape otherwise; but for the most part, by arms and defensive weapons.”² This definition, while ignoring or taking for granted the instinctive basis of fear, has the merit of indicating the nature of the responses which may be associated with fear under complex social conditions.

Events may and do occur in any society which entail unpleasant consequences for the individual, although many individuals are beyond the reach of many contingencies which menace others. But there will be contingencies of which the most fortunately situated individual will be afraid. Since the individual realizes from his own experience that such events may occur at any time, fear will always play an important rôle in human life. And, since the fortunes of the individual are bound up with those of the social group to which he belongs, fear will always play a part in social relationships. Moreover, sanctions of all kinds—religious, moral or legal—are based on fear. In fact, the inhibition from any act whatever to which the individual may be disposed is based at bottom on fear of the unpleasant consequences which the commission of that act might entail.

Fear and Wage-Labor.—That fear largely determines the behavior of the wage-earner is obvious. Fear of a temporary or permanent loss or diminution of earning power may be regarded as the primary fear from which most other fears incident to wage-labor are derived. Under the existing industrial system, where the employer has the legal right to “hire and fire,” where many employers at least pursue policies calculated to render employment insecure, and hence their labor force more tractable, and where not even the employers themselves

² *Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government*, Chap. I; edition by Woodbridge, F. J. E., *The Philosophy of Hobbes*, p. 244.

could wholly guarantee security of tenure to their employees, fear is inevitably a conspicuous element in working-class psychology. It is especially potent in the case of wage-workers because it cannot normally express itself in escape reactions. This, added to the constant excitations of fear impulses, produces a state of affairs which may properly be deemed pathological.

Repression of Laborer's Impulses Through Fear.—

Other instinctive tendencies are closely associated with fear in this situation. The retention of one's job is conditioned by managerial favor, among other things, and managerial favor is won and retained by abstention from those acts which are displeasing to management. This abstention entails the repression of several powerful tendencies, notably the self-assertive, constructive and gregarious tendencies. The workingman, as a general rule, must show himself obedient at all times to the orders, and even to the whims and caprices, of his superiors. This domination by managers and foremen, in so far as it is effectuated through fear, belongs to the offensive sort of self-assertion to be discussed later. Its tendency is to arouse the workingman to revolt against those at whose hands he suffers thus.

The constructive impulses are likewise repressed through fear of the consequences which might follow were their promptings heeded. If laborers are on the piece system painstaking labor would mean reduced wages, while if they are engaged by the day painstaking work would, through a restriction of the output, usually mean a discharge or a reduction in wages.³ The employer's interest normally lies in the direction of a minimum labor cost, or maximum output per labor unit, and the employee

³ Cf. Robert Tressal, *The Ragged Trousered Philanthropists*, *passim*.

is controlled, under either the day or the piece system, by this interest. As we shall see, however, this is not the chief cause of the repression to which the constructive impulses are subjected in modern industry.

Gregarious impulses are also frustrated in some degree through the operation of fear. These impulses tend to bring together those who share in a common experience, and to foster the common interests growing out of this experience. Wage-earners in a given industry and, to a lesser degree, in industry at large, have this common experience and these common interests. But it is the policy of most employers to prevent their employees from organizing themselves into associations which would further those interests, or to hamper such associations in their activities, once they have been formed. And they are able in a great many cases to accomplish their purpose, for, owing to the competition between laborers for the available jobs (a competition fostered by the employers themselves), they can exercise their right to hire and fire in these premises with great effect.

Still other instinctive tendencies are inhibited through fear in one way or another. Offensive self-assertion on the part of managers and foremen would normally provoke fighting reactions were it not for fear of the consequences. So would the payment of wages deemed unfair, the imposition of excessive fines or penalties for the infraction of rules and, in fact, all the conditions of labor fixed by the employers which seem unjust or oppressive.

Even the sex and parental instincts, or impulses and interests derived therefrom, are indirectly inhibited by fear, under the prevailing conditions. The fear of unemployment, sickness, accident or a wage reduction, any one of which might entail suffering to loved ones at home,

represents a negation of that economic security which is requisite to the best family life. And as before intimated, fear tends to deter the workingman from combining with his fellows and taking measures calculated to alleviate this insecurity, and to bring him such increments of income as would allow a higher standard of living for his family.

That the worker's acquisitive impulses are repressed throughout is obvious. Although not a specially conspicuous element in working-class psychology, the frustrations to which these impulses are subject have a considerable significance for our problems. We are concerned here, however, with these and other impulses only in so far as they are dominated by fear tendencies, and the acquisitive impulses, while more or less directly repressed through fear, are more immediately subordinated to other impulses that are dominated by fear.

We may say on the basis of this analysis that fear largely dominates the behavior of the modern workingman, except in so far as he has built up protective defenses against those contingencies which he has learned to fear. Expressed differently, fear exercises a hegemony over the other instinctive impulses of the workingman so far as they have reference to his vocational interests, save where they have been released from this thralldom by the protective defenses with which the worker may have fortified himself. Fear thus plays a powerful rôle in the life of the present-day laborer. As before stated, fear will always play a part in human relationships, because, human life being what it is, events will always occur which entail suffering or unhappiness, and the anticipation of such events will normally excite fear in one form or another. And if, as may be assumed, the existence of any efficient social organization implies the employment of sanctions

against acts deemed anti-social, fear will always be a social force of no mean importance.

But an excessive use is made of fear in the case of the workingman, and this has results which are unfortunate, considered from a social point of view. For under this fear psychology the upbuilding tendencies of the workingman are not utilized as they might be, and particularly the tendencies associated with the gregarious, self-assertive and constructive impulses. This fact has perhaps no very great significance for a naturalistic interpretation of the labor problem, except that a recognition thereof will tend to enlist the efforts of impartial onlookers in movements aiming at a better utilization of these upbuilding tendencies. Intellectual leadership is thus recruited for these movements, and this, of course, represents an accession of strength not to be discounted.

Fear and Industrial Conflict.—Hobbes says, in the passage quoted, that flight is not the sole property of fear, but that fear leads men to "provide so that they may not fear," and that they "secure themselves by flight indeed, and in corners, if they think they cannot escape otherwise; but for the most part, by arms and defensive weapons." Fear thus impels people to guard themselves against that which they fear. Now, escape and other instinctive responses associated with fear do not serve to protect the workingman against the contingencies which he fears. He must have recourse, in Hobbes' phrase, to "arms and defensive weapons," or, better stated, to a defensive organization upon which he may rely, but organization, be it observed, which is necessarily of a militant character.

The contingencies which the laborer fears are functions, so to speak, of that industrial system and its associated legal and political institutions to which the laborer

finds himself subjected. That system with its associated institutions becomes the target of attack, therefore, upon which the laborer's militant organization directs its fire. And because of the number, the intensity and the persistency of the laborer's fears his struggle against that system and its associated institutions is resolute, intense and persistent in proportion, and will necessarily continue to be such so long as the conditions which provoke those fears shall prevail. Since the conditions against which the laboring man battles are derivatives of a single organization, which is manned by a more or less coherent body of people, the laborer finds it possible to concentrate his power in a unified organization also (although he has not always realized this possibility).

With the development of the struggle between the two classes, other instinctive tendencies become conspicuous in the behavior of the laboring group, particularly the self-assertive, pugnacious and gregarious tendencies, and together with the fear tendencies dominate further developments in the situation. But the analysis of these other tendencies in relation to our problems must await its proper occasion further on.

Now, as labor organization develops, and partial victories are won through its agency, the laborer begins to realize his strength, fear loses for him something of its volume and intensity, something, too, of its pathological character, and the other instinctive tendencies become more and more potent in the motivation of his behavior. But the fear of which the laborer divests himself is appropriated, so to speak, by the opposing party. With the growing strength of labor organization, and the efficacy which it proves itself to possess as a "defensive weapon," the capitalistic group sees its supremacy challenged, as also the privileges and perquisites which go with that suprem-

acy. The minimum program which labor in the position occupied will entertain is incompatible with that supremacy, or at least with the autocratic form thereof which has flourished in the past. Capitalistic supremacy is therefore seriously threatened. This in itself excites fear on the part of the capitalist group, and provokes counter-attacks aimed at putting down the growing revolt of the labor group. That fear increases and the fighting organization of the class is perfected and extended as the suspicion arises that the laboring group may be satisfied, ultimately, with nothing less than the overthrow of their class as such. The pugnacious, self-assertive and gregarious tendencies of this class receive a new emphasis, and are now specially directed toward the suppression of the rising revolt against their power.

A conflict is now on in good earnest, a conflict which engenders and sustains the fear, hate, assertiveness, pugnacity and loyalty to a cause which characterize every open struggle between large groups of men. Fear is excited afresh in the members of the laboring group as the combative energy displayed by the other side indicates the possibility of its own eventual defeat. There are on both sides the ups and downs of feeling which attend the varying fortunes of war everywhere. Under the stress of these conditions both sides are apt to become bitter and implacable, and resolved to fight the issues between them to a finish. And the party which dreads change is apt to become reactionary in its attitude, while the side which insists on change is apt to become radical in its demands.

Whether this struggle will end in a compromise or, differently stated, in a fairly stable equilibrium of the opposing forces will depend, among other things, on the ultimate aims cherished by the two groups, and on the resources in men, money and organization which they can

bring to bear on the struggle. The conflict might conceivably terminate in some form of "industrial government," or in such a legal recognition of "property in the job" as Professor John R. Commons advocates.⁴ It might, on the other hand, terminate in the complete ascendancy of the capitalist class, or in the overthrow of that class by the labor group. Other alternatives are pressing for consideration. This question is one, however, which we are not now in a position to consider. But let us bear it in mind.

Fear and Government.—We could make a corresponding analysis of the rôle played by fear in the obedience of a country's citizens or subjects to that country's government. But the governmental problems with which we are concerned will be considered at some length in another place, and we shall do no more here than indicate the general bearing of fear tendencies on these problems.

We shall not concern ourselves with what might be called the necessary rôle of fear in the maintenance of "law and order." That observance of law and respect for government are secured in part through sanctions against unlawful acts, including revolt against constituted authority, is recognized by every one. These sanctions are potent because of the fear which their contemplation excites.

We have a different situation when the government seems unjust or oppressive. Official injustice and oppression, or what appears to be such, connotes a repression, more or less serious, of powerful instinctive tendencies, and this may provoke defense reactions of the kind already analyzed. Such rebellion would, in its turn, provoke

⁴In conversation and correspondence with the writer. Professor Commons is now actively engaged in the advocacy of unemployment prevention and insurance, which he regards as partial legal recognition of a property right in the job. Cf. his article, "Unemployment," *The Survey*, Vol. XLVII, 1921, pp. 5-9.

punitive measures on the part of the government, and we should then have a more or less sustained conflict of some sort between governmental and revolutionary parties. How serious the struggle became would depend on the nature of the issues at stake, the potency of the instinctive tendencies aroused on the two sides, the resources which they severally could bring to bear on the struggle, and whatever capacity for rational adjustment of the dispute the parties thereto might possess.

The political problems with which we are concerned have special reference to conflicting class interests. Now, the government cannot stand aloof from any serious conflict between classes, as legal questions are involved at almost every point in such a conflict, and these must be dealt with by governmental agencies. Moreover, one or the other party to the struggle will sooner or later invoke the coercive power of the state to restrain, subdue or hamper its opponent. We may assume, as a general working formula, that the action of a government in situations of this sort will be the resultant of the various pressures brought to bear on it. But two opposing economic classes will very rarely be able to apply equal pressures to governmental agencies, and we may therefore expect the action of the government to incline in the direction of those interests which can bring the greater pressure to bear. It should be obvious, without naming it, which of our two classes answers to this description. It is, of course, the class variously referred to (depending on the speaker's sentiments) as the "ruling class," "master class," "dominant class," and the like.

From the viewpoint of our problems, then, governmental action may be regarded as a function of social and economic power, taking this term in a broad and inclusive sense. This assumption will be qualified, and supported

as thus qualified, in due course. But it will serve the purposes of our analysis at this point.

Attitude of Labor Toward the Government.—Now, the class whose interests (based on common experiences) have brought it in opposition to this dominant class will in time regard the government as being on the whole an ally of the latter, especially where issues between the two classes are in question; and it will eventually react against the government in much the same way as against the dominant class itself. The subordinate class, it need not be said, will go in this direction with a good deal of hesitation, reluctance and misgiving, and it may be that the issues between the two classes will have been fought out before the government has suffered any serious discredit in the minds of the subordinate class.

Two circumstances in particular tend to preserve the credit of the government. First, the government will be seen to represent all classes fairly well in an important group of its functions, as, for example, in matters pertaining to education, sanitation and defense against external aggression. Second, the government has, from the start, an enormous prestige which tends to absolve it from hostile criticism. This prestige rests on those fundamental political traditions accepted by the masses and officially represented by the government, as also on the claim, supported by powerful suggestioning agencies, that the government stands throughout for the entire social group.

We need not enter into a detailed analysis of the fear tendencies in relation to the government's part in this struggle between capitalist and labor groups. Because of functional differences the struggle between government and labor will necessarily differ in many respects from that between capital and labor, but it would not be particularly enlightening to identify these differences here.

We must point out, however, in leaving this topic,

that, in so far as a subordinate class comes to distrust its government, the "principles" upon which that government is based will be discredited, and should the class come into power, a radical revision of those principles, as also a reconstruction of governmental machinery, may be expected. For it will have been seen that those principles were not incompatible with the oppression of their class, or what was deemed to be such, and that the existing machinery of government did not operate to protect their class against injustice. Moreover, there will have been developing alongside this disillusionment respecting the government and the principles which it purported to represent, more positive ideas of how a government should be organized and how it should function; and these ideas will tend to prevail should the class come into power.

If it is utopian to anticipate a time when class divisions cannot arise in society, then we are justified in saying that every political philosophy and every form of government which may hereafter be established are apt to decline and be replaced by other principles and institutions more acceptable to the new classes which may have come into power. This does not mean that the old will have contributed nothing to the new. On the contrary, it will probably have contributed the more substantial part of the new. But the old will be taken up into a new synthesis, effected under the impulsion of the new interests which shall have triumphed over, or absorbed, the old.

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CHAPTER VI

REPULSION

"THE impulse of this instinct is, like that of fear, one of aversion, and these two instincts together account probably for all aversions, except those acquired under the influence of pain. The impulse differs from that of fear in that, while the latter prompts to bodily retreat from its object,¹ the former prompts to actions that remove or reject the offending object."² The original excitants of the tendency seem to be foul odors, distasteful substances, and slimy or slippery objects in contact with the skin.³ The range of the objects affected by this tendency is, however, extended by association, resemblance and analogy⁴ to include almost any act, opinion, sentiment or trait of character which we strongly disapprove.

The significance of this tendency for our problems, while not equal in importance to that of fear, is nevertheless considerable. If it be true, as McDougall claims,⁵ that disgust, the emotional concomitant of the instinct, enters into the complex emotions of scorn, contempt, loathing and hate, then it plays a not inconsiderable rôle in class antagonisms, as these sentiments often characterize the attitudes of employers toward their employees and manual laborers generally, and, in less degree perhaps, the attitude of wage-earners toward their employers and the employing class in general.

¹ But see Chap. V.

² McDougall, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

³ McDougall, *loc. cit.*

⁴ McDougall, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 130-140.

These sentiments are more conspicuous in the worker's attitude toward the conditions of his labor. According to a recent writer, one of the "peculiar elements [in the worker's psychology] is his aversion, his constant and almost irrepressible disgust for the mechanical, oppressive and dehumanizing nature of the daily function. This fact cannot be over-emphasized. No reiteration is too vehement to express the hopeless feeling of loathing for the machine and the monotony that it forces upon the workers—the constant drilling of an unchanging motion, a never-ending repetition that destroys all interest and kills all creative effort. This feeling of hatred is doubly strong because it is constant and for the worker infinite and without escape. It is a hatred born of instinct and not of understanding or analysis. The analysis and understanding may come later and supply the reasons for revolutionary temper and enthusiasm. But with the average worker—conservative and radical—it is an instinctive resistance against suppression of the freedom for play, for interest, for creativeness."⁶

Similar sentiments may also be recognized in the repugnance (which might be called æsthetic) of many sensitive people toward a social and economic system under which so much disorder, misery and oppression are to be found, and which they believe to be responsible for these evils. The significance of such sentiments for an objective analysis of the labor problem is not to be minimized, for it is among people who share these sentiments that the intellectual leadership of the movement is largely recruited.

⁶ Frank Tannenbaum, *The New Republic*, July 7, 1920.

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CHAPTER VII

PUGNACITY

MCDougALL has insisted¹ on the fundamental rôle played by the fighting instinct in social evolution, and Stanley Hall has emphasized² the part played by anger, the emotional concomitant of the instinct, in the life of the individual. This tendency seems, in fact, all but coterminous with human life itself, for if, as we shall see, any obstruction to our activity is apt to excite it, almost any significant situation has the possibilities of arousing it.

Thorndike has distinguished specialized fighting reactions for different types of situations, such as "being interfered with in any bodily movements which the individual is impelled by its own constitution to make, the interference consisting in holding the individual," "an animal of the same species toward whom one has not taken the attitude of submission and who does not take it toward him," "the mere presence of a male of the same species during acts of courtship," and the like.³ A more useful account for our purposes is that given by McDougall, who holds that the condition of the excitement of this impulse is "any opposition to the free exercise of any impulse, any obstruction to the activity to which the creature is impelled by any one of the other instincts. And its impulse is to break down any such obstruction and to destroy whatever offers this opposition. This instinct thus presupposes the others; its excitement

¹ *Op. cit.*, Chap. XI.

² *American Journal of Psychology*, Vol. X, pp. 516-591.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 68-73.

is dependent upon, or secondary to, the excitement of others, and is apt to be intense in proportion to the strength of the obstructed impulse." ⁴

This definition must be qualified, however, to allow for escape reactions (accompanied by fear), for the voluntary submission of one person to another, where a fighting response might have been expected, and for circuitous methods of attaining the end of the obstructed impulse in lieu of a frontal attack on the obstruction itself. These types of response, however, are not always to be regarded as possible substitutes for a fighting response, but oftentimes as only the triumph of rival tendencies for the time being. Where such is the case, the fighting impulse tends to recoup itself, for its temporary defeat, on some other occasion when the circumstances are more propitious. Again, it happens that possible rival tendencies are themselves frustrated by the given conditions, and a fighting reaction is virtually the only response available to the organism. As we all know, an animal, when cornered, is likely to fight, while under other circumstances the response would have been one associated with fear.

Some additional preliminaries, and we shall discuss the bearing of this tendency on our problems. Says McDougall: "The races of men certainly differ greatly in respect to the innate strength of this instinct; but there is no reason to think that it has grown weaker among ourselves under centuries of civilization; rather, it is probable . . . that it is stronger in the European peoples than it was in primitive man."⁵ Very few would now be disposed to challenge this assertion, after all the devastation of recent years, wherein the tendency in question has been

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 62.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 285.

so conspicuous. And there are no grounds for believing that it will be weaker in any future period with which we can reckon.

There are important sex, age and family differences in fighting tendencies, but these differences are perhaps pretty evenly distributed among the different classes of the population, and the differences in one class might therefore be taken as balancing those in another. Even if we assume, with Veblen, that fighting tendencies in the capitalist group are stronger than in the labor group, the latter certainly have sufficiently potent fighting tendencies to bring them into conflict with the former, and to make this conflict interesting both to the capitalists themselves and to dispassionate students of the labor problem.

Fighting Tendencies in Society.—Of greater significance for our inquiry are the various modes of expression manifested by the fighting tendency under different social and physical environments. "Its modes of expression have changed with the growth of civilization; as the development of law and custom discourages and renders unnecessary the bodily combat of individuals, this gives place to the collective combat of communities and to the more refined forms of combat within communities."⁶ In a society like our own, therefore, the tendency in question will not usually express itself in primitive personal encounters, but rather in a struggle between groups whose interests are not altogether harmonious, in attacks on social and political institutions thought to frustrate important interests, and in scientific and other controversies having no immediate political consequences. It is also manifested in athletic contests, business and professional competition, and a more or less friendly rivalry, in a great

⁶ McDougall, *op. cit.*, p. 285.

variety of matters, between individuals, groups and entire communities.

This deflection of the fighting tendency from its original modes of expression must be borne in mind. Most of the situations which, under primitive cultural conditions, led to personal encounters have been brought under social control and are now so effectually inhibited by legal, moral and religious sanctions that they offer little or no problem. The long list of acts declared in penal and moral codes to be torts, crimes or wrongs, and accepted by the community as such, represent the territory conquered by organized society from the fighting and associated impulses operating in a crude primitive manner. More refined expressions of this impulse in the domain of personal relationships there still are and always will be, but such will enter into our problems only in an indirect manner. Men are brought into personal conflict now mainly through their group relationships. But when the antagonism between two groups comes to the point where it takes on this primitive personal turn, the struggle may become incomparably more bitter and uncompromising than it was before. All this amounts to saying that personal conflict is now *organized*, for the most part, and has reference to the group divisions in society.

Fighting Tendencies and the Labor Problem.—Let us consider now the bearing of the fighting tendency on our problems. As we have seen, many powerful tendencies are repressed in the laborer through fear. Constructive, acquisitive, self-assertive, sex, parental and gregarious tendencies are all repressed, to a serious degree, through fear inhibitions of one sort or another. Even the fear tendencies are repressed, as escape from the situations which excite them is not easy, if indeed it is possible at

all. The fighting tendency itself is repressed. What will a man do in such a situation?

He cannot run away from it, for the situation is too ubiquitous for that. He cannot attain the ends of his thwarted impulses in a roundabout way, for he must hold a job of some sort or his family will starve. Habit and dread of the unknown deter a great majority of laborers from attempting to better their circumstances in a new country or a new occupation, and those who make such an attempt usually find the same conditions prevailing in the new situation as in the old. They are still dependent on a job. But holding a job, under the circumstances assumed, entails all the repressions we have indicated. Escape or other impulses which might triumph over the fighting impulse are thus ruled out. The laborer, in short, is *cornered*. And he will react as all men react when cornered. He will fight.

Take a single element of the situation, the distribution of the product, or money income. Under a price régime where the satisfaction of almost every instinctive impulse (or the interests into which these impulses are organized) depends on the money income at one's disposal, the struggle over the distribution of the product becomes one of unparalleled intensity. What before had been a number of local or special struggles, so to speak, are now concentrated on a single issue corresponding to a number of issues in the earlier period. Add to the repression of instinctive impulses, due to inadequacy of money income, that entailed by the working conditions themselves, as analyzed in our discussion of fear, and you have a damming up of powerful impulses which is apt to involve the most fateful consequences.

Development of the Conflict between Capital and Labor.—The fighting on the labor side, at first of a defer-

sive nature, takes on a more confident and aggressive tone, as the group develops cohesiveness and partial victories reward its struggles. Counter-attacks by the opposite side serve both to reinvigorate those fear tendencies which played so potent a rôle in the origin of the struggle, and to develop in the labor group a class-consciousness, a herd spirit, a morale, which brings its fighting efficiency up to a high level. The outcome of the struggle will depend on a number of factors already indicated, the detailed consideration of which must be postponed till a later stage of the inquiry. We must content ourselves here with the observation that in such a situation as we have described, appeals for a rational, dispassionate consideration of the issues involved are apt to fall on ears deaf to the plea. A few men have the capacity of getting outside their own personal or class bias and of viewing their interests in relation to the interests of others. And a larger proportion of men could be trained to take such a view. But it is certain that under existing conditions those who can do this constitute a very small proportion of the population. Men as at present born and brought up in the world are literally incapable of taking an impartial view of their interests and of considering them in relation to the total complex of interests of which they are part. Interests are only the organization, under the given social conditions, of our instinctive impulses, and if, as we have assumed, interference with these impulses evokes a fighting response, it follows that any sharp opposition of interests will normally bring men into conflict.

This is not to say that the fighting impulse will always express itself in struggles between classes, or against social institutions. Indeed, we can conceive an organization of society in which the impulse would operate in

behalf of society as a whole, in overcoming obstacles to the attainment of social well-being, or in rendering positive services benefiting the entire social group. But it is as certain as anything can be that such a social organization is not for our age, and that so far as present problems are concerned it may be regarded as an impracticable ideal. The present social organization carries with it so many injustices, inequalities and oppressions, and these make themselves felt as such to so many men suffering from them, that any hope of these men being seduced away from their own personal and class struggles to fight for humanity at large is chimerical. The fighting impulse has in the past been concerned with the immediate to such a degree that only for a few gifted persons is such a sublimation as William James spoke of possible.⁷

For if our definition of the fighting tendency be correct, its impulse will be directed, as a rule, against those obstructions which thwart other impulses, or the interests which are derived therefrom. Men are not going to cease overnight fighting for those things they care for most, and fight thereafter only for things about which they care a great deal less. While it is true that a certain outlet for the fighting tendency may be provided in the form of athletic contests and other improvised competitive activities, it would be idle to hope that the laborer's animus against conditions which defeat his most cherished interests can be assuaged in this way. The obstruction of any impulse is apt to arouse the fighting tendency, and the impulse thereof will be directed against that particular obstruction, not against other obstructions which one might hope to substitute for it.

⁷*The Moral Equivalent of War*; reprinted in *Memories and Studies*.

What significance has the fighting tendency for our governmental problems?

As we have pointed out, governmental action is apt to incline in the direction of dominant economic interests, and, in so far as this is recognized to be so by the subordinate class, its reaction to the government will be similar to its reaction against the dominant class. The latter has been analyzed already, and that analysis may be taken to hold, *mutatis mutandis*, for the worker's reaction against the government. But let us emphasize again the point there insisted upon, that, while a powerful tradition in favor of established political institutions may and does deter men from engaging in open revolt against their government, yet in so far as the conviction gains ground that the government has aligned itself on the side of an opposing class, the disadvantaged party will direct its attacks against the government itself. Similarly, but at a later stage in the struggle, the validity of those principles upon which the government is based will be called in question, and a more or less radical revision thereof demanded.

That the fighting tendency draws to the side of a subordinate class many whose personal fortunes would not identify them with this class is obvious. If, as McDougall claims, anger, the emotional concomitant of this impulse, is one of the two emotional constituents of moral indignation⁸ (tender emotion, associated with the parental instinct, being the other), the fighting tendency plays an important rôle in all movements for the emancipation of an oppressed class. The motivation of many who have come into the labor movement from the outside is thus to be understood. Moral indignation also

⁸ *Op. cit.*, pp. 77 et seq.

plays a large part, no doubt, in the motivation of the labor group itself.

Fighting Tendencies in Politics.—It remains to indicate the bearing of the fighting tendency on the processes of democratic government, considered independently of the labor problem. Close observation of our political campaigns should convince one, I believe, that the popular interest therein is more of a sporting than of a civic nature. And not infrequently political campaigns develop into serious struggles in which the most strenuous efforts for victory are displayed on the opposing sides. "Political struggles," "political contests" and other similar terms indicate a general recognition of this fact.

Closely associated with the fighting tendency, in political campaigns, are the gregarious and self-assertive tendencies, and whether a campaign will be conducted in a spirit of rivalry, more or less friendly, or in a spirit of anger or bitterness will depend on the particular rôles played by these several tendencies. Where the party, considered as a herd, is placed above state or country, also considered as a herd, the campaign will be in the nature of a contest between enemies. Where the larger group claims the prior loyalty, a spirit of rivalry will prevail, and there will be some attempt to consider the issues at stake from the standpoint of this larger group. Where party spirit is rampant, the assertion of one's self through one's party is desired as of a victor over a conquered enemy; but where party spirit is subordinated, a humiliating subjection of one's opponents is not demanded. No more is demanded than the voluntary acceptance by the minority of the majority decision, which is assumed to represent the entire social group. But the fighting impulse enters into all political campaigns and militates against a dispassionate consideration of the

issues involved. The same is true of gregarious and self-assertive impulses also, as we shall see later on.

Let us consider in more detail the bearing of the fighting tendency on this problem. Once a man wholeheartedly identifies himself with a nation, a class or a party, his fighting impulses are aroused whenever that group is attacked or threatened. As we all know, struggles between such groups are apt to annul differences within the groups themselves, at least for the time being, and to render their members impervious to criticism directed against their groups or the principles for which they stand. The Communists' retention of power in Russia is, in large part, to be explained thus, as also Germany's wonderful morale up to the closing months of the war. The same applies to party struggles in this country. True, political campaigns are really educative for many citizens, but not, in all probability, for the great majority. Who will venture to say that "dyed-in-the-wool" Republicans, or Democrats, have their opinions changed by any political campaign? Yet the majority of voters in this country are "thick-and-thin" supporters of the one party or the other. Each of them believes, of course, that his party as such can do no wrong, but this belief is not based on a critical study of the principles for which the party stands, but is determined by habit, tradition and suggestion, when not due to personal or class interest. The political campaign, far from undermining these beliefs, only serves to confirm and strengthen them. This it does by bringing to their support the powerful impulses associated with self-assertive, gregarious and fighting tendencies in human nature.

Even critical students of politics are motivated by these same impulses. Let one propound or accept a hypothesis, thus identifying himself with it, and his fight-

ing spirit is apt to be aroused whenever that hypothesis is challenged. He certainly will not be as disposed to give evidence on the other side its due weight. A classic illustration, drawn from another field, is the case of Darwin, who confessed that he had to jot down, lest he forget, evidence discovered which bore against hypotheses favored at the time. Instances could be multiplied, but enough has been said to make the point clear.

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CHAPTER VIII

THE SEX INSTINCT

AS EVERY one knows, the sex instinct is of the utmost importance in human life, being an essential part of the reproductive system, and for that reason potent beyond most other instincts. And so many vital human interests are related in one way or another to the sex instinct, or to sex differences, that sex motives are apt to be involved in every social problem of any complexity. It certainly is involved in the labor problem, as our previous discussion will have shown.

We shall not enter into the current controversies over the specific functions of the sex instinct in social life, but, taking a common-sense view of the matter, trace the bearings of the instinct, so regarded, on our problems.

We have already had occasion to discuss the indirect repressions of the instinct due to economic conditions. As we saw, the powerful interests associated with the family and the home are based fundamentally on the sex and parental instincts, although in so great a complex of interests all other instincts will be represented. Now, under the present social system, the family is generally the consuming, but not the producing unit, the latter being a larger aggregate of individuals, including members of many different families. This necessarily involves, and perhaps will always involve, a struggle over the distribution of goods produced by this aggregate. While it might also lead, and in fact does lead, indirectly, to contests between those in the same economic class over their respective shares, the struggle is mainly between those who have the immediate control over distribution, the capitalists or

entrepreneurs, and those whose incomes are determined or limited by this class. The latter include industrial wage-earners, farmers and renters. We are here primarily concerned with the problem of industrial wage-earners. Our present task is to show in some detail how the sex instinct enters into this problem.

The Sex Impulse and Standards of Living.—The compelling urge of standards of living, both those that are maintained and those more expensive standards which constitute the goals of endeavor, has reference more often to the family than to the detached individual. The struggle over the distribution of the product, and therefore in behalf of a higher standard of living, derives a good deal of its intensity, as a rule, from the fact that a better way of living is desired for those bound to us by conjugal and parental ties. This complex of motives operates also in the opposite direction. Men upon whose earnings wife and child depend are often made cautious by the possibility of wages being cut off for an indefinite period of time through participation in a struggle for an increased share of the product. Such self-imposed caution goes, however, with a repression or frustration of interests based on the sex and parental instincts, as also of the fighting, self-assertive and other impulses associated therewith. Such damming up of powerful impulses almost inevitably leads to determined struggles later on when the occasion seems more propitious or when it is impossible for these impulses to be repressed further.

Other repressions of the sex instinct entailed by the economic system should be noted. Men and women often become habituated to a comparatively high standard of living before the assumption of family responsibilities is contemplated, and unwillingness to lower their standard operates, in many cases, to deter them from assuming such

responsibilities, the income at their disposal being insufficient for the maintenance of their standard with these added responsibilities. Rightly or wrongly, the repression of sex and parental instincts which this entails is often blamed against the economic system, and tends to draw those concerned into movements aimed at a radical reconstruction of the system.

Moreover, sex and parental instincts are often repressed after marriage, on account of parents' unwillingness to bring children into the world whom they cannot rear in accordance with the standards which they have adopted. Or they may compromise by accepting a lower standard of living, and having more children, but this, too, entails the frustration of interests related to the two instincts.

Again, to maintain their standard, it may be a mere subsistence standard, the wife or mother is often obliged to supplement the husband's earnings by herself going out to work. This also, when the necessity is felt to be urgent, entails the repression or frustration of interests founded on the sex and parental instincts, and tends to affect the attitude of those concerned toward the economic system.

All these alternatives connote the inability of the individual, under the given circumstances, of maintaining for wife (or husband) and children that standard of living to which he (or she) thinks them entitled. While this does not always inhibit the sex and parental instincts in their primary forms, it does frustrate interests based on these instincts.

Repression of Sex Instinct in the Casual Worker.—

Another item of no mean importance must be added. Many industries are of a seasonal or casual nature, and depend for their labor force on casual or migratory workers. Examples are the specialized agricultural indus-

tries of California, and the great lumber industries of the Northwest.¹ The assumption of family responsibilities by these workers is exceedingly hazardous, if not impossible. Yet the majority of this group, perhaps, are disqualified by mental or moral defect of some sort from holding jobs which are compatible with family ties. Here, therefore, the sex and parental instincts are repressed altogether, so far as any normal expression thereof is concerned. As a matter of fact, however, perverted expressions of the sex instinct are quite common among this group of workers. The parental instinct seems to be repressed even more completely.

Now, add to the severity of these repressions, other repressions which this group suffers in common with other labor groups and you have a degree of repression from which serious consequences are likely to ensue. Already, as careful investigation has shown,² a large proportion of this group has espoused radical doctrines aiming at the overthrow of the system under which they suffer. The I. W. W. has taken advantage of this situation, and the casual industries have been a stronghold of that organization.

It should not be too easily assumed that the organization of men such as these can play but a feeble rôle in the labor movement. Similar elements played a very important rôle in the French Revolution and the events which followed, and there is no doubt that the leaders of the I. W. W. are preparing an analogous rôle for the casual and migratory workers in this country.

The Feminist Movement.—Any complete analysis of this question would include a consideration of marriage

¹ Carleton H. Parker, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, November, 1915.

² Carleton H. Parker, *loc. cit.*

customs and laws in their relation to the economic system, but this lies outside the limits of our inquiry. In all probability the inhibitions imposed on the sex and parental instincts by these customs and laws, however necessary they may be, have an important indirect influence on the attitude of many people toward the economic system. Marriage and economic institutions are integral parts of a single system of social institutions, and a program aimed primarily at the reconstruction of one group of these institutions will necessarily carry implications for reform in the related groups.

The so-called feminist movement, which is aimed primarily at the breaking down of those inhibitions on the sex and parental instincts which are deemed unnecessary and unreasonable, as well as at the general political and economic emancipation of women, does support at many points the radical movement for economic reconstruction, while the latter in its turn is on the whole quite sympathetic with the demands of the feminists. Moreover, a certain degree of affinity between the two movements is assured by the radical type of thought and sentiment shared by them both. There is consequently a tendency for the two movements to support one another in the furtherance of their several aims. But the feminist movement has only an indirect bearing on our special problems, and we may content ourselves, therefore, with this brief notice of it.

Sublimation of the Sex Instinct.—Finally, "sublimated" expressions of the sex instinct, if such there be, would have a certain significance for our problems. Although many writers claim that the sex instinct functions, in a sublimated form, in artistic, intellectual and civic activities, this hypothesis has not as yet been subjected to a thorough investigation. In any case, the

bearing of these alleged tendencies of the sex instinct on our problems would be rather remote, and we shall accordingly not attempt to determine just what it might be.

I would suggest as an alternative hypothesis, that these alleged manifestations of the instinct, where they are not directly related (and because of erotic motives) to sex interests, really represent, not a specific sexual energy, but a general organismic energy which might be diverted into one or several of many different channels. Artistic, intellectual and civic activities represent, I think, a number of original tendencies working in combination, and the constructive, inquisitive and gregarious impulses would seem to be more potent factors therein than is the sex instinct.

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CHAPTER IX

THE PARENTAL INSTINCT

WE HAVE shown how the repression of parental and other tendencies by modern industrial conditions has given rise to movements aimed at the establishment of conditions permitting a more normal functioning of these tendencies. We have pointed out also that tender emotion, the affective element of the parental instinct (which combines with anger to constitute the sentiment of moral indignation), draws to those movements many people whose personal fortunes or experiences would not alone identify them therewith. We must now consider this instinct somewhat more closely and trace out connections thereof with our problems which have not been touched upon hitherto.

Although "in its racial origin the instinct was undoubtedly primarily maternal," it is always present (save in pathological cases) in both men and women.¹ Moreover, the instinct must needs be specially powerful in the human species, for otherwise, with the prolonged infancy of the human young, the species would soon die out.

Social Expressions of Parental Impulses.—The original excitant of the instinct is the presence or behavior of one's own offspring, but "just as is the case in some degree with all the instinctive responses, . . . there takes place a vast extension of the field of application of the maternal instinct. . . . When we see, or hear of, the ill-treatment of any weak, defenseless creature (especially, of course, if the creature be a child) tender emotion and

¹ McDougall, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-72.

the protective impulse are aroused on its behalf, but are apt to give place at once to the anger we call moral indignation against the perpetrator of the cruelty.”²

Many authors, of whom Alexander Sutherland is perhaps the best representative,³ regard the parental instinct as the root of all altruism, while McDougall believes that moral indignation (tender emotion plus anger) is the foundation of all justice and the greater part of public law. It is probable, as we shall see later, that gregarious tendencies are of equal potency with the parental in the genesis of moral sentiments and in the motivation of one's efforts in behalf of one's fellows, but it is unquestionably true that the parental instinct is at the root of much if not all our disinterested activities in behalf of others.⁴

The question might arise, in view of these facts, whether parental impulses do not tend to deter from injustice those in a position to profit by it. Coming to our own problems, how does the parental instinct function today in fostering just and humane relationships between economic classes?

It certainly motivates much activity on the part of reformers, both moderate and radical, in behalf of what they conceive to be oppressed groups or classes. But it is no less powerful in the case of many classed as oppressors by these same reformers. The most cursory survey of temporary conditions, however, is enough to demonstrate its unfitness to cope with social problems that are at all complicated.

The reason for this is not far to seek. For the great majority of people the parental impulse is aroused in behalf of others not intimately related to them only by

² McDougall, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-77.

³ *Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct.*

⁴ Cf. McDougall, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-82.

suffering actually witnessed or depicted so graphically as to arouse sympathies not particularly active, as a rule. Even when the misery attributable to the relationships of the present order is realized by well-to-do people, they are incapable, as a rule, of searching out a remedy, or even of recognizing movements which might provide a remedy. For the impulse to accomplish much in the way of fundamental reforms, it must be combined with a vivid imagination, a genuine intellectual interest in the issues at stake, a real capacity for searching out solutions, and a determination to keep at the task until the requisite changes have been effected. This combination of qualities is a rare one.

Parental Impulses and the Labor Problem.—The increasingly effective regulation of children's and women's labor might seem to belie this conclusion. But these and other similar cases come under the rule already indicated, which allows for the effective regulation by organized society of situations not difficult of realization for the average man or woman. The remedies for situations such as these are fairly *obvious*, and social organs may deal acceptably with evil situations the remedies for which are obvious. The remedies being obvious, they will command the requisite popular support.

Solutions more difficult to grasp have fewer chances of adoption. The average person can master them only with great effort and, not mastering them, they are rejected as new and strange. The persistent instruction which might bring the average man to an understanding of such issues is out of the question, since the facilities for instruction—the schools, newspapers, etc.—are largely under the control of people who are opposed to any fundamental modification of the *status quo*.

Those profiting by social inequalities have smaller

chances than others of being moved by parental impulses to remedy the suffering entailed by these inequalities. Nursed in a class tradition justifying the dominance of their class to its own benefit, bearing a primitive dislike toward the class which has so often seemed refractory, insolent or inferior, the parental instinct finds other directions in which to function than in improving the position of that class. For much the same reasons a nation at war is rarely moved by the sufferings of women and children in the enemy country.

Add to all this the fact that most of the instinctive impulses in the members of a dominant class (as represented by their interests) would be obstructed, at least for a time, by any fundamental change in favor of a subordinate class, and the chances that the promptings of their parental instinct in behalf of this class will be effective are so small that, so far as the class at large is concerned, we may leave them out of account. Moreover, the normal reaction of the class to parental promptings of this sort on the part of others not so biased will be one of determined opposition. We have, so to speak, the organization of all the instinctive impulses (as interests) battling against the possible extension of just one of them to a class of objects, an oppressed group, which, because it is not the primary object of the instinct, makes a comparatively weak appeal.

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CHAPTER X

ACQUISITIVENESS

Most psychologists are agreed in assuming original tendencies toward acquisition and ownership (here considered together), although an eminent economist has questioned the existence of either.¹ An analysis like that of Ordway Tead's,² however, shows pretty conclusively that a sense of proprietorship, whether or not it has a specific instinctive basis, is one of the most potent factors in modern economic life. We should also have to admit a tendency to extend one's proprietorship over greater and greater quantities of the things which gratify the sense of proprietorship.

Tead's analysis has the merit of proposing answers, based on his own observations, to the questions raised by Graham Wallas³ concerning the modifiability of this general tendency (assuming there is such), and the possibility of expressing it otherwise than through the possession of property. Tead's general answer is that the tendency may be gratified, in most cases, by "enough control over property to permit us the use of it" rather than by the possession of it *directly* and *permanently*. This conclusion is supported by some striking evidence drawn from the author's observations of the behavior both of propertyless wage-earners and of propertied men of business.

We shall assume this view of the facts to be correct, and take it as the starting-point of our own analysis. The collecting and hoarding tendencies in children, and miserli-

¹ Taussig, F. W., *Inventors and Money-Makers*, pp. 81 *et seq.*

² *Instincts in Industry*, Chap. V.

³ *Human Nature in Politics*, pp. 36 *et seq.*

ness and kleptomania in some adults, warn us, however, against discarding as non-existent or unimportant a tendency to *acquire* and to retain the *possession* of material things. These latter tendencies could, however, be subsumed under the concept of a tendency to acquire and retain control of things which are, or are imagined to be; useful.⁴ Corrections in terms can be made by those who prefer to consider the problem under the more familiar category of ownership or possession.

Acquisitive Impulses in a Capitalistic Society.—The tendency to acquire and retain control over useful things is, then, to be the topic of the discussion. The significance of this tendency for our inquiry could scarcely be overestimated. To realize its full significance, however, we must understand the peculiar functions devolving upon it under a capitalistic economy such as ours. In a society organized on a coöperative basis the tendency would be far less important, from the standpoint of individual well-being, than in a capitalistic society. For in a society of the former sort communal provision of living necessities might take the place of individual acquisition and ownership. But in a society based on competition and private property the tendency in question means almost everything from the standpoint of individual survival and well-being.

Recognition of this fact is found in the popular view of success. Success, in popular estimation, means "getting on in the world," and getting on means the attainment of a place in the economic system which brings in a comparatively large money income. Such place is identified, on different levels, with the possession of a com-

⁴I do not consider possible racial and other differences in the strength of these instinctive tendencies. I assume that they are sufficiently powerful in the human species generally to justify an analysis of the rôle they play in industrial life.

atively large amount of income-producing property, enjoyment of a comparatively exalted position as manager or professional worker, or the tenure of a well-d position in the army of industrial workers. These, therefore, constitute the goals of endeavor in our modern society.

Another consideration of cardinal importance is suggested by the fact that wants are normally insatiable. Certainly no attainable amount of wealth, however large, satisfies the average man in present-day society. Wants will probably ever be insatiable, but a society is conceivable where the wants satiable by material things could be entirely satisfied. Not so in our society. Veblen in his brilliant analysis⁵ of prevailing social standards has proposed explanations of this peculiarity in our present economy. The *easy* gratification of the self-assertive pulses, in the form of a conspicuous display of wealth, and, we might add, in the exercise of *unearned* power, seems to be the primary motive back of wealth-getting on large scale. But success in both is relative to the success of others, and no standard of display or of power attained by one rich man is beyond emulation by others. The consequence is that there is no maximum of wealth, or, to come, additions to which would not be useful for purposes of further competitive display or the further grandizement of power.

Doubtless we should have to add other motives if we wished to offer a complete explanation of modern business enterprise, especially motives derived from the so-called instinct of workmanship. In cases where these motives are dominant, wealth-getting takes on quite a different aspect, for wealth is not then employed as a means of easy gratification, but is sought as a means to, when it does not

⁵ Veblen, T., *The Theory of the Leisure Class*.

come as a by-product of, gratifications involving another sort of effort than that of mere money-making. Large-scale engineering enterprises would often be manifestations of this latter sort of motives. Again, wealth is sought as the *initial* condition of the gratification of wants, but not as the *sole* condition. A man interested in research or travel, for example, might first provide himself with an assured money income as the initial condition to the satisfaction of those interests.

The general economic insecurity of those not possessed of considerable wealth would constitute for them a stimulus to the acquisition and possession of wealth corresponding perhaps to the motives dominating the typical business man.

Hegemony of the Acquisitive Impulses.—It is clear, in view of these considerations, that under a money economy such as ours, the satisfaction of almost every instinctive impulse depends on the money income at one's disposal. This is no less true of gratifications where money provides only the initial conditions, such as scientific or literary activity, than of gratifications possible immediately from the possession of great wealth, such as competitive display or the enjoyment of financial or political power.

The acquisitive tendencies therefore minister to most other instinctive impulses by motivating efforts at the control of material conditions requisite to the gratification of the latter. As aforesaid, this is far more true of our own society than it would be of a society organized on a coöperative basis. For only on rare occasions, in modern industrial society, are substantial satisfactions afforded to a man's interests except by way of money expenditure. Such occasions there are, notably in times of war or other

public crisis, and these we must not fail to take into account. But such occasions are exceptional.⁶

Under the institution of private property, involving the parcelling out of the physical environment to individuals, together with capitalistic production and its specialization of services, and the existence of a large propertyless class dependent on money wages for the satisfaction of their wants, society is divided into distinct classes, each controlling in some degree, and independently of the others, a class of factors absolutely necessary to the production of the goods demanded by society. But the share of goods, and hence the satisfaction of interests, which the several proprietors of these factors will secure depend on the distribution of power among them.

An analysis of the distribution of power under the present system is outside the scope of this inquiry, but it will not be amiss to observe that the increase or retention of power by a person or class generally depends on a struggle of some sort with other persons or classes also desiring to augment or secure *their* power. Hence the struggle between landlords, laborers and capitalists is not concerned alone with the distribution of income, but also with the distribution of power. These issues are referable, in part, to acquisitive tendencies in human nature.

Special consideration must be given to the retention, as distinguished from the acquisition, of control over the

⁶ Consumers' goods provided by the community and accessible to all classes of people might seem to be an exception to this rule. But this provision represents money expenditure also, and, as such, it is closely related to problems of distribution. Let any marked increase in a public budget be proposed, and the taxpayers will, as a rule, be opposed to it. It is true that, because of the obscured incidence of tax burdens, the poorer classes are apt to favor increases in the kinds and amounts of the consumers' goods provided by the community. But we know that in reality they pay their full share of the bill.

means of satisfying wants or interests. Attempts to dislodge a person or class from the place occupied in the economic system meets with a more determined opposition than do efforts to defeat a proposed aggrandizement of power. That is to say, the struggle in defense of privileges already secured is far more intense than the struggle to secure new or better privileges. This is true as regards both the immediate distribution of income and the exercise of power over the process of distribution. The difference is to be explained mainly on grounds of habit, on the greater force exerted by standards of living maintained at the time than by standards it is hoped to attain.

What forms this struggle over the distribution of product and power will take is a topic more properly considered elsewhere. We are now concerned only to describe the rôle played by acquisitive and possessive tendencies in a capitalistic society. It would scarcely be too much to say that they occupy the *central* place in commercial and industrial activity and that, on the whole, they dominate other instinctive tendencies which, under a different economy, might be ascendant over them. This, if true, carries most important implications for the problems of our inquiry.

Any machinery devised by society for regulating the struggle over product and power will eventually be repudiated by any party to the struggle whose interests are consistently defeated thereby, and who would eventually conclude that this machinery was set up, or at least functioned, in the interest of an opposing party. Just these considerations explain in large part the growing distrust of existing political and economic institutions, despite their traditionary sanctions, and the growing strength of movements for their modification or abolition.

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CHAPTER XI

SELF-ASSERTION

UNDER this title we shall discuss behavior variously referred to as self-assertion, self-display, domination, emulation or mastery. Says Ordway Tead: "The kernel of fact about human nature represented by these names is the familiar impulse to rise above the dead level of humanity and be an individual. And they may connote an additional urge to impose one's self and one's will upon one's fellow-men."¹

Certain of these tendencies (for the terms employed are not exact equivalents) have already been treated, incidentally, in our discussion of other tendencies. It is mainly to provide the means of self-display in the form of a conspicuous consumption of wealth, and self-assertion through the exercise of political or economic power, that great wealth is sought and valued. This tendency therefore bulks large in the motivation of commercial activity today. Emulation or rivalry also, either apart from or in combination with the tendencies just mentioned, motivates much of the behavior of the modern business man.

Self-assertive or mastering behavior also enters conspicuously into the relationships between employers, managers and foremen, on the one side, and the employees of the rank and file, on the other. We here enter into considerations which bear vitally on the present inquiry. For self-assertive impulses are no less characteristic of wage-earners and others in subordinate positions than of

¹ *Instincts in Industry*, p. 86.

employers and others in positions of authority.² And the tendencies of the two often, and perhaps normally, run counter to each other and cause much of the antagonism between the two groups.

Two Types of Self-Assertion.—To avoid confusion, we must distinguish two sorts of self-assertion, as also of the various species thereof enumerated above. There is self-assertion that is offensive, and self-assertion that is inoffensive; a natural leadership which is not commonly resented, and a forcible subjection of others to one's will which is very generally resented; self-display which is obnoxious, and self-display which is quite unobjectionable; rivalry or emulation which is admitted to be fair, and competition which is denounced as unfair. It is the offensive self-assertion, the obnoxious self-display, the unfair competition, that breeds trouble in the world and sets economic classes against each other.

It is commonly felt that the more expensive standards of display in modern society are financed by wealth not earned by the spenders. This is believed to be true not only of conspicuous consumption made possible by the inheritance of great wealth, which obviously has no relation to the merit of the spender, but also, in less degree, of display financed by wealth accumulated by the spender himself. Whether rightly or wrongly, it is pretty generally held that single individuals cannot earn fortunes of the size accumulated by our American multi-millionaires. A comparison is made between the superfluity of these men, so often spent on an obnoxious self-display, and the want of many millions for the necessities and comforts of life. The contrast is taken to signify a senseless self-

²I do not imply that self-assertiveness is so pronounced in the typical wage-earner as in the employer. It is not unlikely that some of the differences between the behavior of the two are due to differences in the innate strength of this disposition.

indulgence for the few, and the denial of a legitimate self-expression to the great mass. It is not denied that many of these men who have acquired great fortunes did so through the aid of natural gifts of leadership, and the self-assertion growing out of such gifts is not resented; but the self-assertion growing out of colossal fortunes amassed through methods which, it is believed, will not bear scrutiny, is resented.

Self-Assertion Through the Standard of Living.—

These inequalities of wealth have another consequence significant for our inquiry. One's standard of living represents, among other things, one's scheme of self-assertion, or display. Where substantial differences in the standard, so regarded, are recognized, there is generally an endeavor on the part of those with a given standard to attain standards more expensive than theirs. This, of course, is a well-recognized phenomenon of social psychology. Now, great differences in standards, especially in countries where ideas of equality have become current, breed general discontent. For two reasons: First, the very expensive standards serve to set apart those maintaining them as a superior class, and relegate those lower down into a class deemed inferior, and the self-assertion of the superior class which this connotes, not coming from natural gifts of leadership, is resented. Secondly, despite this fact, those lower down in the scale strive to approach these more expensive standards, but in this they are, as a rule, disappointed. The resulting discontent is quite often translated into a condemnation of the system which entails so much inequality and unhappiness. Feeling thus engendered doubtless enters largely into the demands of laborers above the subsistence level for higher wages, and into popular demands for inheritance, income and excess profits taxes, for the curbing of private monop-

olies, and the like. It also probably motivates movements for the replacement of the present system by one promising a distribution of wealth having greater reference to personal merit.

Self-Assertion and Industrial Management.—Another situation in which the self-assertive tendencies of economic classes come into conflict is that of industrial management. The position of capitalists or directors of capitalistic production is in the nature of the case that of superior or master; the position of the wage-earner that of inferior or servant. The manager has the authority to hire and fire; to reduce or increase wages; to fix hours, speed and other working conditions; to make his will felt in a thousand ways that cannot be classified.

Where this authority is skillfully exercised, and especially when its exercise can be made to approximate or simulate real leadership, no difficulty results, as a rule. And if the employees are given opportunities to assert themselves in the suggesting of improvements to the management or in emulating other groups of employees in amount or quality of production, and if, added to this, hours, wages and working conditions seem to be fair, managers and men may work together for an indefinite period of time without any great amount of friction arising. If such a relationship prevailed in all industrial establishments, opposition between the two groups might not have arisen at all.³ This would not apply, of course, to those laborers who, despite such considerate treatment, believed, whether rightly or wrongly, that at its best the present system entails the exploitation of their class. We do not here raise the question whether the laboring class as a whole might be led to this conclusion, supposing that

³ Cf. Tead, *op. cit.*, Chap. VI.

all capitalist managers were wise in their treatment of the men under their direction.

The chances for an amicable understanding between the two groups would be vastly improved, in all probability, were the wage-earners granted an equal voice in the management of industry, especially as regards the immediate conditions affecting their employment. This result would follow even though, from the standpoint of radical critics, the exploitative character of the system remained the same. All these changes would connote the inhibition of the offensive sort of self-assertion on the part of managers, and the encouragement of a normal self-assertion on the part of wage-earners. This would mean that the self-assertive tendencies which might engender conflict between the two groups were systematically accommodated in a constructive, coöperative policy of industrial management.

Many students of the labor problem are pinning their hopes to such a program. They believe that the best solution of the problem is to leave the institution of private property and the contractual relationships between property-owners and wage-earners substantially what they are, and to work deliberately for a better organization of control, voluntarily adopted, in the individual factory or workshop.

How much sanction does an objective appraisal of the psychological factors involved afford a program of this sort? There is no doubt that it may be realized in establishments where the proprietors or managers have the wisdom and tact to carry it out. The inference from such cases that it might offer a general solution of the labor problem does not appear, however, to be borne out by a careful analysis of the psychological factors in the situation.

It is a commonplace of political discussion that very

few men in positions of authority will not, in some respects at least, abuse their authority. Translated in our terms, the average man, having the opportunity for it, will indulge in those species of self-assertion—mastering behavior, display, etc.—which are offensive to others. History records no instances of *classes* possessing great power who have not used that power in an offensive self-assertion at the expense of other classes *in* their power to some degree.

The question whether power *ought* to be so used, whether moral or religious sanctions are entirely devoid of deterrent force, is one we are not called on to discuss here. We do not question the value of inculcating a wise use of power. Such considerations are pertinent to the present inquiry only in so far as they affect the actual behavior of those possessing power. So far as a dispassionate inquiry can return an answer to the question, it compels us to believe that a class possessed of great power will always use it at the expense of others subject to that power. While this is less true of power acquired chiefly through natural gifts of leadership, it is true in some degree of that sort of power also. The natural leader is apt to be like the rest of mankind in this regard, despite the fact that his capacity for winning followers may make his exercise of power less offensive. Examples will occur to us all of men in the business world who have had a really devoted following, but who at the same time held the lash over others bound to them by ties of a far different kind.

Our conclusion must be that projects for a voluntary redistribution of power by those holding that power are based on a mistaken conception of human nature, and are, on that account, doomed to failure. Again, that I may

not be misunderstood, let me insist that there is no intention of denying a certain educational value to the advocacy of projects of this kind. And so far as they have such value, they will modify the actual course of events, but the outcome will be determined in the main by motive forces of a quite different kind. Probably ninety human beings in a hundred strive to increase rather than divide their power; and ninety out of a hundred will, in some of their relationships, use their power in a way offensive to, and likely to be resented by, others.

The class at whose expense power is thus offensively used, and in whose case a normal self-assertion is thereby denied, will sooner or later rebel against the class or group dominating over them in this wise. Whether their rebellion will result in the overthrow of the system making such an offensive use of power possible, together perhaps with the political institutions associated with that system, will depend on a number of factors the exact combination of which cannot be foreseen. It will depend, among other things, on the hold, in tradition, of this system and its associated institutions; on the possibility of relaxing the hold of this tradition on the class held in subjection as well as on others who might take their part; on the strategic positions which the opposing classes may occupy; and on the capacity of the two classes, and especially of the dominant class, for compromise in the interest of a fairly peaceful adjudication of the issues at stake.

If, however, powerful impulses such as these cannot be repressed for too long, the class in which they are repressed will sooner or later succeed in fundamentally modifying the system which entails that repression. This is possible under a money economy where many repressed groups monopolize skilled services vitally necessary to

the existence of society, provided these groups should be persuaded to use their power in behalf of their class as a whole.

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CHAPTER XII

SUBMISSIVENESS

THIS tendency is so closely coördinated with the tendencies just discussed that a detailed examination thereof will be unnecessary. It is usually called into play as a response to behavior of a self-assertive kind, unless such behavior provokes fighting or counter-self-assertive responses.

"Individuals in whom the tendency to submit is strong are more numerous than those in whom the tendency of self-assertion assumes influential proportions. Especially in industry do we see incontrovertible evidence that people desire to be led and to have aims and ends imposed upon them or at least defined for them. In fact, many people seem to derive a downright pleasure from being bossed. . . . To rest back upon the dictates of another is to most people one of the deeply satisfying experiences of life."¹

This account of submissive tendencies might seem to contradict the analysis set forth in the preceding chapter. This is not really so, however, as the author quoted is discussing voluntary submission, a correlative of natural leadership in the person to whom submission is made. This sort of submission or abasement, together with the corresponding type of self-assertion, or leadership, is requisite to any sort of stable social organization. It is self-assertion of the autocratic sort, and the abasement which rankles as an injury, that cause difficulties in the world. The author quoted goes on to say: "There is . . . a phase of submissiveness that is socially desirable and necessary; and there is a type of abasement that is appa-

¹ Tead, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

rently debasing. The instinct working out in one direction serves beneficent ends, working out in another it appears to block progress and independent developments."²

The task of social organization would then seem to consist, in part, of the arrangement of people into groups of natural leaders and equally natural, or willing, followers. It is a problem of great difficulty, whatever the circumstances, because of the tendency, everywhere present, for those in authority, natural leaders included, to indulge in the obnoxious forms of self-assertion. And these sorts of self-assertion are encouraged by both the voluntary and the enforced submission; and the more ruthless self-assertion of those in power enforces greater and greater submission until eventually, if the tension is not otherwise relieved, the breaking-point comes and violence ensues. Says Tead: "The most dramatic example of the dominance of self-abasement is the structure and character of our present system of producing goods—the essence of which is the control of production by capital-holders. It creates the master and servant, employer and employee, boss and gang, vested interest and landless proletariat relationship—a situation in which submission is at present essential to the earning of a livelihood. With absolutism of control in the ordinary non-union large-scale shop, corporations have been able to rely upon the meekness of disposition among workers to 'get away with' the rules imposed and the disciplinary methods used. When we recall that the management hires, promotes, fires, discharges, demotes, decides hours and wages without interference wherever it can, we must realize that 'the Nemesis of docility' is at hand. And what makes matters worse is that submission on one side fosters domination on the other until a theory has developed and

² Tead, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

is openly supported by many employers that a benevolent but firm despotism is the secret of successful factory management." ³

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³ *Instincts in Industry*, pp. 125-126.

CHAPTER XIII

CURIOSITY

TO BEGIN with a concrete definition of native curiosity or the inquisitive instinct, as it is often called, we may reproduce Thorndike's carefully worded formula: "Attention to novel objects and human behavior, cautious approach, reaching and grasping, the food-trying reactions of putting in the mouth, tasting and biting, general exploration with the eyes and manipulation with the hands are the responses which, in connection with the situations that evoke them, make up a large part of so-called curious behavior. The element not hitherto listed may best be named the love of sensory life for its own sake. Merely to have sensations is, other things being equal, satisfying to man. Mental emptiness is one of his great annoyers. We may justly picture the brain of man as containing many neurones, in connection with the sensory neurones, which crave stimulation—are in 'readiness to conduct'—though no immediate gratification of any more practical want follows their action. Man wants sense impressions for sensation's sake. Novel experiences are to him their own sufficient reward."¹

According to McDougall, this disposition is not one of primary importance to the individual, and it exhibits, for that reason, "great individual differences as regards its innate strength; and these differences are apt to be increased during the course of life, the impulse growing weaker for lack of use in those in whom it is innately weak, stronger through exercise in those in whom it is innately strong."²

¹ *The Original Nature of Man*, pp. 140-141.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 61.

Significance of Curiosity for Social Problems.—The significance of curiosity for our problems, while considerable, is not readily specified. We may regard it as complementary to native intellectual capacity and, together with training and other environmental influences, as determining the sort of use which will be made of intellectual capacities. Where strong curiosity is wanting, but little significant use will be made of intellectual powers, however much above the normal they may be.

The *direction* which curiosity takes is equally important. Every normal human being is curious to a degree, but in the large majority of people curiosity is directed toward the immediate, the personal or the sensational. Observation of the conversation in small groups or at larger social gatherings, or a consideration of the news emphasized by the daily press, should be sufficient, perhaps, to attest the correctness of this assertion. For any very significant use of intellectual powers—significant for problems such as ours—there must be added to the combination of strong curiosity in the right directions, plus intellectual capacity, a certain earnestness or energy in research. It is not uncommon to find people who are interested in, and able to master, complex social or other problems, but who are wanting in the earnestness or the energy—call it what you will—to make any decisive social use of their intellectual powers.

Now, the number of people who have these three characteristics—intellectual capacity, curiosity as to social and political problems, and the energy to think through complicated problems—are a very, very small proportion of those affected by these problems. But for a really intelligent grappling with such problems all these characteristics are necessary. And even these will not suffice, for

there must be environmental conditions favoring the development and utilization of intellectual powers.

Curiosity and the Labor Problem.—Coming closer to our problems, we may say that neither the dominant nor the subordinate class are conspicuous for independent thinking on social and economic problems. For one thing, the members of neither class can, as a rule, get beneath the preconceptions, the sentiments and the attitudes which their particular social and economic relationships have impressed upon them. There are, of course, exceptions in both cases, especially in the case of the dominant class, where there is the possibility of leisure for a real investigation of economic problems and a probability of their having received some training in scientific method. But these exceptions are so rare as to be conspicuous when they do occur. The attitudes, sentiments and conceptions upon which the thought and behavior of the two classes toward each other are based grow largely out of the relationships between the two; and because their desires and interests so often come into conflict, their sentiments and attitudes are apt to be compounded of fear, anger, self-assertion, and other emotional or instinctive reactions incident to this conflict. If it be true, as McDougall claims, that curiosity is not a disposition of prime importance, it could rarely be potent enough to counteract the reactive mechanisms founded on these primary, and more powerful, tendencies. How few employers understand, or have the capacity for understanding, that the reactions of their employees are literally bound to be what they are! The employees, of course, are just as devoid of understanding where the behavior of the employer is in question. Curiosity plays a comparatively feeble rôle in both cases, so far as any objective study of the relationships between the two classes is concerned.

Curiosity is probably more specific, more utilitarian, than most psychologists are disposed to believe. If we follow McDougall in defining an instinct (or tendency) as an inherited disposition to perceive and pay attention to objects of a certain class and to act in regard to those objects in a particular manner, then curiosity will often, if not generally, be associated with specific instinctive impulses. And when an impulse (or an interest into which it is organized) is interfered with, we may expect curiosity to function as an inquiry into the means of overcoming this interference. In other words, curiosity is largely canalized along the lines of impulse and interest, albeit in a few people it seems to operate in an independent fashion.

Curiosity on the part of typical employers and wage-earners will therefore become concentrated on their own personal (or class) interests, where it is not concerned with the immediate, the personal and the sensational in the world outside. The employer will be curious about the conditions affecting the success of his enterprise, the possibility of reducing labor costs, the means of securing docility on the part of his employees, and the like. Wage-earners, in their turn, will be curious as to the means of making their jobs more secure, the pay higher, hours shorter, working conditions better and themselves more powerful as against their employers. It is quite futile to expect that either can take a dispassionate view of the system under which they work and really understand the position of the other. Thought or reason will not be concerned here with the accommodation of the two groups of interests to each other—with such modifications of the system as would make this possible—but it will concern itself with issues more immediate, namely, specific bene-

fits or aggrandizements of the individual or the group in question.

Curiosity and Industrial Change.—Curiosity does function, in both cases, in the development of industrial processes and industrial organization. An enormous amount of activity is thus motivated. These changes are cumulative and combine, with other factors, in fundamentally modifying the economic system which fostered them. Curiosity thus plays a large rôle, indirectly, in the creation of class issues, however little it contributes to a settlement of those issues.

Curiosity does function, however, in the expert investigation of social and economic problems, and such investigation has its influence on the disposition of these problems. Economic groups have their intellectual leadership, and this leadership counts, first and last, for a good deal. A class occupying a subordinate position, for example, will sooner or later find intellectual leaders who will interpret its position to it, and press upon it a program of improvement. No one can fail to recognize the profound influence on the labor movement of Karl Marx, Sidney Webb and other intellectual leaders. Such men have been endowed with characteristics and favored by conditions which have made curiosity an effective motive in the world of politics.

It is *not* curiosity in the same sense that has given their work its effect. When it comes to the inculcation of new ideas on the rank and file, one cannot rely on a driving curiosity to carry men through an investigation leading to independent conclusions. The rank and file have not the curiosity, the intellectual capacity, the energy, the leisure and the training which, taken together, would qualify them for arriving at conclusions of their own. Their assent to the novel propositions advanced must be

secured through quite different processes. The general method is to simplify and translate in terms of daily experience propositions too difficult for the average man to grasp without such an exposition. Furthermore, a good deal of use must be made, in such an undertaking, of the suggestibility and credulity associated with the gregarious tendency. Once the propositions to be advanced can be associated with the herd to which one's audience belongs, the battle is all but won, for assent is then sanctioned by the herd, while dissent will be effectually inhibited. Needless to say, the very real problems raised by any radical program which may be proposed will not be fully understood by those on whom the realization of the program depends.

The methods of propagandists, whether radical, reactionary or moderate, will thus be adapted to the exigencies of the situations with which they are to deal. They will certainly not be the methods of the intellectual leader who formulates and expounds a program. The influences brought to bear will, for the most part, be what Graham Wallas calls the alogical, and for the very good reason that logical arguments will not do the work required.

Curiosity, then, when combined with the complementary traits and conditions specified, does function in the scientific treatment of social and economic problems, but it cannot be depended on to lead the mass of men to examine scientifically their own relations to these problems. This means that in the last analysis a rational politics is impossible, although a scientific treatment of political questions may have its effect. Science is powerful in this domain only by calling to its assistance didactic methods adapted to the intelligence and the experience of the group it is desired to reach, and bringing to

bear upon the members of the group the various alogical influences associated with gregarious and other instinctive tendencies.

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CHAPTER XIV

CONSTRUCTIVENESS

THE group of tendencies variously referred to as the instinct of contrivance, constructiveness or workmanship, or, more vaguely, as the creative instinct or impulse, is thus characterized by Veblen: "As a matter of selective necessity, man is an agent. He is, in his own apprehension, a center of unfolding impulsive activity—'teleological' activity. He is an agent seeking in every act the accomplishment of some concrete, objective, impersonal end. By force of his being such an agent he is possessed of a taste for effective work, and a distaste for futile effort. He has a sense of the merit of serviceability or efficiency and of the demerit of futility, waste, or incapacity. This attitude or propensity may be called the instinct of workmanship."¹

As a corrective to the too pronounced teleological implications of this conception, we may follow McDougall in saying that "for most of us the satisfaction of having actually made something is very real, quite apart from the value or usefulness of the thing made. And the simple desire to make something, rooted in this instinct, is probably a contributing motive to all human constructions from a mud pie to a metaphysical system or a code of laws."² Thorndike, although admitting the usefulness of a general concept of this sort, maintains that the tendency in question is "a complex of several sets of original connections and of their guidance by material and human surroundings. Chief among the former are the tendency

¹ Veblen, T., *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, p. 15.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 91.

to multiform physical and multiform mental activity . . . the satisfyingness of mental control and of human approval, and annoyance at being thwarted and at human contempt. Amongst the guiding factors are objects to be duplicated, ends to be gained and the human customs approving certain products of intellect or skill and condemning others. . . . This potent mover of men's economic and recreative activities has its tap-root in the instinct of multiform mental and physical activity."³

We need not attempt to settle the question whether there is a specific constructive instinct, but may assume, as the starting-point of our analysis, a more or less potent complex of tendencies, with an instinctive basis, to construct, contrive, order or arrange things, mental and physical. Viewed broadly, this complex tendency is closely related to curiosity and the intellectual abilities which function with it, as the more significant manifestations of the former tendency involve the solution of more or less difficult problems, as in the case of inventors who work for years on a single problem.⁴

The tendency in question is not directed to a specific end,⁵ but is involved in all human activity. Reflection on any sort of purposive activity will reveal the presence of such an impulse, which prompts and finds satisfaction in a certain orderly adaptation of means to ends, the failure or denial of which causes annoyance and discontent.

While invention and original thought are perhaps the clearest and most significant illustrations of constructive tendencies in operation, they are seen no less clearly in the activities of business men, skilled artisans and producers in general. These tendencies are probably potent in moti-

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 143, 144.

⁴ See Taussig, *op. cit.*, Chaps. I and II.

⁵ Cf. Taussig, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

vating the activities of all able men of business, being perhaps of coördinate importance, in their case, with the acquisitive and self-assertive tendencies. In so far as this is the case, it belies earlier crude generalizations which represented all industrial activity as motivated solely by the desire of gain, and points the need for a critical attitude toward current economic interpretations of social and political evolution.

Repression of Constructive Tendencies in the Wage-earner.—That this tendency is not so conspicuous in the activities of wage-earners, while it may be due in part to a lesser innate strength of the tendency, is generally conceded to be due mainly to modern industrial conditions.

Ordway Tead has offered a detailed analysis of the conditions which frustrate this tendency. According to this writer, the tendency "seems normally to manifest itself in conjunction with the possessive instinct. It may well be, therefore, that the thwarting of the sense of proprietorship explains why the workmanly tendencies are not more active than they are in the world of industrial manual labor."⁶

The same author suggests, further, that "the potency of this impulse is somewhat in proportion to the amount of the individual's physical and nervous energy," and that this condition largely fails in the case of workers "who have grown up in the mental aridity of a city slum or company-owned town, with little education, poor food, and long hours of work. . . . Devitalizing influences are in the ascendant and a call for creative workmanship would impose a burden which there is not energy enough to carry."⁷ Low pay, "since it causes lessened

⁶*Op. cit.*, p. 44.

⁷*Op. cit.*, pp. 45-46.

energy and harassing anxiety," has a like effect. It also reduces incentive.⁸

Furthermore, the "astonishing insecurity of employment" centers interest on concerns more vital to the workingman than the expression of his constructive tendencies. Obviously, desires growing out of these tendencies are not so imperious as the demand for food and other living necessities, and the fear which supervenes when these are threatened.

Again, "one reason why better work is not done is that workmen do not know how to do it," there being today a minimum of training in the skilled crafts. Often employers are "more interested in getting work done on the date of delivery than in its quality."⁹ Workmanship is sometimes indifferent because the employer is seen to be always "on the make," and "less interested in quality than in his own returns."¹⁰

Most important cause of all, perhaps, wage-labor is becoming more and more mechanical, and offers smaller and smaller outlet for impulses not satisfied by a monotonous repetition of the same process, but only by an intelligent adaptation of means to ends.

Finally, "there may be deliberately unsocial ideas at work in the minds of the workers," who may have become "converted to a destructive program for gaining constructive ends, or who may have become despondent, lazy, or irresponsible."¹¹

Taking all these conditions together, one is forced to the conclusion that constructive tendencies are today effectually repressed in a large proportion of wage-

⁸ Tead, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

⁹ Tead, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

¹⁰ Tead, *op. cit.*, p. 49. Cf. Robert Tressal, *The Ragged Trousered Philanthropists*, *passim*.

¹¹ Tead, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-51.

laborers. One could take up these conditions, one by one, and show that they are necessarily involved in the present system of production, with its emphasis on quantity of output, its specialization of services, its divorce of ownership from the thing produced, its propertyless proletariat and its antagonistic economic classes.

Possibilities of Improvement.—Certain of the conditions mentioned could no doubt be rectified without radically changing the system itself. There is no reason why the labor turnover should not be considerably reduced, hours shortened and living wages paid under a capitalistic system, and these changes would encourage greater attention to workmanship, were other conditions favorable. It is not certain, however, that even such moderate reforms will be generally introduced before the strains and stresses in the economic system have accumulated to the point where a radical reconstruction of the system is inevitable. Our analysis of the psychological factors involved tends to show that the outcome of present tendencies may be just such a revolutionary upheaval and readjustment.

The reforms under consideration, while they would make possible a better functioning of certain instinctive tendencies, would not provide much added outlet to the constructive tendencies. The mechanization of industrial processes is of the very essence of large-scale capitalistic production, and with the incentive to quantity output and low unit cost growing ever more potent, we cannot expect a reversal of the trend in this direction in behalf of human values not immediately translatable into increased profits for the capitalist entrepreneur. We may say, therefore, that even though all these other changes could by some magic be introduced in time to alleviate the situation, they would contribute but little to the solution of the problem

created by the mechanization of industrial processes. There can be no real outlet for constructive tendencies where no workmanly labor is offered. This analysis applies, of course, only to those industries which have become mechanized, not to the many, though a decreasing number of, industries which do offer an outlet to the tendencies in question. Non-mechanical labor is obviously the *sine qua non* for the expression of the laborer's constructive tendencies, and the prevailing methods of production offer such to an increasingly small proportion of manual workers.

Socialized Education of the Workingman.—At least three important proposals for the correction of, or compensation for, this deficiency have been made. The most famous is perhaps that of Jane Addams,¹² who proposes that industrial workingmen be taught the social use of the processes which they severally superintend, and the specific relationships of the individual workingman to the industrial system as a whole. It is Miss Addams' contention that the realization of the significance of these specific processes and relationships will redeem, so to speak, the mechanical labor itself from monotony, and do away with that sense of insignificance which comes from excessive specialization.

This proposal seems to be based on too idealistic a conception of average human nature. I cannot imagine many workingmen who had become educated enough to understand our complex industrial system remaining content with machine-tending or with such specialized processes, fast becoming typical, as tightening a certain nut on machines moving rapidly by on a carriage. Moreover, for a workingman to "see industry in its unity and entirety," and to have "a conception that will include not only himself and his immediate family and community,

¹² *Democracy and Social Ethics*, pp. 213 et seq.

but the industrial organization as a whole," would signify a more active imagination and a greater curiosity in regard to large social concerns than most workmen are endowed with. Workers who had the imagination, the curiosity and the ambition to educate themselves in the way Miss Addams speaks of would probably find more congenial employment than that of machine-tending.

This proposal implies, too, that the average workingman can be satisfied with "things of the mind" to a remarkable degree. The workmen whose constructive tendencies found expression in study and research would not long remain machine-tenders, whereas those, a great majority of the whole number, who could express these tendencies only through some form of manual labor would scarcely find a sublimated expression thereof in study and research. Miss Addams, it would seem, has overrated the curiosity and intellectual capacity of the average workingman.

The Distribution of Control.—A second proposal is that control over production be so distributed as to put a large measure of responsibility for the management of industrial enterprise on the rank and file of the wage-earners. The voluntary sharing of authority by those in authority has been considered already,¹³ and the chance for any considerable movement in this direction was judged to be but small. If such a movement could succeed, there is no doubt that considerable outlet for the worker's constructive tendencies would be provided. The planning of improvements in industrial processes and in working conditions would certainly be substantial expressions of these tendencies. But by far the greater bulk of the day's work would still be mechanical in character. Moreover, only a comparatively small proportion of

¹³ Chap. XI.

workers would have the initiative and the intelligence to suggest improvements in industrial processes already highly developed and specialized, and the extent to which working conditions might be improved through the initiative of the workers would be seriously limited by the competitive conditions of industry and by the profit-motives of the employer. The chief condition frustrating the worker's constructive tendencies would not be touched by changes such as these. This is the increasingly mechanical character of industrial processes themselves.

We can conceive a joint control of industry which would permit a solution of this problem. If employers and employees could agree to evaluate all industrial processes in terms of workmanship and other instinctive satisfactions, as also, of course, in terms of consumers' goods, and then carry out the improvements which this evaluation proved to be necessary, the problem would, of course, be solved. This would involve the discarding of certain types of machine processes altogether, the modification of other types, the adaptation of speed to the worker's physiological organization, and perhaps a general reduction in the length of the working day. If it were concluded, as would not unlikely be the case, that standardized quantity production should, in the interests of the consumer, be retained, then there would be a compensation in a greatly reduced working day, permitting the worker's constructive impulses to function in other directions.

This program would involve not only a detailed evaluation of industrial processes but also a general willingness to institute the reforms found to be needed. The obvious comment on this program is that its adoption and execution would connote the existence of an economic system quite different from our own. Typical owners and managers of capital could never "see" such a program, to put

it mildly, for their entire experience has accustomed them to think in terms of pecuniary gain, and this involves, among other things, the reduction of labor costs to a minimum, increased output, standardized quantity production, and these are all incompatible with such a program as we have described. The acquisitive impulses,¹⁴ as before pointed out, dominate the other instinctive impulses of the typical employer, and this program would run counter at every point to the impulses so organized.

Scientific Management.—A third and somewhat similar scheme is scientific management broadly conceived. Says Taussig: "The familiar schemes have too much of the mechanical and non-human element. They tend to treat the worker like a machine, not to develop the spontaneity of the living man. I can conceive a sympathetic as well as truly scientific study of the conditions of labor, of the apportionment of tasks to fit the bents of the various kinds of men, of the ways of enlisting the workman's instinctive interest in what he does,—search for an organization and management which shall at once increase the productiveness of industry and the attractiveness of labor."¹⁵

This scheme, like that just discussed, assumes the possibility of employers generally ridding themselves of the sentiments and attitudes impressed on them by the economic relationships which they represent, and taking a far-sighted, truly scientific view of the psychological problems involved in the management of their enterprises. Taussig says that "the current proposals [of scientific management] appeal to the average employer because

¹⁴ It may be more accurate to speak in such cases of *acquisitive interests*, in which innate acquisitive impulses play a conspicuous but by no means exclusive rôle. The contexts in which the latter term is used should, however, make its meaning clear.

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 71-72.

they promise to give him more output at less expense; in part also because they promise to out-maneuver the trade-unionists. For these same reasons they are bitterly opposed by the union leaders and doubtless also by the rank and file." ¹⁸ Such will probably be the reactions of employers to similar proposals in the future, and such the counter-reactions of their employees.

The inquisitive impulses and associated intellectual powers, together with the more disinterested attitudes based on the gregarious and parental impulses, are not powerful enough in the average employer to overcome the acquisitive, self-assertive and fighting impulses, and lead him to take an impersonal attitude toward the system under which he and those associated with him work. The employer's dominant attitudes are developed through his contact with a more or less refractory human material which often frustrates the expression of *his* instinctive impulses, and this fosters in him the various sentiments and attitudes we have analyzed.

Even granting that a scientific management of the kind Taussig speaks of could be generally introduced, it would not touch the main problem of mechanized industrial processes. Were this condition removed the capitalistic system as such would have ceased to be, for quantity output and mechanization of the industrial process are of the very essence of this system.

Effect of Repression on the Worker's Attitude.—We have still to consider the question of just what effect the thwarting of the worker's constructive tendencies has on his attitude toward his employer and toward the system which thus functions to his disadvantage. Probably only the more imaginative worker is *conscious* of any resentment or discontent on this particular score. Most workmen

¹⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 72.

are perhaps not consciously aware of any need for constructive activity, although they are conscious of the monotony and irksomeness of mechanized labor. The most important effect on the workers' attitudes is undoubtedly a certain irresponsibility which monotonous labor generates. Their *best* energies must be engaged if they are to entertain a genuine interest in and devotion to that in which they are engaged. They can have but small sense of responsibility or proprietorship for a business which means chronic monotony and fatigue, when it does not mean harsh or inconsiderate treatment by the management.

As the individual concern does not in any genuine sense *belong* to the worker, so the general industrial system is not the worker's system. The average worker's own thinking does not, of course, take him far enough to formulate this for himself, but his subjection to and repression by the system make of him a possible recruit to movements promising to replace it with one devised more in his interest.

To get a conception of the whole complex of attitudes generated in the workingman by this system, we should have to add to this irresponsibility for and lack of loyalty to the system, growing out of a repression of constructive tendencies, other repressed impulses already discussed—self-assertive, acquisitive, pugnacious, parental, etc.

Constructive Impulses and the Economic System.—We ought, in leaving this topic, to emphasize again the conclusion arrived at before, that the satisfaction of constructive impulses depends less on the money income at one's disposal than do most other instinctive impulses. Economic independence does, of course, allow a greater latitude in choosing one's occupation, but the types of occupation and the number of opportunities in the several

occupations are largely determined by the prevailing economy. In other words, constructive tendencies, for the great mass of people, must be satisfied in the *production* of wealth, rather than in constructive activities not strictly correlated with wealth production.

Production and consumption are, of course, not independent of each other. The impulses associated, under our economy, with the consumption of wealth have largely determined the development of the processes of wealth-production. Indeed, one of the most serious criticisms of our present system is that it is dominated by the pecuniary motives (associated with conspicuous consumption) of the business man.

Another consideration important for our problems is the potency of the constructive impulses in determining for many people the choice of a vocation, and their influence, in all probability, in the case of all. Other things do not have to be equal for a considerable proportion of mankind to choose those occupations which furnish the greater satisfaction to their creative or constructive impulses, and many will change their occupations time and time again in order to find one that furnishes the best outlet for these impulses. Such behavior, although manifested in the field of industrial production, cannot be made to square with a blanket "economic interpretation" of history.

In a society organized on a coöperative basis, constructive tendencies would doubtless play a close second to the gregarious tendencies in the motivation of economic behavior. Since, by assumption, such a society would be organized to promote the highest welfare of all classes in society, the profound satisfactions that come from the best exercise of the constructive impulses would doubtless

bulk large in determining the specific character of the industrial system.

Such a program may be based on an idealistic conception of human nature. But with the passing of industrial control into the hands of producers of all classes, and the economic security which it would be one of their first tasks to establish, interest would in all probability then center in the problem of organizing productive processes in such a way as to secure as many human satisfactions as possible. Machine production, the specialization of industrial processes, working conditions, length of the working day, provision for the employment of leisure time, would all be considered from the standpoint of welfare, and although irrational impulses in human nature would operate then as now to defeat any close approximation to a rationally conceived program of welfare, the animating principle which guided thought and constructive endeavor on these matters might be what we have stated.

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CHAPTER XV

GREGARIOUS IMPULSES

THE herd, or gregarious, tendency has been described as "the impulsion to be and stay with those of one's kind." We might add that it includes impulses, expressed in an infinite number of ways, to think, feel and act with one's kind.

This tendency is of the utmost importance to an understanding of political and economic behavior, and a somewhat extended analysis of it will on that account be justified. The work of Trotter¹ ought to be consulted by all who are interested in the subject, as he was the first writer properly to assess the far-reaching significance of the tendency, and to subsume under it a number of instinctive impulses not before coördinated in so fruitful a synthesis.²

The biological rôle played by this tendency in human evolution must be grasped if its influence in modern society is to be understood.

In the first place, this tendency appears to represent a variation analogous to, and as significant as, the transition from unicellularity to multicellularity farther back in the evolutionary series destined to culminate in the human species.³ In both cases, natural selection modified its rigor with respect to the simpler unit (the cell or individual) and operated in part on the larger unit (the multi-

¹ Trotter, W., *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*.

² Trotter's work has of course come in for a good deal of criticism, but such a synthesis as he proposes seems fully justified. The validity of the analysis in this chapter does not, however, turn on that question, since the specific traits subsumed under the gregarious tendency may be considered separately, if one prefers to do so.

³ Trotter, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-20.

cellular organism or the social group). It is obvious that an immense advantage accrued to the species whose members developed the trait of thinking, feeling and acting together. Eventually, the complex of tendencies designated as gregarious often gave a differential advantage of group over group, or species over species, which meant all the difference between extinction and survival. The behavior prompted by these tendencies "will be found not necessarily to favor the survival of the individual as such, but to favor his survival as a member of a herd."⁴

"The functions of the gregarious habit in a species may be broadly defined as offensive or defensive, or both. . . . The dog and the sheep illustrate well the characteristics of the two simple forms of gregariousness—offensive and defensive."⁵ This distinction, says Tead, "is not one which carries over into human groupings in any very hard-and-fast way. Biologically man's groups are normally more defensive than otherwise. But given the large defensive group, like a nation, in which protection from outside forces is assured, smaller groups will inevitably appear within to assert their own special interests."⁶

What specific mental traits does this tendency connote in the case of the human species? In other words, what modes of behavior actually constitute a human herd, and give it its value for purposes of defense and aggression?

Relation of Gregarious Impulses to Intellectual Attitudes.—One essential trait, it is obvious, is love of association with one's kind, or, stated negatively, the intolerance of solitude. "This intolerance," says Trotter, "is the cause of the mental fixity and intellectual incuriousness which, to a remarkable degree for an ani-

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 98.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 28.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, pp. 148-149.

mal with so capacious a brain, he [man] constantly displays. As is well known, the resistance to a new idea is always primarily a matter of prejudice, *the development of intellectual objections, just or otherwise, being a secondary process* in spite of the common delusion to the contrary."⁷

The author does not explain how it is that herd impulses act as a soporific to the admittedly great intellectual powers of the human, and this, if true, needs elucidation. I would suggest that the explanation is to be found in the relation of intellectual activity to the historical conditions of group survival. The intellect might be said to have two classes of functions: One is to serve as an organ of communication between the members of the group; the other is to serve, by way of solving problems, as an organ of adaptation to new or perplexing situations. The two groups of functions are, of course, bound up together, but a distinction between them should aid in a determination of the part played in social life by intellectual activity.

Now, during the incalculably long period of time when the human herd was beset on all sides by other herds of the same species, and by other animal species, both solitary and gregarious, the intellectual function of intercommunication was incomparably more important than the function of adaptation to *new* situations. While the latter class of functions were not entirely outlawed, even under the rigorous conditions assumed, they played but small part in determining the activity of the herd at large. Herd unity in action was the all-important thing, and innovative intellectual activity tended then, as now, to divide the herd, and was, on that account, more or less effectually inhibited. The point will become clearer as

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 113. Italics not in original.

the discussion proceeds. Here it is important to realize clearly the significance of the principle that the functions of the intellect are largely instrumental to objects defined by the gregarious tendency operating in a more or less irrational manner.

Group Domination of Conduct.—A second constituent trait of the herd tendency is the impulse to identify one's self with the herd in one's behavior. "The cardinal quality of the herd is homogeneity. It is clear that the great advantage of the social habit is to enable large numbers to act as one. . . . To secure these advantages of homogeneity, it is evident that the members of the herd must possess sensitiveness to the behavior of their fellows. . . . The original in conduct, that is to say resistiveness to the voice of the herd, will be suppressed by natural selection; the wolf which does not follow the impulses of the herd will be starved; the sheep which does not respond to the flock will be eaten. . . . Slightly more complex manifestations of the same tendency to homogeneity are seen in the desire for identification with the herd in matters of opinion. . . . Each one of us in his opinions and his conduct, in matters of dress, amusement, religion, and politics, is compelled to obtain the support of a class, of a herd within the herd. . . . In the individual mind there will be an unanalyzable dislike of the novel in action and thought. It will be 'wrong,' 'wicked,' 'foolish,' 'undesirable,' or as we say 'bad form,' according to varying circumstances. . . . It is . . . sensitiveness to the behavior of the herd which has the most important effects upon the structure of the mind of the gregarious animal."⁸

Suggestibility and Public Opinion.—One form of this sensitiveness to herd behavior is the extreme suggestibility of the average man. "It is of especial importance to note that this suggestibility is not general, and that it

⁸ Trotter, *op. cit.*, pp. 29 *et seq.*

is only herd suggestions which are rendered acceptable by the action of instinct. Man is, for example, notoriously insensitive to the suggestions of experience. . . . Anything which dissociates a suggestion from the herd will tend to ensure such a suggestion being rejected. . . . If the biological explanation of suggestibility here set forth be accepted, the latter must necessarily be a normal quality of the human mind. *To believe must be an ineradicable natural bias of man, or in other words an affirmation, positive or negative, is more readily accepted than rejected, unless its source is definitely dissociated from the herd.* . . . Man's resistiveness to certain suggestions, and especially to experience, as is seen so well in his attitude to the new, becomes therefore but another evidence of his suggestibility, since *the new has always to encounter the opposition of herd tradition.*"⁹

This credulity of man bulks large in the formation of public opinion by the press and other agencies of communication, and has the most vital bearing on the question discussed elsewhere,¹⁰ namely, what value should be attached to "freedom of discussion" in matters political. The opposition of herd tradition to the new bears on the same question, as also the related question whether a positive freedom of discussion is really possible.

These characteristics of the herd tendency illuminate another question closely related to those mentioned, namely, whether rational judgments on political and other questions affected by herd impulses are possible for any considerable proportion of people. This question is also discussed in another place,¹¹ but we may here indicate the general bearing of those impulses on the problem.

⁹ Trotter, *op. cit.*, pp. 32 *et seq.* Italics not in original.

¹⁰ Chap. XXVI.

¹¹ Chaps. XXV, XXVI.

"Direct observation of man reveals at once the fact that a very considerable proportion of his beliefs are non-rational to a degree. . . . If we examine the mental furniture of the average man, we shall find it made up of a vast number of judgments of a very precise kind upon subjects of very great variety, complexity, and difficulty. . . . The bulk of such opinions must necessarily be without rational basis, since many of them are concerned with problems admitted by the expert to be still unsolved, while as to the rest it is clear that the training and the experience of no average man can qualify him to have any opinion upon them at all. The rational method adequately used would have told him that on the great majority of these questions there could be for him but one attitude—that of suspended judgment." ¹²

"It is of cardinal importance to recognize that belief of affirmations sanctioned by the herd is a normal mechanism of the human mind, and goes on however much such affirmations may be opposed by evidence, that reason cannot enforce belief against herd suggestion, and finally that totally false opinions may appear to the holder of them to possess all the characters of rationally verifiable truth, and may be justified by secondary processes of rationalization which it may be impossible directly to combat by argument. . . . The opinion, in fact, may be hazarded that the acceptance of any proposition is invariably the resultant of suggestive influences, whether the proposition be true or false, and that the balance of suggestion is usually on the side of the false, because, education being what it is, the scientific method—the method, that is to say, of experience—has so little chance of acquiring suggestioning force." ¹³

¹² Trotter, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-36.

¹³ Trotter, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-40.

An important feature of the herd tendency, considered in this light, is its power of influencing *any* sort of opinion or behavior, however new it may be, which can secure herd sanction. And those controlling the agencies of communication can secure herd sanction for almost any sort of opinion or conduct, it matters not how revolutionary. The new opinion or mode of conduct gets itself accepted, despite the hold of tradition, by insinuating itself as sanctioned by the herd. The discredit into which many traditional public policies in this country have recently fallen is to be accounted for in this way. The tendency to accept a positive affirmation or denial, unless dissociated from the herd, explains, for example, the widespread acceptance of the claim, reiterated over and over again, that communists, I. W. W.'s and "reds" in general are disloyal to the country, and that the expression of their views constitutes a menace to our "free institutions."

On the whole, however, the herd tendency falls in with traditional modes of thinking and acting, where political questions are concerned. In other fields there is a tradition which favors change, notably the fields of science and invention, but not so in the domain of politics. This association of the tendency with the traditional in politics—in other words, with the *status quo*—would seem to offer a hopeless handicap to rational programs of reform that are at all radical. This handicap does not, however, make such programs altogether impracticable, as we shall see. It is true that every one must have the sanction of a herd, or group, in his social and political behavior, but there are apt to be herds or groups supporting any type of behavior congenial to the individual—ranging from the criminal gangs to the small coteries sharing an advanced philosophy or social program. The

significance of numerous groups or herds within the larger herd will be discussed at length further on.

Sensitiveness to Herd Emotions.—A third general characteristic of the gregarious animal is its sensitiveness to the passions of the herd, particularly primitive anger and fear. "These activities are by no means limited to the outbursts of actual crowds, but are to be seen equally clearly in the hue and cry of newspapers and public after some notorious criminal or scapegoat, and in the success of scaremongering by the same agencies."¹⁴ Many examples in contemporary political life will occur to every one. The hue and cry after pacifists, communists, pro-Germans and I. W. W.'s, and the war-time fear of German plots and conspiracies, are familiar instances.

Susceptibility to Leadership.—A fourth general characteristic of the gregarious animal is a remarkable susceptibility to leadership. "If a man is fluent, dexterous, and ready on the platform, he possesses the one indispensable requisite for statesmanship; if in addition he has the gift of moving deeply the emotions of his hearers, his capacity for guiding the infinite complexities of national life becomes undeniable. Experience has shown that no exceptional degree of any other capacity is necessary to make a successful leader. There need be no specially arduous training, no great weight of knowledge either of affairs or the human heart, no receptiveness to new ideas, no outlook into reality. Indeed, the mere absence of such seems to be an advantage. . . . The successful shepherd thinks like his sheep, and can lead his flock only if he keeps no more than the shortest distance in advance."¹⁵

This trait has no great direct significance for our prob-

¹⁴ Trotter, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

¹⁵ Trotter, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

lems, other than to emphasize the view discussed elsewhere, that the consideration of political and economic problems on their merits is not to be expected of the mass of people. The man who can express best the attitudes of the majority, and who can arouse their emotions most readily, will guide them politically, not the man who has a really rational polity to propose. This is not tantamount to saying that knowledge and understanding have no effect on political action. Science is brought to bear on the treatment of political questions, as the extension of the merit system, the service of experts on legislative commissions, and other similar developments demonstrate. These represent victories of rational thought over herd tradition and prejudice. On the other hand, traditional principles, such as freedom of contract and *laissez faire* in industrial enterprise, which represented, when first established, a real advance over the principles which they displaced, persist as dogmas long after they have ceased to apply to the facts of social life. In any case, current political issues are very largely settled on the basis of habit, tradition and class interest, and political leadership utilizes these forces rather than conclusions rationally determined.

Special Marks of Identification.—A fifth feature of the herd tendency is its dependence, for efficient operation, on the ready recognition by the herd of its members, and by the members of their herd. If we bring the herd impulse under our definition of an original tendency,¹⁶ the situation to which man, considered as a gregarious animal, responds is the herd to which he belongs; and his response is the imitation of herd action or submission to herd dictates. Since many herds grow out of common social experiences which are not determined by easily

¹⁶ *Ante*, p. 13.

identified hereditary characters (such as racial differences, for example), special marks of identification are necessary if herd action is to be prompt and decisive. These may be a special garb informally adopted by the members of the herd, a uniform, conventional insignia of one sort or another, or any other distinguishing marks easily seen and recognized.

Factors in Group Differentiations.—Of equal significance with the distinctive traits of the herd tendency are the *conditions* which divide mankind into distinct herds bearing toward one another varying relationships of friendship, hostility or indifference. We must acquaint ourselves with these conditions before we can understand political and economic groupings, and grapple with the problems incident thereto. As the most powerful herd or class in a society will eventually dominate that society, it is obviously necessary to understand the genesis of herds and their increase in numbers and strength.

Trotter suggests that sympathy between one person and another, and hence their herd fellowships, depends on "the extent of the intercommunication between the two."¹⁷ He says that "a man's interest in his fellows is distributed about him concentrically according to a compound of various relations they bear to him which we may call in a broad way their nearness. . . . The distribution of interest is of course never purely geographical, but is modified by, for example, trade and professional sympathy, and by special cases of intercommunication which bring topographically distant individuals into a closer grade of feeling than their mere situation would demand."¹⁸ Tead proposes a different formula: "The instinct of the herd will manifest itself most completely in

¹⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 122.

¹⁸ *Op. cit.*, pp. 122-123.

connection with the group which at the moment offers what appears to be the most urgently needed protection; and it will shift its attachment as the need for protection shifts. In the absence of any consciousness of the necessity for protection, the individual's behavior will be determined by that of the people with whom he associates."¹⁹

Neither of these formulas seems broad enough, and at the same time specific enough, to cover all cases of herd behavior, although they indicate groups of factors which are certainly operative. We would suggest that it is the sharing of a common experience which establishes sympathy between people and determines their group formations. The sharing of a common experience is, in turn, dependent on, or correlated with, one or more of numerous factors, including race, language, nationality, neighborhood, kinship, sex, age, religion, politics, economic or social class, vocation, etc.

Auxiliary Principles.—A number of auxiliary principles must be laid down before this general formula can be applied to our special problems. For the sake of brevity these will be set forth in categorical form.

(1) The strength and influence of herd relationships will be determined by the *volume and intensity* of the experiences common to the members of the herd. Experiences correlated with vocation, economic class, politics, race, language, religion and nationality are, for our problems, the more significant.

(2) Of different herds appealing to the same individuals that one will claim the prior loyalty which seems to further best the interests growing out of common experiences. (a) There may, however, be a more or less definite distribution of interests among various herds, each of which is supreme in the field assigned to it. (b) Where

¹⁹ *Instincts in Industry*, p. 133.

membership in a given herd *interferes* with the satisfaction of a vital interest, its appeal to possible members will to that extent be weakened.

(3) The herd appearing to represent historically dominant traditions will have an advantage over herds representing newer and less respectable traditions.

(4) The numerically larger herd will have the superior appealing power. This principle is closely related to that just enunciated.

(5) (a) The dominant herd in a modern society, through its control of the means of communication, will be able to represent its opinions and desires to be those of the society at large. (b) The opposing herd will, however, secure the adherence of a considerable proportion of those eligible to membership therein (on the basis of common experiences), although it can but rarely gain the support of those who, by virtue of their experiences, occupy an intermediate or neutral position.

(6) Herd groupings are not absolutely stable, but vary with shifting interests. The new groupings will, however, conform to the principles already laid down. Some of these will be of a temporary nature, while others will be more permanent, depending on the nature of the conditions which led to the regrouping in question.

These several principles could be justified in detail by evidence drawn from group behavior, but to avoid such a tedious analysis, and to get on with our investigation, it will be enough to apply them to the special problems under consideration. They will thus be subjected to the test of the relevant facts, and elucidated by the applications thus made of them.

(1) **Volume and Intensity of Common Experiences.**—The principle that the volume and intensity of common experiences determine the strength of herd relation-

ships is illustrated by, and helps to explain, the strength of craft unionism as against industrial unionism; the difficulty of integrating skilled and unskilled workers into one organization, or of winning over teachers and other "brain" workers to avowed working-class organizations; the obstacles which race, language, nationality and religion offer to the unification of working-class movements, etc. It also helps to explain the greater hold of the labor union on many of its members than that of their church, their political party or their state. The "class consciousness" of the wage-earning group, and its development into a militant organization are partly to be explained on the same principle.

(2) **Prior Loyalty and the Furtherance of Group Interests.**—This principle is closely related to that just considered. Working-class organizations often claim a prior loyalty because they appear to further best the interests common to their members. As allowed for by the principle itself, however, the labor organization could never lay claim to a prior loyalty in all things. In such matters as sanitation and fire protection, to cite clear examples, no labor organization would think of challenging the authority of the state. It is very different where wages, hours and working conditions are concerned, and because it is felt that the state will not protect the laborer's interest in these matters as effectually as will his own organization. Hence the opposition to compulsory arbitration of industrial disputes and to the regulation of wages, hours and working conditions by the government. The most determined opposition is, however, evoked when the position of labor as a group is attacked, and the existence and power of the labor herd as such are threatened. The bitter fights for union recognition, and against legis-

lation designed to hamper or cripple labor organizations, are thus to be explained.

The preference for direct methods of settling industrial disputes is, however, partly to be explained on other grounds. As we have seen, the gregarious animal is sensitive to the passions of the herd, particularly primitive anger and fear. Now, as will be abundantly clear by this time, both fear and anger are very conspicuous in the worker's reactions to his situation—fear of a multitude of ills excited by the general economic insecurity under which he labors, and anger at the obstruction, direct or indirect, of all his more potent impulses. Fear impels him to protect himself with "arms and defensive weapons"—with a fighting organization, that is, and anger, or the fighting tendency, prompts him to use these weapons against the obstructions which thwart his instinctive impulses. With the development of militant class organizations, the herd tendency becomes more potent, and serves to intensify both anger and fear until they find expression in overt action against the conditions which have excited them. As there is no escape from these conditions, fear and anger will eventually prompt to the same reactions. Escape tendencies themselves are obstructed, and this further provokes the laborer's fighting impulses. The confidence of an aroused fighting impulse presently triumphs over the cautiousness of fear, and sanctions a more aggressive policy of dealing with the situation in hand. The impulse of the fighting tendency is to attack *directly* the obstructions which have aroused it to action, and where this impulse has become dominant, through the sanction of the herd, direct methods will be preferred to indirect.

Often a given herd will fail to attract to itself people who are eligible to membership therein, because alliance

with the herd would interfere with some vital interest which demands satisfaction. Many people are deterred from joining labor organizations because they are afraid of being discharged from their positions, or otherwise penalized by their employers, or because they shrink from allying themselves with a class deemed *inferior* by society at large, including many of their own associates. Social recognition or advancement in a material sense would often be denied, and many persons who belong to the wage-earning class are deterred from identifying themselves with it for just these reasons.

This really means, in the last analysis, that the more urgent interests are expressed through membership in the herd opposed to labor. Any number of interests might, putting all cases together, be defeated by an alliance with the labor herd. In general, all those interests based upon friendly connections with the dominant class would be liable to suffer, and such interests are apt to be pretty substantial for those not definitely assigned by the nature of their vocation to the labor herd. Indeed, a large proportion of manual laborers themselves are so infected with "bourgeois" psychology that they scorn to identify themselves with a movement based on a frank recognition of their semi-servile status. That is much more true of those whose labor sets them apart from the manual-worker class. In this number would be included a large proportion of clerks, salesmen, teachers and "brain workers" generally. The class in power shares this idea, and through its domination of the agencies of opinion, but without intending it perhaps, keeps a large proportion of the wage-earning group infected with the same idea.

This obviously prevents "class-conscious" labor from attracting to its membership a large proportion of those who by economic status would be identified therewith.

The significance of this factor for the methods employed by labor in the realization of its aims should be obvious.

(3) **Historically Dominant Traditions.**—Our third principle means that those who represent, or who can successfully represent themselves as representing, historically dominant traditions get themselves accepted as the spokesmen of the larger herd, as against those representing or appearing to represent a newer and less respectable tradition. The old or familiar is that which is sanctioned socially, the new is that which is subversive of the old and which therefore goes counter to social sanctions. The new as a general rule is accepted only by a few, and is therefore opposed by the larger social herd.

The *status quo*, which is the old, has an immense advantage, therefore, over radical movements which are subversive of the *status quo*. Here, as elsewhere, possession is nine points of the law. In view of the fact that the class in power can, through its control of the machinery of communication, successfully represent its attitudes and opinions to be consistent with the old, whether or no they really are so, the propaganda of a radical group will have but little effect on those who instinctively respond to the mass suggestion brought to bear upon them through the machinery of communication. Such propaganda will be directed mainly, therefore, to those who have learned to discount suggestioning forces, and who can be convinced that a radical program is demanded in the interests of their group.

(4) **Superior Appeal of the Larger Herd.**—If the larger herd offers a stronger appeal than the smaller, then those who appear to represent the larger social group will have an advantage over those who seem to be in the minority. This is seen in the effect which appeals on behalf of the "public" have on labor leaders and, not

infrequently, on employers as well. Again, through their control of suggestioning agencies, the dominant class represents their own interests as being identical with the interests of the public at large. There not being enough counter-suggestion to neutralize these representations of the dominant class, the latter usually have a decisive effect, and, as pointed out, not infrequently with the labor group itself.

We may likewise explain, in part, the respect accorded to governmental agencies which, in many ways, do represent the entire society, but which represent also the interests of the dominant class to the detriment of the subordinate class. Again, a myth is sedulously cultivated that the government represents impartially all classes under its jurisdiction, and that it does not favor any one of these classes at the expense of the others. Only the more intelligent of the subordinate class can discount the volume of suggestion which supports this myth, and take an objective view of the government and governmental action.

Our fourth principle also helps to explain the temporary merging of herds or classes in times of crisis when the existence or the welfare of the entire society seems to be threatened. The familiar phenomena of war-time are thus to be understood. Capitalists and wage-earners then tend to sink their differences and subordinate interests which are normally dominant to the necessities, real or fancied, of the larger herd to which they both belong. These phenomena of war-time are also to be referred in part to our second principle, for the really common interests of antagonistic classes are for the moment so jeopardized, or seem to be, that all unite to repel the danger which appears to threaten.

The behavior of the pacifists may also be referred to

our fourth principle. It is the appeal of the larger world herd, as conceived through an effort of the imagination, to which the pacifists respond so whole-heartedly. The national herd has lost for them much of its appealing power, and humanity at large has taken its place as demanding the prior loyalty.

It is important to observe that such behavior constitutes an exception to the general rule that the mass of men are motivated by what they conceive to be their material interests. We shall find it necessary to qualify that rule still further, by purging it of the rationalistic assumptions which call for a one-to-one correspondence between economic interests and what might be designated as economic behavior.²⁰ Normally, however, men are largely motivated by their material interests. Not so in times of war or other public crisis, save for those in whose case, perhaps a minority, material interests still predominate, as with the "profiteers" who take advantage of their country's need to enrich themselves at its expense.

Expressed in psychological terms, the instinctive impulses of men, under a money economy, will be organized under the hegemony of the acquisitive tendency²¹ during normal times, except that fear plays perhaps a more potent rôle in the case of the wage-earner; while in times of war or other crisis involving the entire society, these impulses will be brought under the hegemony of the gregarious tendency. A "self-sacrificing" patriotism or a sincere and courageous pacifism represents just such a hegemony of the gregarious tendency. All the powerful instinctive impulses function in both situations, but the *syntheses* thereof are different and determine different types of behavior.

²⁰ See Chaps. XXIII, XXIV.

²¹ See Chap. X.

Two further qualifications should be noted. The gregarious tendency dominates the conduct of normal people at all times, in certain departments of behavior. Actions controlled by those parts of the prevailing ethical code which few or none seriously question are examples in point. These are given their power through the herd impulse. They *are* the voice of the herd and to it every one hearkens. "Conscience" is largely this voice of the herd speaking within us, and bidding us do or refrain from doing certain things enjoined or forbidden by the ethical code.

It does not follow that every member of the herd accepts the same ethical standards. Some few have rejected many parts of the prevailing code, and there are divergent ethical codes within the same society, so that the conduct controlled by the herd tendency is by no means homogeneous. But a great part of the behavior of all people in any given society is to be understood as determined mainly by the herd tendency enforcing the prevailing ethical code.

The other qualification is that the behavior of a small minority of people is dominated *mainly* by gregarious impulses. People who consistently subordinate their material interests to what they conceive to be the welfare of the entire social group come within this category. Many social workers, physicians, nurses, employers and labor leaders are of this number. The parental tendency is often, if not always, allied with the gregarious tendency in controlling the behavior of these people, and in many cases, no doubt, is the more potent of the two. In all such a hegemony of the gregarious tendency. All the hegemony with the mass of people, is distinctly subordinated to the social interests based on these other tendencies.

Many "socially-minded" persons, however, share

what Santayana calls the pathetic fallacy, which leads them to suppose that all the world might be made as idealistic as themselves. This fallacy has vitiated, as working philosophies of life, all the idealistic religions which have come down to us from the past. It vitiates the liberalist philosophy today.²² There have been, on the other hand, a few people of this class who have had imagination enough to see that they were not typical of mankind at large, and have aligned themselves, whether for good or ill, with those forces in human nature that must be depended on to get things done.

The economic behavior of the average man at normal times is controlled in part by the gregarious tendency functioning in the interest of society at large. The plane of competition, for example, has been considerably raised through the force of public opinion, so that business practices which formerly would have excited no comment are now effectually outlawed. In this case, society has been independent enough to develop and impose standards of conduct upon the class which normally dominates it.

This concession does not, however, invalidate our previous analysis. After, as well as before, the acquisitive impulses exercised a hegemony over other instinctive impulses. The gregarious tendency conditioned, so to speak, the leadership of the acquisitive, but did not displace it. Whether or not a society is possible wherein the hegemony of the instinctive impulses would fall upon the gregarious has been considered in another place. A significant social experiment is now under way, which is said to be based on such an organization of instinctive impulses.²³

²² See Chap. XXV.

²³ Cf. Lenin, N., *The Soviets at Work*; Goode, W. T., *Bolshevism at Work*, etc.

Should it be found possible so to organize society, the doctrine of economic determinism as we know it would have largely fulfilled its historic function, and would be replaced by one better adapted to the conditions prevailing under the new order. In general, the doctrine would no longer apply to behavior regarded from the standpoint of the individual, but it would apply to behavior regarded from the standpoint of the social group. Such a revolution in social relationships, were it possible, would represent a victory of the gregarious and other tendencies in human nature which make for harmony and solidarity over the acquisitive and other tendencies which make for division and conflict.

(5) Advantages Enjoyed by the Dominant Herd.—Our fifth principle is considered at some length in a later chapter ²⁴ where the principle of freedom of discussion is critically examined. Considerations not there adduced, however, will be in order here.

The principle as stated may seem to carry with it the implication that the dominant class *deliberately* and *unscrupulously* controls the machinery of communication in its own interest. No such implication is intended. Through the rationalizing processes spoken of by Trotter, the average person leads himself to believe that justice is on the side of *his* interests, and that something like infallible truth characterizes his opinions on political and economic questions. There is of course much deliberate falsehood among all classes, but it would be a prejudice to suppose that the members of the class in power are somehow more mendacious than others. Any competent observer who has associated with large employers of labor will have realized how sincere are their claims that labor leaders and radicals are wicked and unscrupulous, and

²⁴ Chap. XXVI.

that the present economic system is the best of all possible systems.

The machinery of communication is an *integral* part of this system, and naturally falls under the control of the class that dominates the system. This machinery *naturally* functions, therefore, in the interest of the dominant class. No special wickedness is needed to explain this fact.

The economic system is perhaps best regarded as a great complex of social relationships into one or another combination of which all the people who grow up under the system are inducted, each of them acquiring a set of attitudes, sentiments and ideas which are *peculiar* and, in some sense, *appropriate* to the particular relationships into which he is inducted. There is, of course, the possibility of going from one set of these relationships to another, but the set of relationships which one represents at the given time are apt to determine one's attitudes and sentiments toward the system as a whole. We have the complex of relationships represented by the employer, and a corresponding employer psychology; a complementary complex and psychology for the wage-earner, and indeed for all the specialized crafts, professions and occupations included in the system.

In the absence of a broad scientific training, persons inducted into any group of these relationships are apt to believe that the attitudes, sentiments and ideas more or less passively absorbed are absolutely valid, and to put down as fools or knaves those who disagree with them. Real thinking plays, of course, some part in all this, but competent thought is rarely manifested in an examination of the premises underlying the system of relationships we have spoken of. Where premises are questioned and critically examined, we have science and philosophy, but

scientists and philosophers are few in number, and we do not look for them among employers and wage-earners as such.

In the last analysis it is these divergent ideas, attitudes and sentiments which are so naïvely acquired that bring people representing different combinations of social and economic relationships into conflict. On a scientific view, therefore, no special maliciousness is needed to explain the attitude of employers and employees toward each other, or the use of the machinery of communication by the dominant class in its own interest. The behavior of them all is, so to speak, preordained by the system itself. Shift around the actors and put prospective capitalists in the place of wage-earners, or wage-earners in the place of capitalists, and we would have substantially the same result.

It is these different combinations of social relationships which produce, or, rather, constitute, social classes. It is, therefore, absurd to talk about the undesirability of class divisions in a society like ours. They are as inevitable as are chemical reactions in the world of matter, and must be dealt with as such. So is class conflict. It is essentially involved in the system itself, and it is as futile to talk of doing away with class conflicts in a society such as ours as of doing away with the tides.

Although the dominant class has an immense advantage, in its conflict with the opposing class (or classes), in its control of the machinery of communication, nevertheless it cannot prevent this class from increasing in numbers and power. The specific social and economic relationships which the wage-earners represent literally constitute them into a more or less hostile class. It is part of the object of this essay to show how this consequence ensues. We have already pointed out that the

dominant class will, in assuming to speak for the larger social group, prevent many wage-earners from identifying themselves with the labor group, and this we do not need to emphasize anew. Whether or not the class in power can prevent the opposing class from growing into a majority, so that political instruments might be employed in the furtherance of its interests, is also a question considered elsewhere. We may pass, therefore, to a consideration of our sixth principle.

(6) **Changes in Herd Groupings.**—We may lay it down as a working hypothesis that herd groupings will be as stable as are the social and economic relationships which produce distinct herds. The amalgamation of herds brought about by war or other public crisis will pass soon after the crisis itself has disappeared. And although a great war will have affected more or less fundamentally the system of social relationships prevailing when the crisis arose, it is futile to expect that the spirit of "self-sacrifice" manifested by all classes when the crisis was actually present will carry far over into peace time and motivate those large programs of social reconstruction which so many will have espoused during the period of the crisis.

The comparative fluidity of social relationships produced by such a crisis, and the opportunity it offers for the aggrandizement of power by economic classes will, however, serve to throw in relief the conflicting interests of those classes and tend to bring about a sharper class alignment, with a recruiting of strength by the fundamental groups from hitherto neutral or intermediate groups, and a greater determination to fight out class issues to a definite conclusion.

One could interpret the trend from craft toward industrial unionism as a herd regrouping determined by chang-

ing economic conditions, as also the tendency, recently become pronounced, for teachers and other wage-earners in the "intellectual" group to identify themselves with the labor movement. One may say, also, that economic changes which signify an improvement in the position of one class (as the employers, for example) will provoke compensatory reactions on the part of those disadvantaged by these changes.

The shifting of emphasis, in recent years, from political to direct methods has been due to a growing recognition that governmental agencies are and, indeed, must be aligned pretty definitely on the side of the dominant class. This recognition has made possible the dissociation of an increasingly large proportion of the laboring group from the herd recruited by the class in power and dominated by it, and which passed for so long as the "public," or state, that it commanded the prior loyalty of all groups in society, labor included.

This shift in emphasis from political to direct methods has greatly magnified the importance of those groups of labor which, like the miners, the railway and the transport workers, occupy a strategic position, and has, in fact, given to these groups a sort of hegemony over organized labor as a whole.

Not only, therefore, are herd groupings affected by changing economic relationships, but the methods employed by herds or classes in the realization of their aims are also modified.

Summary.—A summary of our discussion of the herd tendency would run the risk of overlooking important considerations which must be taken into account at a later point of the inquiry. The more salient points may, however, be passed in review.

One most significant result of the analysis is the

correlation effected between herd tendencies and an important group of intellectual functions. The individual is seen to have a strong instinctive impulse toward association and communication with his fellows, and toward identifying himself with the major groups to which he belongs, in matters of opinion. Credulity goes with this impulse, and affirmations, positive or negative, are normally accepted at their face value, unless definitely dissociated from the herd to which the individual belongs. The mind was shown to be largely an organ of herd communication, and in a lesser degree an organ of adjustment to new situations.

Consider the bearing of these conclusions on political questions. A scientific approach to political questions is obviously the very antithesis of that credulity which goes with herd impulses. The political opinions of the masses, therefore, are not to be thought of as scientific, or rational. The idea or opinion which is reiterated oftenest will be associated with the herd, and is therefore accepted by the members of the herd. Those in a position to put the greatest volume of reiteration behind their views will have those views prevail. They will be opposed by smaller herds who have become disaffected to some degree with the larger herd, through a realization that the machinery of communication itself creates this larger herd, and that it functions in the interest of the class which controls the machinery of communication.

But control of the machinery of communication will usually assure a majority to the class controlling this machinery, since, owing to the strength of the herd impulses, a large proportion of people will always be determined in their attitudes and opinions by the volume of suggestion brought to bear upon them. The political implications of this analysis are developed in another

place.²⁵ We may here state the conclusion arrived at there, that if the class controlling the machinery of communication can thus keep a majority on its side, then the opposing class cannot look to "majority rule" for the satisfaction of interests conflicting with those of the class in control. For a *legal* freedom of discussion will not give the opponents of the *status quo* that measure of control over the *means* of communication which could serve to bring them a political victory.

Another important outcome of the discussion is the conclusion that under a money economy, the instinctive impulses are necessarily under the hegemony of the acquisitive tendency, save in times of war or other public crisis threatening the entire social group. It was concluded, however, that in a society organized on a coöperative basis, hegemony of the instinctive impulses might pass to the gregarious tendency.

A further significant conclusion is that class divisions and class conflicts necessarily come of different people representing different relationships, or functions, in the economic system under which they live, and that it is therefore futile to talk of doing away with class struggles as long as any such system prevails. If the system evolves in such a way that a class powerful enough to challenge its validity should arise, then the system itself may be abolished or modified.

Many types of thought, sentiment and behavior affected by gregarious tendencies have not been explicitly discussed in this chapter, and these have a good deal of significance in themselves, and some bearing at least on our special problems. This is true of the attitudes, sentiments and ideals identified or associated with group loyalties of one sort or another. An analysis of such

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loyalties would identify the operation therein of many specific traits, including parental, gregarious, fighting, self-assertive, submissive and fear tendencies, habits or associations originating in group experiences, and reflective thought having more or less reference to group interests. Group loyalties so characterized are all but coterminous with human life itself, since practically all human interests have some reference at least to one or more of the groups constitutive of the given society. Needless to say, attitudes and sentiments coming under this general category may be very narrow or quite broad in their reference, the narrower motivating group conflicts on a more or less extensive scale, and the broader motivating a larger measure of social harmony. The types of behavior associated with group loyalties would have to be determined in all cases by a painstaking analysis of the situations to which they were the responses. The group loyalties most significant for our special problems have already been considered in sufficient detail, perhaps, though but little use has been made of that particular term.

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CHAPTER XVI

PLAY TENDENCIES

The Schiller-Spencer Theory of Play.—We shall not rehearse at length the historical theories of play, nor enter into any very extended discussion of questions under this head which are still unsettled. The Schiller-Spencer theory that play is an expression of surplus energy¹ cannot account for the specific forms of play, nor does it explain age, sex and individual differences in play activities.

It will be found, however, by consulting Spencer's own formulation of the theory, that it is not so defective as has been supposed. For Spencer did more than hint at the utilitarian value of play, which has been so much emphasized in later discussions; and he even laid it down as an important auxiliary principle that surplus energy is generally expended in the playful exercise of tendencies (faculties and powers he called them) which have been quiescent for some time. This latter principle comes very close indeed to the concept of repression which plays so important a rôle in psychology at the present time. The theory is defective in certain respects, as we shall see, but this does not detract from the value of the contribution made by these authors to the theory of play. Spencer at least was not purporting to deal in any exhaustive way with the subject, and improvements of the theory since he wrote were made possible, largely, by data not available to him at that time. Naturally, too, so complex a subject was bound to receive further illumination at the hands of later investigators.

¹ Spencer, H., *The Principles of Psychology*, Part IX, Chap. IX.

The Utilitarian Theory.—The next theory in order of historical importance is that propounded by Karl Groos,² and variously referred to as the utilitarian, practice or preparation theory of play. Groos' theory has the merit of doing full justice to the Schiller-Spencer theory, and of dealing with certain difficulties which seem to have been evaded or ignored in some recent discussions of the subject. In criticism of the surplus energy theory, Groos points out that surplus energy is not a necessary or universal condition of play, but that it is only a favoring condition. As he says, the theory does not allow for the fact that both children and adults often play to the point of physical exhaustion. This Groos himself explains by an "impulse to repetition" (an assumed physiological characteristic of the organism), and by the "intoxication of movement" which often results from the repetition of some movements, particularly where there is "the added influence of rhythm," a trance-like condition supervening which is alleged to be practically irresistible.³

As regards this specific problem, it may not be out of place to suggest that although an "impulse to repetition" may largely explain why play of certain kinds, as dancing, for example, is often continued to the point of exhaustion, the explanation in other cases would seem to lie in the nature of the instinctive impulses brought into operation. I should say that competitive games, for example, are so often continued to the point of exhaustion because of the operation therein of the fighting impulses. For it is probable that in the struggle for existence, where the fighting tendencies were given their specific character, sur-

² *The Play of Animals*, and *The Play of Man*, especially Part III of the latter.

³ *Play of Man*, pp. 366-369.

vival or advantage would often depend on fighting reactions continued for so long as the situation demanded, or until the point of exhaustion was reached. A similar explanation might be found to apply in other cases.

The central point of the Groos theory is that which explains play, particularly of the young, as preparation or practice for the serious activities of later life. Although admitting that the "life of impulse and instinct alone can make special forms of play comprehensible to us," Groos maintains that "play depends . . . first of all on the elaboration of immature capacities to full equality with perfected instinct, and secondly on the evolution of hereditary qualities to a degree far transcending this, to a state of adaptability and versatility surpassing the most perfect instinct." ⁴

Although this theory has special reference to the play of the young, it is held to apply to certain play activities of adults as well. Groos seems, however, to regard most adult play as an expression of surplus energy, or as recreation. The recreation theory, as developed by Lazarus and accepted by Groos, holds that "when we are tired of mental or physical labor and still do not wish to sleep or rest, we gladly welcome the active recreation afforded by play." ⁵ We must not forget in all this that special forms of play are explainable, according to Groos, by "impulse and instinct" alone. This explanation, it seems to us, is quite consonant with his general theory, and exempts it from much of the criticism aimed against it by recent writers. Groos rejects provisionally the theory now known as the Recapitulation Theory, on the ground that the Lamarckian principle of the inheritability of acquired

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 375.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 364.

characters, which is implied therein, has not been proved correct.

Before taking up the criticisms of Groos' theory from the standpoint of the Recapitulation Theory, let us record our recognition of the positive contribution which he has made to this subject. Although, as we shall see presently, many play activities of the child cannot be deemed preparatory to the serious activities of later life, unless the term preparatory be taken in a broader sense than Groos intended it, yet it is obvious that many play activities of children are susceptible of such an interpretation. For it is through the child's activities, most of which perhaps are of a playful nature, that his original tendencies are developed and knit together. Motor coördinations of all sorts, as also the more specific adaptations of the child to its physical and social environment, are effected for the most part through play activities. This may be regarded as one phase or period in that continual reorganization of original nature of which we have spoken. And play activities may be regarded, in another sense, as preparatory to the activities of later life. The child must develop somehow, or he would always remain a child, and we are justified in assuming that his development normally takes a more or less determinate course. And that course of development, on its mental side, must comprehend the playful activity which is so characteristic of all children. This playful activity may be regarded as a necessary developmental phase of the child's life, in just the same way as phases through which the embryo passes are to be regarded as necessary developments of the uterine period.

The Recapitulation Theory.—But although Groos explains specific forms of play by impulse and instinct alone, a supplementary theory is needed to account for

sex, age and individual differences in play tendencies. This seems to be provided by the Recapitulation Theory.

G. Stanley Hall may be regarded as the leading advocate of this theory, although he has been ably seconded by Gulick, Patrick and other writers. The controversial tinge which the theory usually takes on is to be accounted for by the relation which it bears to the utilitarian theory. We cannot do better perhaps than let this theory speak for itself in the words of its own representatives.

"True play," says Stanley Hall, "never practices what is phyletically new, and this, industrial life often calls for. . . . I regard play as the motor habits and spirit of the past of the race, persisting in the present, as rudimentary functions sometimes of and always akin to rudimentary organs. The best index and guide to the stated activities of adults in past ages is found in the instinctive, untaught, and non-imitative plays of children which are the most spontaneous and exact expression of their motor needs. The young grow up into the same forms of motor activity, as did generations that have long preceded them, only to a limited extent, and if the form of every human occupation were to change today, play would be unaffected save in some of its superficial imitative forms. It would develop the motor capacities, impulses, and fundamental forms of our past heritage, and their transformation into later acquired adult forms is progressively later. In play every mood and movement is instinct with heredity. Thus we rehearse the activities of our ancestors, back we know not how far, and repeat their life-work in summative and adumbrated ways. It is reminiscent, albeit unconsciously, of our line of descent, and each is the key to the other." ⁶

"This theory of play," says Patrick, "is the only one

⁶ *Adolescence*, Vol. I, p. 202.

that has successfully attacked the specific problem of accounting for the form taken by children's play."⁷ "The plays most dear to the hearts of boys are running, jumping, climbing, coasting, skating, wrestling, wading, swimming, boating, fishing, hunting, shooting with darts, spears, arrows, or guns, building bonfires, robbing birds' nests, gathering nuts, collecting stamps, eggs, beetles or other things, flying kites, digging caves, making tree houses, spinning tops, playing horse, playing marbles, jackstones, mumblepeg, hide-and-seek, tag, blackman, prisoner's base, leap-frog, baseball, football, tennis, cricket, golf, etc. Children of all ages have the greatest interest in pet animals, dogs, cats, rabbits, birds, horses, etc. . . . To these plays should be added, of course, the countless indoor games, such as checkers, chess, cards, dominoes, etc. These children's plays have so little in common with the later pursuits of adult life that it is evident that some quite other theory is needed to explain them than the practice and preparation theory. When the boy is grown to manhood he will not be found doing these things, except in his hours of relaxation. . . . He will be found cultivating the soil, harvesting his crops, shoveling dirt, sand, or coal, blasting rocks from quarries and minerals from mines, building houses, buying, selling, manufacturing or transporting goods, teaching school, healing diseases, preaching sermons, engaging in politics or commercial transactions, giving lectures or conducting scientific research."⁸

Such plays as those specified must be explained on the Recapitulation Theory, says Patrick, although he admits that the imitative plays of children bear a closer resemblance to adult activities, and that the Groos theory is less

⁷ Patrick, G. T. W., *The Psychology of Relaxation*, p. 46.

⁸ Patrick, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-38.

strained in its application thereto. Neither Hall nor Patrick seems to give sufficient weight to the cultural determinants of children's plays, for all games at least were transmitted by previous generations, when not a product of recent invention. This objection does not apply, of course, to such activities as running, jumping, climbing, wrestling, swimming, nut-gathering and the like. Although games are to be understood, in part, as products of the past, the persistence and popularity of games transmitted by the past must be explained on the ground of their adaptability to original tendencies. It would seem, therefore, that we must invoke some such theory as that advanced by these writers to account for many play activities of childhood.

It is possible, as we shall see, to view all play as merely the expression of original tendencies which are operative throughout life, and thus obviate the necessity of assuming special tendencies which function only in childhood. Fortunately, we are not obliged to take sides on this question, as the play activities significant for our inquiry may be referred to original tendencies whose existence neither party to the controversy would question. We should note in passing, however, that the Recapitulation Theory is not outlawed, as many have supposed, by the acceptance of the neo-Darwinian view that acquired characters are not inherited. For one could hold, on this view, (1) that the forms of play peculiar to childhood are determined by vestigial mental traits, analogous to vestigial bodily characters; or (2) that these play activities constitute a necessary phase of development in the life history of the human organism; and that these characters arose, not from "use and disuse," but from variations in the germ-plasm which were useful at the time, and adopted as such by selective agencies.

One serious objection to the Groos theory, according to Patrick, is its failure to "explain adult sports and to correlate them with the plays of children."⁹ This does not seem quite just to Groos, as he does propose explanations of adult play; but it is true that he did not effect any close correlation between adults' and children's play. The same criticism is directed against the Recapitulation Theory itself,¹⁰ which, be it remembered, Patrick himself accepts, in the main.

Patrick's Category of Relaxation.—Patrick maintains, in dealing with this problem, that "the plays of children and the sports of adults are to be closely coördinated and explained by reference to the same general principles."¹¹ The grounds for such principles are found in a "striking similarity between the plays of children and the sports of men, on the one hand, and the pursuits of primitive man on the other, . . . [which] similarity is due to the fact that those mental powers upon which advancing civilization depends, especially voluntary and sustained attention, concentration, analysis, and abstraction, are undeveloped in the child and subject to rapid fatigue in the adult. Hence the child's activities and the play activities of the adult tend always to take the form of old racial pursuits."¹² We are not directly concerned, in this inquiry, with the play of children, and so we shall pass on to Patrick's theory of adult play, which he considers under the broader category of relaxation.

All forms of relaxation, play included, are regarded by this author as "relief from tension or release from some form of restraint."¹³ Relaxation itself is always

⁹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 39-40.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 46.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 48.

¹² *Op. cit.*, pp. 48-49. Part of the original is italicized.

¹³ *Op. cit.*, p. 19.

"some form of reversion to primitive attitudes, physical or mental, and it brings rest and peace and harmony."¹⁴ Adult relaxation has thus a twofold explanation. First, the higher brain centers are easily fatigued and must be rested; and, secondly, sustained attention and concentration, involving the higher brain centers, goes with an inhibition of more primitive tendencies which are seeking opportunities to express themselves. Sport, or relaxation, meets both requirements. The play of adults, he says, restores a "disturbed balance in the psychological organism"—a disturbance due to the *strain* put upon the higher brain centers, and the *repression* to which the primitive tendencies are subjected. The one set of tendencies or capacities is overworked, so to speak, and the other set does not work enough. Both rebel at these conditions, and seek relief or release, as the case may be, in such widely various forms of relaxation as laughter, sport, war, profanity and alcohol.

This view of the matter we shall assume to be correct, subject to the qualifications indicated in our review of the different play theories. One further elaboration of the theory will, however, be in order before proceeding to our special problems.

"Any situation in life," says Thorndike, "may be enormously complicated, so that a mixture from responses of, say, curiosity, hunting, kindness, and manipulation may be its result. A two-year-old child may be to a six-year-old child, at one and the same time, a novelty, a small object passing him, a fellow man, and a stimulus to secondary connections, and so may be stared at, run after, patted and felt of. So the six-year-old may not hunt and subdue, nor feed and protect, but, as we say,

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 87.

'play with' the baby."¹⁵ McDougall offers a similar explanation of rivalry, as manifested in many play activities of children and adults, and even of the lower animals.¹⁶ We have met with analogous combinations of instinctive tendencies throughout our inquiry.

But few psychologists find it necessary to assume a specific instinct of play, although so careful an observer as Thorndike admits the possibility of original play tendencies. Under these would be included "special tendencies to hunt for hunting's sake in ways notably different from the 'real' hunt; to fight for fighting's sake in ways notably different from the 'real' fight; to fondle and pet in ways notably different from the 'real' mothering."¹⁷

It has seemed necessary to enter into this rather tedious account of the different play theories in order to give perspective to our discussion of play tendencies in relation to modern industry. That discussion itself will not be as prolonged as have been these theoretical preliminaries to it.

Significance of Play Tendencies for Economic Activity.—It would be surprising if, on such a theory of play as we have set forth, play tendencies should be found to have little or no significance for economic activity. F. W. Taussig does, in fact, hold to this view, contenting himself with the statement that play figures in the theory of consumption, but not conspicuously in the theory of production. "Much play, elaborate play," he says, "is a result of industrial prosperity rather than a cause of industrial efficiency."¹⁸ It is doubtful, as we shall see, if

¹⁵ *The Original Nature of Man*, p 145.

¹⁶ *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, thirteenth edition, pp. 115-117.

¹⁷ *Op cit.*, p 146.

¹⁸ *Inventors and Money-Makers*, pp. 9-10.

this view will stand the test of a more searching inquiry than Taussig has seen fit to give it.

The question arises at once whether play does not, or might not, provide all necessary relief or release from the tensions and restraints entailed by modern industrial labor. From the standpoint of a normal expression of the original tendencies in human nature, play is to be regarded as the complement of work, providing, as we have seen, relief for those capacities or faculties which have been overworked, and an outlet for those tendencies which have been repressed.

We may say, parenthetically, that the play or free-time activity of adults, manual workers included, do, in fact, provide an index to the tensions and repressions entailed by their daily labor. So, the play activities of groups suffering such repressions and tensions are differentiated from similar activities of groups where the repressions and tensions are not so pronounced. Almost any methodical activity entails repressions and tensions of one sort or another, so that there is a general need of play, or relaxation, by adults. But, although the play activities of the manual worker are not sharply differentiated outwardly from those of people who are under less strain or restraint, an intimate acquaintance with working-class life convinces one that there is nevertheless a real differentiation in the play activities of the two groups.¹⁹ This differentiation is seen in the greater appeal made by forms of relaxation offering relief or release to those faculties most strained or restrained in the manual worker. On the one hand, games offering the best outlet to the fighting and self-assertive tendencies, whether enjoyed as participants or as spectators, and, on the other

¹⁹ Cf., for example, Jane Addams, *The Spirit of Youth and the City Streets*.

hand, alcohol and other narcotics which offer the readiest means of release for the higher brain centers will be preferred to sports and relaxations not so potent in these satisfactions. Other differentiations of this kind will be indicated as the discussion proceeds.

Play Activities as an Antidote for Industrial Unrest.—

Now, it is conceivable that play activities for wage-earners could be so organized as to compensate for the more serious strains and repressions entailed by their daily labor. Their play activities, in other words, might be made a really adequate complement of their work, so that all their basic tendencies might function in a fairly normal fashion. Many employers have already become interested in this possibility, and are encouraging the development of recreational activities in connection with their establishments, or under the auspices of the local community. Such a program, if well conceived and generally carried out, would, no doubt, do something to allay the "unrest" of which employers are so afraid, and as an antidote to which this program is often urged. Let us take up in order the more serious tensions and repressions which the worker suffers, and see what compensations therefor play activities might provide.

We have seen that practically all the important instinctive tendencies of the worker are obstructed or repressed in one way or another by modern industrial conditions, and that these obstructions usually provoke escape or fighting reactions (eventually the latter) aiming at the abolition or alleviation of the conditions which entail this repression. Now, although these tendencies can be provided an outlet in the form of sport or other forms of relaxation, it is highly improbable that the animus engendered by the repression of these tendencies in industrial

relationships could be diverted in this way from the conditions which entail their repression.

Play activities would not assure the laborer against that loss or diminution in earning power of which he constantly stands in dread, and which, as we have seen, involves the repression, directly or indirectly, of sex, parental, constructive, gregarious, acquisitive and self-assertive tendencies, and even of the fear and fighting tendencies themselves. Play will not in itself bring those increments of income which would not only provide direct gratifications of the acquisitive impulses, but which would also permit a better standard of living for the laborer's family, and hence a satisfaction of interests based on the sex and parental instincts. Play might, on the other hand, provide an outlet for the gregarious impulses, but this would not in itself lead to the formation by the workers themselves of organizations for the furtherance of their more vital interests, particularly interests deemed antagonistic to those of the employing group. Indeed, play is here considered as a possible antidote to just such subversive tendencies as this. But it is this sort of free association to which the gregarious tendency prompts the laboring group, and an obstruction of this tendency could scarcely be compensated for by any play activities which might be devised. Play, likewise, might provide opportunities for more gratifying relationships between the sexes, as dancing and other play activities for "mixed parties" would bring the sexes, especially unmarried people, together under wholesome conditions; and play might, if well adapted, conduce to the alleviation of friction in family life, by providing an outlet, outside the home, for the fighting and self-assertive tendencies which so often mar family life (and often perhaps because no other outlet is provided for them). On the

other hand, play would not provide additional income for the family, nor obviate any necessity which might exist for the wife (or mother) or children to supplement family income by going out to work. And it is these things, as we saw, that entailed the more serious repressions of the sex and parental instincts.

Again, play or free-time activity, generously conceived, would provide an outlet for both the constructive and the inquisitive tendencies. This represents in part the significance and value of evening classes in scientific, technological and other subjects, as also of popular lecture courses, free libraries and the like. But I do not see how the utilization of these opportunities would make the worker more interested in a monotonous job than he was before. Any sentiments of affection and loyalty which such benefits might generate would inure to the advantage of the organization or system providing them, rather than of the industrial concern or the industrial system to which the worker found himself subordinated. It might be thought that where play opportunities are provided by the individual concern, the management thereof would surely gain in the good will of their employees, but the facts do not seem to support this view. Workers as a rule are not enthusiastic over any form of "welfare work" in their behalf, and not a few of them are ungrateful enough to resent it.²⁰ This is due in part, no doubt, to the worker's recognition of the pecuniary motives back of such efforts, and to the policy, not uncommonly coupled with these undertakings, of opposition to movements initiated by the workers themselves.

Finally, games could be specifically devised to provide an outlet for fighting and self-assertive impulses, and even for fear tendencies, if these latter, as Graham Wallas

²⁰ Tead, *op. cit.*, pp. 102-104.

seems to think,²¹ demand expression. Such games would certainly have their value, and might, to a certain extent, allay that industrial unrest in which these tendencies are so conspicuous. Again, however, the primary causes for the excitation of these tendencies would not be touched by any such program as this, as a moment's consideration will show.

In the first place, that economic insecurity which lies at the root of the laborer's fears would not be touched by any play program, although escape reactions of a sort (thrills) are provided in many forms of relaxation. The fears under this head would therefore be as potent as they were before, and would lead to the same reactions. Again, team games, boxing, wrestling, swimming and the like would offer an outlet to the self-assertive tendencies, and as such would certainly have their value. But they would not make the laborer less resentful than before of an offensive self-assertion on the part of managers and foremen, nor less bitter toward that egregious self-display, in the form of a conspicuous consumption of wealth, which contrasts so strongly and, to him, so unjustly with the scheme of display which his own exiguous income allows.

The outlet offered by such games to the fighting impulses would render the worker less pugnacious, if only those impulses were independent of the other instinctive tendencies and not, as we have seen, auxiliary to them. Let us admit, what seems to be true, that the fighting tendency is not wholly instrumental to other instinctive tendencies. Athletic contests will then furnish a very desirable outlet to the fighting tendency, and will, in so far, prevent it from functioning in a more serious and subversive manner elsewhere. But other instinctive impulses would be obstructed just as grievously as before any

²¹ *The Great Society*, p. 89.

play program was put into effect, other things remaining equal, and all such obstructions, as we saw, tend to arouse fighting reactions. The worker's fighting reactions, so far as the conditions of his employment are concerned, seem likely to be what they have been in the absence of a play program.

We may now consider the strain, or overstrain, of certain faculties entailed by modern industrial labor. What is sought here is release from strain, or escape, in a special sense, from the conditions causing strain. As we have seen, the higher brain centers are here involved, those functioning in attention, concentration, analysis, etc. In the typical occupation under machine industry, attention and concentration are at a premium, but little expression being afforded to other functions of the higher brain centers, such as analysis, invention, etc.

Now, as all psychologists know, prolonged attention is painful and difficult in proportion as the objects attended to remain the same, and relatively easy and pleasant as the objects of attention vary. But machines repeat the same motions endlessly, and the objects or processes upon which the worker must fix his attention remain the same day after day. Hence the constant fatigue of the worker's powers of attention, and the attendant pain and monotony.

A play program cannot abolish these conditions; the most it could do would be to provide temporary relaxations for the mental faculties subjected to this perpetual strain. This is certainly desirable, and would be desirable under any economic system where machine industry prevailed. But, once more, such relaxations do not make monotonous labor itself more attractive, nor commend to the worker's loyalty a system which imposes monotonous labor on him.

The reactions provoked by the fatigue and monotony

incident to mechanized labor are to be referred in part to the instinct of repulsion,²² whose impulse, be it remembered, is to spurn or reject, rather than to flee from, the object which excites it. But the object which arouses the impulse in this case cannot be spurned or rejected, and we have another thwarted impulse added to our already long list of repressed instinctive impulses. This added obstruction to instinctive activity serves to provoke the fighting tendency still further, already sufficiently aroused to lead to serious consequences.

Employers' Attitudes Toward This Program.—We have seen that any general compensations which play might offer to repressed tendencies will not serve to reconcile the worker to industrial conditions which continue, as before, to thwart his instinctive tendencies, and for the reason that the really serious repressions are untouched by the play program. Added to this difficulty, insuperable though it be, is one of another kind. I refer to instinctive tendencies potent in the employing group itself, which may and, as I think, probably will defeat any hope of a general movement to realize the pacifying possibilities of a play program. Let us indicate in a summary fashion what these tendencies are.

We may lay it down as a general rule that employers will respond to manifestations of discontent on the part of their employees by reactions which will serve to aggravate rather than to allay that discontent. The prevailing attitude among employers considered as a class is that labor must be "put in its place" and kept there. That is to say, fighting reactions are met with fighting reactions, self-assertion with counter self-assertion, and but little attempt made to discover and alleviate the conditions which arouse fighting and self-assertive reactions

²² Chap. VI.

on the part of the laboring class. Paradoxically enough, this reaction is often combined with attempts on the part of the employers to win the good will of their employees by recreational and other welfare activities. Obviously, however, any good effect the latter may produce is more than offset by reactions of the former sort. For the rank and file of employers the dominant tendency is to fight the devil (their employees) with fire, rather than to quench the fire itself.

Again, to give a play program its maximum good effect would necessitate a general reduction of working hours, and this runs counter to the pecuniary propensities of the average employer. Obviously, to provide powerful tendencies repressed during the working day what general compensations they may be capable of, and to give fatigued powers of attention the relaxation which they call for, would require a good deal of time, and this the average employer is not likely to grant. Moreover, the employer's pecuniary propensities are often, perhaps generally, opposed to the outlay of money requisite to the adequate provision of recreational facilities, either under his own auspices or that of the community at large.

All these things considered, the play movement does not seem calculated to allay the prevailing industrial unrest, nor to make the economic system more secure against the subversive tendencies associated with that unrest.

We must say, in defense of the employers, that they could scarcely be expected to take a long view of their problem and to institute such measures as would be calculated to solve it in their favor. A long view is a scientific view, and the training and the associations of the employing group have not been such as to qualify them for taking such a view. This, of course, is not to

their discredit. Their short view is altogether natural under the given conditions. As a natural phenomenon we have attempted to describe and interpret it.

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CHAPTER XVII

THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

THAT the existence and activity of human beings must be considered in relation to the physical environment, the works of Ratzel,¹ Semple² and many others have amply demonstrated. Climate, soil, trees, mineral resources, topography, geographical position, are all potent factors in the social, economic and political development of any country, and, *pro tanto*, significant for the problems incident to such development.

It is not our purpose to appraise the influences of the manifold geographic factors operative in our political and economic history, but only to indicate their bearing on our special problems. Those interested in a more comprehensive treatment of the general subject should consult the works cited, or the convenient summaries of the subject found in the sociology text-books.

We have already emphasized man's intimate dependence on, his continuity with, the physical environment. The human organism is literally a part of the physicochemical world which is organized in a certain way. And there is a ceaseless interchange of materials and energies between the human body and its physical environment. Indeed, we cannot so much as conceive a human being apart from the chemicals and energies derived from the environment which enter into the body and its activity.

Moreover, the relationships of man with this environment must be of certain specific kinds, if he is to survive; and certain other relationships with the environment

¹ Ratzel, F., *Anthropo-Geographie*.

² Semple, Ellen C., *Influences of Geographic Environment*.

must be added if he is to enjoy more than a bare existence. For survival there must be an adequate supply of water, animal or vegetable food, and, for the organism as developed under civilization, clothing, shelter and fuel (save in warm climates). For satisfactions additional to those associated with mere survival, other material things are necessary. The specific character of all these things will be largely determined by the given civilization, or culture. Food, clothing and shelter, as well as books, conveyances, etc., vary from civilization to civilization. It is clear, however, that every human being must have an assured control over, or access to, his physical environment if he is to survive and achieve any measure of well-being.

Now, where the demands of different individuals on the environment come into conflict, some sort of *modus vivendi* for harmonizing their demands must be set up, if there is not to be a perpetual conflict over the issues thus created. Since the activities of every human being have some reference to the physical environment, it is clear that *any* sort of social organization will be largely concerned with that environment. Where land that can supply the simpler, more necessitous wants of the human organism is plentiful, and the prevailing standards of living do not demand goods whose production involves the coöperation of a number of people, no very urgent social and economic problems will be presented. The early history of this country was, for that reason, but little concerned with problems of this type. Least of all can there be said to have been distinct economic classes under the conditions which prevailed here during the first two centuries of our history. The vast expanse of free land in the West offered every one the means of an independent livelihood, and few were disposed to subject themselves, for

purposes of gaining a livelihood, to the direction of others, so long as access to this Western territory was easy.

But with the disappearance of free land, the development of national and world markets, the rise of capitalistic production, the specialization of industrial processes, and the refinement of standards of living, an increasingly large proportion of people could no longer satisfy their wants through an immediate control of the environment, but had to depend on an exchange of goods or services which they controlled for others of which they stood in need. Production has become roundabout, and the human being's access to the environment conditioned by highly complex, corporate relationships. Under the institution of private property in land and capital, the control of the environment is, so far as the law goes, vested in a class of property-holders, while we have on the other side an increasingly large class of propertyless wage-earners who have no legal right to the environment upon which they are dependent. The problems incident to this situation have been so fully discussed that we shall not give an extended analysis of them here. It will be enough to point out the bearing of the conditions in question on the special problems under consideration.

We have, as before pointed out, the anomaly of an environment (the phases thereof requisite to the production of life's necessities) upon which *all* are absolutely dependent controlled, not by all, but by a *proportion* of those who are dependent thereon. But propertyless wage-earners do, on their side, control a productive factor just as necessary as land and capital. And they can, by withholding the use of this factor, extort concessions from those dependent, in some sense, on the utilization of the environment which they own through the application of this factor. We do not need to enter, from this angle,

into the intricacies of this struggle. Suffice it to say, for reasons already analyzed, that the owners of the environment and of labor respectively desire as large a share of the product as possible. This leads to a struggle over the distribution of the product as well as for control over the process of distribution.

There are many other factors in the struggle between the two classes, as our analysis will have shown. We are concerned here to point out that this struggle is inevitable under the prevailing conditions. When distinct classes severally control different classes of productive factors, neither of which is of any use without the others, they will of necessity coöperate, for the existence of all will depend on it; but they will just as surely struggle over the distribution of that for the production of which they have coöperated. What direction the struggle will take, as also the modifications in the industrial system which will be effected thereby, depend on a number of conditions—among others, the dominant legal and political traditions, the capacity of the two parties for compromise, and the strength of the fighting organizations which they may have developed. The more significant of these conditions it is the purpose of this inquiry to identify and interpret.

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CHAPTER XVIII

CULTURAL FACTORS

NO DOUBT the question will have been raised whether we have not overlooked the possibility of the situation analyzed in the preceding chapters being brought under cultural or traditionary controls, or, stated in more popular terms, under social or state control. This is evidently a question which must be seriously faced, for undoubtedly similar situations in the past have been dealt with more or less effectively by social or governmental agencies, and, conceivably, the situation under analysis here is amenable to a similar control.

The discussion of this problem must be taken in connection with our examination of political liberalism further on,¹ as also with our analysis of instinctive and other mental traits already presented. An exhaustive treatment of this problem would involve a most detailed research into the customs, laws, beliefs and ideals which are operative in society today, and that would involve, in turn, a circumstantial historical account of these same traditionary factors, in order that their present significance might be correctly appraised. Such an undertaking is outside the scope of our inquiry. We shall have to limit ourselves, instead, to the analysis of those traditions which are specially significant for our problems, taken as they are found operating in our political and economic life, and without attempting to trace their historical antecedents. In a simplified treatment of this nature, many important details will necessarily be omitted, and the

¹ Chaps. XXV-XXIX.

whole analysis must, owing to the extreme complexity of the problem, be regarded as quite provisional.

"In no part of the world, and at no period of time," says L. T. Hobhouse, "do we find the behavior of men left to unchartered freedom. Everywhere human life is in a measure organized and directed by customs, laws, beliefs, ideals, which shape its end and guide its activities. As this guidance of life by rule is universal in human society, so upon the whole it is peculiar to humanity."² "Without such rules we can scarcely conceive society to exist, since it is only through the general conformity to custom that men can understand each other, that each can know how the other will act under the given circumstances, and without this amount of understanding the reciprocity, which is the vital principle of society, disappears."³

These traditionary controls of human behavior have not come from a source alien to man, but are the products of human thought and action throughout the past history of the given society. They are all referable, in the first instance, to instinct, feeling, intellectual activity, etc., and to the crystallization of the products of these processes into habits, beliefs, sentiments, etc. All these traditionary factors, therefore, are produced by original human nature itself, functioning in particular physical and social environments. Customs, beliefs and ideals are passed on by instruction, oral communication or some sort of material record, where symbols are employed whose meanings are known or can be learned. This tradition or culture is always growing, and always undergoing reorganization. The mass of our culture as compared with that of a primitive society, and the modifications of

² *Morals in Evolution*, third edition, p. 1.

³ Hobhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

beliefs, customs and ideals which we witness every day, illustrate this dynamic aspect of culture.

Cultural Principles Significant for the Labor Problem.—The infant just born in the world is entirely innocent of any culture, but his induction therein immediately begins. The culture which he assimilates will be a *selected* culture. In general, any given child will absorb those parts of the culture in its society which his elders have absorbed or accepted as suitable for the young. As the child grows up and takes his place in the larger social and economic system, he will assimilate other selected parts of the culture in his society. The particular social and economic functions which he embodies are at once differentiated from, and complementary to, functions embodied by others. As shown in our analysis of the gregarious tendency, this induction into certain groups of social and economic relationships will produce a more or less appropriate set of attitudes, sentiments and ideas respecting the individual's own position, and that of others representing differentiated relationships, with whom he comes into contact. We have seen how this differentiation of functions with the divergent sentiments, attitudes and ideas that go with it gives rise to more or less distinct social classes bearing toward one another various types of relationships—coöperative, antagonistic, etc. These classes will have their "mores" or divergent ethical codes enjoining and justifying certain types of behavior toward one another. Many traditions in a given society will be accepted as valid by all the groups in the society, while other traditions, previously accepted by all, will lose their binding force for some groups, and become the traditions of a party, sect or class. New traditions of general validity will be added. Likewise, new partisan, sectarian or sectional traditions will be developed.

We have already traced the processes whereby distinct herds or classes, each with its peculiar traditions, are formed in a society. It will be of interest to analyze the processes whereby specific traditions within the society or the social class are formed and modified. Says W. G. Sumner: "By autosuggestion the stronger minds produce ideas which when set afloat pass by suggestion from mind to mind. Acts which are consonant with the ideas are imitated. There is a give and take between man and man. This process is one of development. New suggestions come in at point after point. They are carried out. They combine with what existed already. Every new step increases the number of points upon which other minds may seize. It seems to be by this process that great inventions are produced. Knowledge has been won and extended by it."⁴ In different terms, traditions are modified through ideas advanced by the original thinker, these being imitated and acquiring what Trotter calls suggestioning force. Not only do individuals propose innovations, but so do social groups. The American and French Revolutions are cases in point. So are the recent Russian and German Revolutions.

"Changes which run with the mores are easily brought about," says Sumner, "but . . . changes which are opposed to the mores require long and patient effort, if they are possible at all."⁵ Moreover, we may have a tradition favoring change in certain fields—in science, invention and fashion, for example, but opposing changes in other fields, as in legal and political institutions. This principle of a varying resistance to change manifested by different phases of culture has considerable significance for our problems.

⁴ *Folkways*, p. 19.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 94.

So have two other principles enunciated by Sumner: "The folkways are . . . (1) subject to a strain of improvement towards better adaptation of means to ends, as long as the adaptation is so imperfect that pain is produced. They are also (2) subject to a strain of consistency with each other, because they all answer their several purposes with less friction and antagonism when they coöperate and support each other."⁶

In résumé the principles stated are: (1) The unequal resistance to change manifested by different parts of the tradition; (2) the strain toward improvement; (3) the strain toward consistency. The development of social groups with divergent traditions, and the rôle of original thought in suggesting new or modified traditions are taken for granted.

Maladapted Cultural Principles in Our Society.—The system of natural rights, which lies at the foundation of our legal and political institutions, was established in Modern Europe, according to Veblen,⁷ under and as a result of the discipline of handicraft production. The doctrines embodied in this system were devised, according to other thinkers,⁸ as weapons wherewith to combat the ideals, institutions and inhibitions of the old régime. As such they proved quite effective. On their positive side these principles may be taken to represent the legal and political conditions requisite to the orderly conduct of industry and commerce during the handicraft period. But, as Veblen points out, by the time these principles were fairly established, handicraft production itself was on the decline. Nevertheless they have carried over into

⁶ *Op. cit.*, pp. 5-6.

⁷ Veblen, T., *The Instinct of Workmanship*, pp. 283-298, 340-344.

⁸ Reference, *Lectures on Moral and Political Philosophy* by John Dewey at Columbia University, 1917-1918.

the era of machine industry, to which, presumably, they are not altogether adapted.

The elements of this system most significant for the present inquiry are the doctrines of liberty and equality, the principle of private initiative, or freedom of contract, and the institution of private property in land and capital. Now, these principles and institutions, taken together, become quite inconsistent with each other as machine industry develops, and political and financial power is concentrated in fewer and fewer hands. Freedom of contract and private property have fostered a political and economic development which clearly violates the principles of liberty and equality, while (a positive) freedom of contract and private property themselves have become the prerogative of a comparatively small class. The accumulation and concentration of capital have clearly given a large measure of political control to a small class, and this violates the principle of liberty (or self-government), while the grossly unequal distribution of wealth, and of opportunity, violates the principle of equality. And in the course of this development a class arose whose condition, tested by the so-called normal standard of living, has steadily deteriorated.⁹

We thus have a situation to which our second and third principles apply. Freedom of contract and private property (in land and capital) have become incompatible with the principles of liberty and equality, and hence a strain toward consistency; while the condition of the working class, tested by a normal standard of living, has steadily deteriorated, and hence a strain toward improvement.

Now, although the system of natural rights, as a sys-

⁹ It is not implied that the standard of living has not been raised in an absolute sense. As the term itself implies, "normal standard of living" is to be taken in a relative sense.

tem, is ill-adapted to machine industry, yet the elements of that system, taken separately, may be quite well adapted. Obviously, machine production is compatible with private property and freedom of contract, provided liberty and equality be discarded as correlative principles; or with the principles of liberty and equality, provided freedom of contract and private property be discarded. It is not compatible with the two sets of principles taken together. Either the one or the other must, therefore, be discarded. Which will it be?

The Probable Outcome.—Our principle of a varying resistance to change by different parts of the tradition will serve us in the consideration of this question. Which of the opposed sets of principles will prove the more resistant to change? My own view is that the principles of liberty and equality, vague and nebulous though they be, will prove the more resistant in the long run. We cannot go at length into the grounds for this belief. Suffice it to say that, although private property and freedom of contract have the sanction of powerful impulses and habits, the more potent tendencies would seem to support the principles of liberty and equality. It would perhaps be more to the point to say that, in the long run, greater numbers and greater power are likely to be ranged on the side of freedom and equality than on the side of private property and freedom of contract. For the instinctive impulses (or interests) of the majority will probably be obstructed eventually by conditions growing out of property and contract, and this will serve to line them up against these parts of the tradition. We are, of course, discussing the principles in question only as they are involved in large-scale, capitalistic production.

We are not justified in assuming that the reaction against these institutions will take the form of a demand

that they be abolished altogether. The argument of expediency advanced in their behalf has a good deal of force, and those determined that these institutions shall more nearly square with the principles of liberty and equality might accept this argument as valid, and direct their efforts toward reducing the inequalities produced by these institutions, not toward their abolition. This, in fact, is the position of those who advocate minimum wage laws, graduated inheritance, income and excess profits taxes, the regulation of prices, and the like, but who are opposed to a radical reorganization of the economic system.

It could be argued, on the other hand, that the movement to correct political and economic inequalities must develop more and more in the direction of abolishing, or subordinating, the institutions which foster them. In the first place, there seems to be no very powerful tradition in support of a principle of expediency, although the expediency argument has its effect. The argument is a complicated one, and the average man has no taste for arguments of this sort. It is not easy, in the second place, to maintain, in the face of so much evidence to the contrary, that the present system *is* expedient, nor to prove, before it is tried, that the alternative system is inexpedient. Thirdly, it is easily demonstrated, even to untutored minds, that the receipt of income from the mere possession of capital does in itself constitute an inequality in favor of the capital-owner and to the disadvantage of those possessing no capital. This inequality increases as the amount of capital in the hands of individuals increases, and no proof is required, for it is evident, that there is a concentration of capital, or at least of its management, in fewer and fewer hands. Fourthly, as already demonstrated, the relationships of the present system are such that attitudes, sentiments and ideas are cultivated in the

subordinate class which are more and more expressed in a demand that the system subordinating them to a master class shall be radically modified.

The increasingly radical character of the labor movement the world over lends support to the argument set forth. Labor is usually lukewarm toward programs of labor legislation, inheritance and income taxes, and the like, but responsive to proposals for public ownership, consumers' coöperation, and the democratic management of industry, proposals which represent a sharp break with the present order. Even in the United States, where the labor movement is extremely conservative, the growth of socialist sentiment in the orthodox organizations, the movement toward revolutionary unionism and the espousal of nationalization programs by a number of A. F. of L. unions are very significant phenomena.

There are, of course, factors operating in the opposite direction. These we have analyzed elsewhere.¹⁰ The class in power, through purporting to represent the entire social group, and making the appeal of this group more potent for many than that of any avowed class, deters many members of the laboring class from identifying themselves with this class. But the laboring class is numerous and growing, and makes an increasingly powerful appeal to potential members. This class is dissociating itself, more and more, from the "public" which the class in power recruits for its purposes, and is more and more disposed to challenge the authority of the political institutions purporting to represent the entire society, but largely dominated by the class opposed to their own.

The revolutionary movements in Central and Eastern Europe, representing, as they do, a frank repudiation of political methods of settling vital class issues, are sure to

¹⁰ See especially Chaps. XV, XXIII, XXVI.

have a powerfully stimulating effect on the labor movement in other parts of the world. The disillusionment of labor with regard to constitutionalism is all but complete, and we may expect, with the development of radical programs, the perfection of non-political methods for realizing them.

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CHAPTER XIX

THE INTELLECTUAL PROCESSES

MAN's greatest distinction, when compared with other primates, mammals or vertebrate species, is his enormously greater intellectual capacity, for by that capacity is to be explained the great gulf between the behavior of man and of these other species.

From the standpoint of *social* evolution, the human intellect is almost everything. Invention, exploration, investigation, speculation, are nothing but intellect in action, and the achievements due to these intellectual functions measure, or rather constitute, the more significant differences between any two societies, however widely separated in time or space. Man's intellectual capacities have made his elaborate languages, his acquisition of innumerable habits, ideas and sentiments, his massive, transmissible cultures, possible.

Not only are intellectual functions socially significant, they are significant for each individual. The individual significance and the social are, of course, the same thing regarded from different standpoints. Individuals who do not come up to a certain level of intellectuality are not allowed at large in society, because social relationships are based on and assume the functioning of a certain intellectual ability in the individual members of the society. "To draw inferences," wrote John Stuart Mill, "has been said to be the great business of life. Every one has daily, hourly, and momentary need of ascertaining facts which he has not directly observed; not from any general purpose of adding to his stock of knowledge, but because the facts

themselves are of importance to his interests or to his occupations. . . . It is the only occupation in which the mind never ceases to be engaged.”¹

Function of the Intellect in Social Situations.—So much for the general significance of the intellect to the individual and to society. To identify its significance for problems such as ours will require a more painstaking analysis. We shall not impede ourselves with a consideration of the various views held by philosophers as to the functions of the intellect. The facts of behavior would seem to lend some warrant both to the view of the pragmatists that the functions of the intellect are primarily practical, and to the view of the idealists and realists that knowledge for its own sake is the primary object of intellectual activity. An observation of the average man's behavior will show that a great deal of his intellectual activity is devoted to the furtherance of his own practical interests, while a not inconsiderable proportion thereof is given over to concerns which have no very urgent practical significance to him personally. Man must supply his own needs, or get them supplied, if he is not to perish, but he is also interested in sensations and experiences for their own sake, and quite apart from further consequences to which they might lead.² It will be more instructive to consider the specific functions of the intellect in the fields of politics and industry.

We saw in our discussion of curiosity that but few people are endowed with the type of curiosity and intellectual ability to equip them for dealing intelligently with large impersonal issues that are at all complicated. Some few there are who have the interest and the ability to work through the evidence bearing on such questions to

¹ *System of Logic*, INTRODUCTION, § 5.

² Cf. Thorndike, E. L., *The Original Nature of Man*, p. 141.

well-grounded conclusions in regard to them, and this quite irrespective of the implications of the hypotheses entertained for their own personal fortunes. It is, I suspect, a consideration of such cases (often exemplified in their own persons) which have led realists and idealists to the view that the primary function of the intellect is the acquisition of knowledge. The pragmatists, on their side, seem to make intellectual activity more utilitarian and competent than it really is when they insist that it is concerned with practical needs and the solution of practical problems.

More fruitful principles than those in dispute among the philosophers would enable us to correlate intellectual activity with specific impulses, desires and interests. We have suggested in our discussion of the gregarious tendency that the mind should be regarded as largely an organ of communication, and only to a lesser degree as an organ of adaptation, although, as we insisted, the two groups of functions are not separated in real life.

As Walter Bagehot long ago pointed out,³ it was more important for primitive societies to act as a unit than for them to act wisely. Hence the importance of prompt communication, and the relative unimportance of independent thought. Indeed, independent thought would have led to difference and division, and thus endangered the safety of the entire group, whereas union meant strength, however that strength was exercised. Not only ready communication, but sensitiveness to group opinion and to the call of the group leader was necessary. Then as now, of course, there was original thought, but its influence was very strictly conditioned by the operation of the gregarious tendency. These conditions prevailed for so long a period of time, compared with the later period when

³ *Physics and Politics*, No. 1.

conditions favored a larger freedom of thought, that the impulse to communicate is now far more urgent than the impulse to investigate, and the mind is in all probability better suited to the former function.

Confirmation of the view here set forth is supplied by a consideration of the conversation or the more intellectual pastimes of the average person. Interest is usually centered in the bare opinions and actions of others, and but rarely in the truth or validity of these opinions or actions. Approval or disapproval is, of course, constantly meted out to others for their actions or opinions, but our consideration of gregarious impulses should have made it clear that such approval or disapproval is, for the most part, in the interest of group solidarity, not in behalf of the correctness or validity of the acts or opinions of others. So, also, the education of the young in the home and the school is far more concerned with their assimilation of the authentic traditions of their time and their class than with their discipline in a method of arriving at objective conclusions in regard to the concerns of life.

Intellectual Capacities Not Adapted to a Complex Civilization.—Another consideration of cardinal importance is suggested by a survey of the conditions of group and individual survival in ages past. The typical situations with which the individual and the group then dealt were exceedingly simple compared with the complex conditions of modern society. The type of thought called for then was quite rudimentary. The phrase "putting two and two together" would probably characterize that type of thinking quite adequately. People living then never had to deal with a situation involving hundreds of variable factors in varying degrees of independence and dependence on each other, such as we have to deal with today. The conditions which prevailed during the long evolution-

ary period when our hereditary mental constitution was being set did not call for a very high order of intellectual ability, but rather for a highly developed organ of communication plus a relatively low order of intellectual ability. This view could be supported by taking up in detail the situations with which primitive man had to deal, and observing what order of intellectual activity was involved in a successful reaction thereto. The gathering of roots and herbs, the pursuit and trapping of animals, the appropriation of mates, encounters between individuals, primitive warfare between hostile tribes—how simple when compared with the complexities of our modern society with its contending nationalities, its elaborate organization of industry, its scientific warfare and its complicated politics!

We do not imply that, because the conditions assumed did not call for a high order of intellectual ability, there were no able intellects in the period during which these conditions prevailed. Primitive culture as we know it would belie such a conclusion. But great intellectual ability, above a certain level at least, had no particular survival value, and could not have become through selection a characteristic of the human species. And general observation as well as the "intelligence tests" of modern psychology show that people of marked intellectual ability in our own age constitute a very small proportion of the population.

We have, then, this situation: An exceedingly complex civilization has been developed through the specialized activities of myriads of people, living and dead, and yet our minds are not capable of dealing with that civilization intelligently. Not only are there no people with intellects capacious enough to make possible an acquaintance with and understanding of this civilization in all its complexity,

but the intellectual abilities of the great mass of people are of such an order that the knowledge and the understanding which we do have cannot be availed of save to a very limited extent.

This brings us back to the political behavior of our average man. This creature is in the predicament of having to react to highly complex situations through mental faculties adapted only to very simple situations. During the long period when those faculties were being established, our ancestors lived in the immediate to a degree which the intellectual person of today can scarcely appreciate. Their relationships, whether with their fellows, their gods or the things about them were mostly immediate personal relationships. And reactions to the simple situations they had to deal with were largely instinctive, where not subject to the simple social controls imposed by the culture under which they lived, or unless obstacles were interposed which were also dealt with instinctively or through inference of a quite simple type. But today political behavior, if it is not to lead to all sorts of maladjustments, conflicts and upheavals, must be carefully adapted to the highly complex structure of our society with all the specialized interests and activities which it represents. Average human nature is not equal to this demand, and we do have the maladjustments, conflicts and upheavals spoken of. In the last analysis these are inevitable because of that.

More concretely, the political behavior of our average man is largely determined, like that of his primitive ancestors, by his instinctive likes and dislikes, by traditions and habits acquired more or less passively from the environment, by his material interests, in so far as he can puzzle out their political implications, by the suggestions associated with the groups of which he is a member. These

forces, though they may determine a political behavior which happens to be adapted to the given situation, cannot determine behavior which is intelligent, and therefore adaptive as a general rule. The consequences of this fact have been discussed at length in other chapters. The general conclusion to be emphasized here is that the intellect does not function in the mass of people to synthesize or harmonize interests, sentiments and ideas which might bring men into conflict. It furthers or fosters these divergent interests, attitudes and ideas, and, so, facilitates conflict and misunderstanding instead of preventing them. As we have shown, this non-rational behavior is about equally characteristic of different social and economic classes. As a general rule, habit, tradition, class interest and mass suggestion are dominant throughout.

The Rôle of Intellectual Leadership.—Original thought on social and political questions does not, however, count for nothing. The élite certainly have their influence on social and industrial evolution, though a less potent one than we are apt to suppose. They help to determine the medium in which all classes live and struggle. The advancement of science, the improvement of education, the prevention of disease, the better care of defective, dependent and delinquent classes, and the promotion of "social legislation" all have their evolutionary significance. The élite also act as mediators between antagonistic social and economic classes, aiding in bringing about a working adjustment of their interests or, if the differences between them are vital and irreconcilable, mollifying their final struggle for mastery. Through the élite culture of every sort is conserved and developed. How much direct influence the élite have on the fortunes of economic classes is a question not so easy to answer.

They do often furnish intellectual leadership to sub-

ordinate classes. They also, of course, ally themselves, often, with the dominant class. The influence of the élite will depend mainly on how well their thought is grounded on some powerful tradition or interest, or on a tradition or interest which, under the given conditions, might become powerful. *Pro tanto*, it must be founded on a correct evaluation of the conditions and tendencies which combine to create traditions and interests.

One could, with profit, take up current social and political philosophies—current among the élite—and show how they stand this test. The ethical idealism of Felix Adler,⁴ the intellectual communism of Miss Follett,⁵ the pragmatic educationism of John Dewey,⁶ to take only a few examples, all have their social applications, but they offer no solution to the problem of class relationships with which we are confronted. For none of these philosophies is grounded on a dominant tradition or interest, or on anything that can readily become such. Examples on the other side would be found in Adam Smith, Rousseau, Voltaire and others who in their several ways interpreted and promoted the interests of the rising bourgeois class, in Karl Marx, Sidney Webb and others who have grounded their philosophy on the interests of the laboring class.

As pointed out elsewhere, the superior understanding of such men has its effect through their analysis being simplified and brought down to the level of the groups whose leaders they are. Reliance for practical results must be placed here as elsewhere on instinct, interest, mass suggestion and other motive forces which determine men's

⁴ *An Ethical Philosophy of Life*

⁵ Follett, M. P., *The New State*.

⁶ *Democracy and Education*. A more detailed consideration of Dewey's doctrines is given in Chapter XXXI.

political behavior. Intellect plays its part, of course, in guiding and concentrating these forces on the measures formulated and advocated by the intellectual leader.

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CHAPTER XX

HEDONIC FACTORS

WE DO not need to enter the controversy over the functions of pain and pleasure in human life. To our way of thinking the issue between hedonists and their opponents is largely artificial, being created by the abstraction from human nature of a single trait or character, and then asking the question whether it is not responsible for all or a major part of human behavior. The question is of a sort with that which asks whether heredity or environment is the more important in the development of the individual. The two are, in the nature of the case, involved in all human development. Likewise with the hedonic factors. They constitute only *one* group of factors out of several,¹ all of which are operative in human behavior.

We could take the factors of all these other groups and trace out their relationships with the hedonic factors, but that would not, so far as our problems are concerned, be very enlightening. Less, perhaps, than factors of any other class do pain and pleasure provide a ground of distinction for the classification and analysis of human actions. This is doubtless because qualitative and quantitative differences in pain and pleasure are best identified by the different types of behavior with which they are associated, whereas these latter are not so well identified by the pain and pleasure differences with which they are correlated.

The most acceptable definition of the functions of pain and pleasure seems to be that offered by Thorndike: "The

¹Cf. Chap. II.

original tendencies of certain states of affairs to satisfy or to annoy are among the most potent determinants of human behavior and of those changes in it which result from education. Satisfaction and discomfort are in fact the great educative forces. They are such originally, and become still more so by virtue of the fact that behavior which is accompanied or closely followed by them becomes itself satisfying or annoying as the case may be. They are of great value in the control of human nature because they are the roots of the phenomena which we call interests, desires, wants and motives. The original tendencies whereby this satisfies and that annoys are thus the ultimate selective forces in human behavior, providing the first rewards and punishments for education's use. From them, directly or indirectly, all later wants, interests and ideals derive their motive power. There is no other means of arousing zeal for a given course of thought or conduct than by connecting satisfaction with it; the mind does not do something for nothing."²

We could go over our entire analysis of instinctive impulses and other factors in political behavior, and identify the hedonic sanctions associated with the various types of response distinguished, but that would add little to the analysis presented. It is obvious that painful and pleasurable experiences are conditioned by the instinctive impulses, an unimpeded expression of those impulses generally producing pleasure or satisfaction, the obstruction of such impulses producing pain or annoyance. We know, again, that acting according to an acquired habit, routine or procedure is productive of pleasure, other things being equal, and that interference with a habit, routine or procedure causes annoyance.

² *The Original Nature of Man*, p. 295.

We cannot say, I think, that either the capacities for pain and pleasure or the instinctive impulses are the more fundamental. They are both essential characters of the human organism, and both play indispensable rôles in mental development. According to Thorndike's Law of Effect,³ an instinctive action which leads to pain or annoyance will be modified, an accessory habit being formed which will guide the impulse of the instinctive tendency in future so that the painful consequence may be avoided. Habits of all sorts would be similarly modified. Objects of desire (which may be expressed in terms of the physical and social environment) would likewise be determined and modified by the several satisfying and annoying experiences associated with them. By a sort of retroactive inhibition, painful experiences put a negative valuation on possible objects of desire; satisfying experiences, through retrospective enhancement, give to such objects increments of positive value.

Such measures and programs as we have considered in our analysis, so far as they have conscious reference to the future, are but plans for the duplication or extension of conditions associated in the past with satisfying experiences, or the abolition of conditions associated with annoying or painful experiences.

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³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 172-173.

CHAPTER XXI

HABIT

"HABIT," . . . says Graham Wallas, "is constituted by the fact that if our nervous system is stimulated along certain lines of discharge, leading either to action or feeling or thought, the next situation of the same kind finds the nervous system to a certain extent prepared. The resulting act or feeling or thought then follows more certainly and requires a weaker stimulation. Finally the habit becomes a definite tendency, which may be started with little or no external stimulus. . . . Habit, I have said, may influence our bodily actions, or our feelings, or our trains of thought. But a habit of feeling or thought does not necessarily produce a habit of action."¹

Conformity to habit and routine is satisfying, and unless conditions arise which render some departure therefrom more or less imperative, people will generally act from habit, even though the situation calls for a reaction of a different kind. "In virtue of this tendency [to the formation of habits]," says McDougall, "the familiar as such is preferred to the less familiar, the habitual and routine mode of action and reaction, in all departments of mental life, to any mode of action necessitating any degree of novel adjustment. And the more familiar and habitual is any mental process or mode of action in a situation of a given type, the more difficult is it to make any change or improvement in it and the more painful is any change of the character of the situation that necessitates an effort of readjustment."²

¹ *The Great Society*, pp. 72-73.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 119.

For the problems with which we are concerned there is a connection, amounting to a virtual identity, between tradition and habit. The child when born is promptly inducted into the social usages, sentiments and ideas which are accepted by its parents, teachers and associates generally as authentic and binding. Habit in large part, therefore, is nothing but applied tradition. As such it is supported by those sanctions associated with the gregarious tendency which we have seen to be so powerful. Not all habit is supported by herd sanctions, but most habits operative in social and economic behavior do come under the influence of the gregarious tendency. We may say, indeed, that society is very largely the art of molding or guiding behavior through the establishment in the individual of habit-controls over thought, feeling and action having a social significance, and of bringing to the support of these controls the potent sanctions associated with the gregarious impulses and other traits in human nature.

Now, when the inertia of habit is added to the powerful sanctions with which the gregarious tendency supports the old or traditional, we have an almost invincible combination against facile change or readjustment. This inertia of habit increases "in the individual as he grows older; and [with it] the consequent preference . . . for the familiar and the dislike of all that is novel in more than a very moderate degree."³

Relation of Habit to Social and Industrial Problems.—These characteristics of habit have an especial significance for our problems. Traditions absorbed by a voting member of the population while young may have been fairly well adapted to the conditions which prevailed at that time, but they will not be adapted to the conditions which prevail a decade or score of years thereafter. Yet the likelihood

³ McDougall, *op. cit.*, p. 354.

is that the voter as he grows old will adhere to traditions thus assimilated, which no longer apply to the facts of the situation. The fact, therefore, that a great proportion of our voting population are men past the time of life when new habits of thought are readily acquired is one of portentous significance, and it certainly has its bearing on any theory of democratic government that may be proposed. The significance for our problems becomes the greater when we consider that the interests of the class in power are safeguarded by habit and tradition.

You have, then, this result: The elderly men in a society are generally opposed to any reconstruction of traditional policies necessitated by social and industrial evolution—almost enough in itself, perhaps, to render (unavailable the methods of majority rule in bringing about necessary social readjustments; and to this, bad as it is, must be added the powerful sanctions supplied the traditional and habitual by gregarious and other tendencies, sanctions potent with old and young alike.

Moreover, to make matters still worse, political loyalty is often, perhaps generally, associated with mere party names or catchwords, and persists regardless of the fact that party traditions themselves change. Consider, by way of illustration, the history of the Republican Party. Called into existence at the time of a great national crisis to serve as an instrument of national reunion and, incidentally, the abolition of slavery, it has become, by common consent, the party of big business, and the most effective political instrument of the dominant class. Yet it retains the loyalty of countless thousands who affiliated themselves with it, or whose fathers did, when it was an effective instrument of national reconstruction. Nothing could be more alien to the spirit of Lincoln than the present Republican Party, but yet a large part of its

strength lies in the appealing power which Lincoln gave it. A similar analysis could be made of the Democratic Party or any other dominant party which has become venerable with age. *Family* traditions controlling party affiliations are established and hold year after year, and generation after generation.

I have said that the traditions of dominant parties become less adapted to social and industrial conditions as time goes on. There are, of course, specific modifications of party policy which are in the right direction, but the net result is about what I have stated. The explanation of this is to be found in the fact that the dominant class has resources for molding the traditions of political parties which the subordinate class has not, and these resources are, of course, utilized in its own interest. This, obviously, is what happened to the Republican Party.

Technic of Manufacturing Political Habits.—Where new habits of political thought are desired, methods are available for their prompt formation. These methods are associated with the gregarious tendency, which is quite powerful enough to overcome the inertia of habit when the two come into conflict. A parcel of quotations from Graham Wallas will set the process before us:⁴

"The whole process of inference, rational or non-rational, is indeed built up from the primary fact that one mental state may call up another, either because the two have been associated together in the history of the individual, or because a connection between the two has proved useful in the history of the race. . . . The political importance of all this consists in the fact that most of the political opinions of most men are the result, not of reasoning tested by experience, but of unconscious or half-conscious inference fixed by habit. It is indeed

⁴*Human Nature in Politics*, pp. 101, 103, 105.

mainly in the formation of tracks of thought that habit shows its power in politics. . . . If the word 'Wastrel,' for instance, appears on the contents bills of the *Daily Mail* one morning as a name for the Progressives during a County Council election, a passenger riding on an omnibus from Putney to the Bank will see it half-consciously at least a hundred times, and will have formed a fairly stable mental association by the end of the journey. If he reflected, he would know that only one person has once decided to use the word, but he does not reflect, and the effect on him is the same as if a hundred persons had used it independently of each other."

This process could be interpreted from the standpoint of suggestion as well as from the standpoint of association. One manifestation of the gregarious tendency, we saw, is credulity. A person not trained to scepticism regarding statements purporting to represent facts will accept them at their face value unless they are definitely dissociated from the herd of which he is a member. So, the technic of establishing a new habit of thought, where such is desired, is to repeat over and over again the idea, opinion or association which is to become habitual, and it will be accepted and become a more or less permanent bit of the mental furniture of the person accepting it. As shown elsewhere, the class in power has incomparably greater facilities for the employment of this method than has a subordinate class.

We should have to set over against this power of habits so formed, the influence of opinions and attitudes formed on the basis of evidence. As we have maintained, however, the mass of men under present conditions are controlled in their attitudes and opinions by mass suggestion and other alogical influences rather than by reflective thought.

Our general conclusion must be that the inertia of habit, and the processes whereby habits of political thought are formed, normally support the *status quo*. The opponents of the *status quo* must therefore rely for success on rational thought, and on competitive suggestion forces emanating from groups antagonistic to the dominant class and to the public which it recruits for its purposes.

We may point out, finally, as bearing on one of our problems, that the power of habit cannot be made to square with a blanket economic interpretation of social life. Habit cannot be strictly correlated, in its genesis or its functions, with the pecuniary interests of the class or the individual, although, as we saw, it safeguards the interests of the dominant class. The preference for familiar modes of action, to take the standpoint of the individual, operates to prevent many men from seeking to better themselves financially through the adoption of new modes of action. Disinclination to leave a familiar place of residence, to break with old associations, and perhaps to habituate one's self to a new occupation, is undoubtedly potent with the vast majority of people, and *dominant* with a great proportion of this number.

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CHAPTER XXII

CONCLUSIONS: THE CLASS STRUGGLE

IT NOW remains to summarize the results of our analysis, and focus them on the problems in hand. Let us remember, in so doing, that no résumé of an intricate analysis can be a substitute for the analysis itself, and one must therefore go back to that analysis in all its detail, if its full force shall be brought to bear on the problems under consideration. It will be in order, however, to assemble the salient points of the analysis and bring them in closer relation to our problems.

Unsoundness of Rationalistic Method Demonstrated.—We are able now to strengthen our position that a rationalistic method is quite unsuited to the treatment of social and political questions. For we have shown at length that all the natural factors operative in society combine to produce social changes, and that by far the greater number of these factors have nothing in common with reason. This is not to say that social action may not be rational in a sense, for the factors operative in particular situations may be amenable to a rational control. Our analysis goes to show, however, that such is but rarely the case in the situations we have considered.

We saw that the hereditary mental traits of the human species were evolved under environmental conditions radically different from the conditions under which they function today. A certain plasticity of the organism makes possible a measure of adaptation to present conditions, but we may say that those traits are far from being well adapted to conditions prevalent today. We should expect this maladaptation to result in social disharmonies

of all sorts, and that result, as we have seen, is produced in abundance. We have, in sum, a hereditary mental outfit evolved under primitive conditions, and capable of functioning fairly well only under such conditions, but nevertheless compelled to function as best it can under conditions of civilized life radically different from those early conditions.

The instinctive impulses noted and analyzed are essentially non-rational tendencies to action, although they come to a certain extent under the guidance of reason and experience. But considering their number and potency, their reference to the immediate and the personal, their rebellion against restraint, their largely archaic character, together with the fact that intellectual functions are largely instrumental to the expression of just these impulses, it would be surprising if they normally led to a balanced social action, to action, that is, which did justice to a vast range of interests such as subsist in our own society. And our analysis shows that they do not, and indeed could not, lead to balanced action of this kind.

Pleasant and unpleasant experiences were seen to play an important rôle in mental and social development. These experiences are correlated with instinctive impulses and other original tendencies, and, while serving to bring them into a better adjustment to the environment, must have much the same limited reference as they. Painful and pleasant experiences tend, in the main, to support the cultural factors transmitted by the past. While many of these factors are of great positive value, many others, particularly in certain fields, defeat needed readjustments and lead to social disharmonies. Hedonic factors also function in the modification, as well as in the support, of habits. While habits normally have considerable adaptive value, they often persist, especially in the domain of

politics, after the conditions to which they had reference no longer obtain.

It will be seen, on further considering the genesis of habits, that many habits are formed *which at the time* have reference to past rather than present conditions. Such, for example, is the assimilation by the young of family traditions in politics established long before, as well as of the prevalent legal traditions pertaining to property and contract, which, as we have seen, are adapted to a system of production no longer dominant. All such habits must be classed with archaic instincts as an obstructive force in society.

Some additional observations regarding traditionary factors will be in order. A large proportion of these factors have a positive social value, as, for example, the industrial arts, and other practical applications of modern science. The value of such parts of the tradition cannot be overestimated. But over against those traditions which have a high adaptive value must be set the traditions which are no longer adapted to prevailing conditions, and whose value is therefore negative rather than positive. Examples of such traditions have been given under other heads. All traditions of this sort may be deemed archaic and put in the same category with archaic instincts and habits as irrational forces in the given society. Added to the maladaptations produced by these traditions are others due to antagonistic interests or classes in society.

The physical environment is, so to speak, the arena upon which the social drama is staged. It is, of course, a great deal more than that, for materials from this environment enter in one way or another into every phase of human activity, conditioning, supporting and limiting that activity throughout. Together with our legal institutions it divides the population into economic classes or

groups bearing toward one another various complementary, coöperative, antagonistic, relationships.

These characterizations apply only to the normal, the average or the typical. They will be qualified and elaborated by the detailed results of the analysis now to be assembled. It will be convenient, in pursuance of our summary, to assemble in two parts those portions of the analysis which bear respectively on the relationships between capital and labor, considered independently of politics, and on political action, considered independently of those relationships. We can then consider the bearing of each on the other, which is one of our principal problems.

In dealing with the relationships between capital and labor, it will conduce to clarity if we consider separately the modes of operation of the several social factors which tend to produce opposition and conflict between the two classes, and then consider the modes of action of these and other factors which tend to allay this opposition, and to obviate this conflict. It will also be convenient to divide the general problem into two parts, pertaining, respectively, to the division of the product, and to industrial relationships not bearing directly on problems of distribution.

The Distribution of Income: Factors Determining This Process.—In any normally prosperous establishment, after deducting from gross receipts all operating costs, wages excepted, there will be left over a sum for distribution between the wage-earners on the one side and the owners of the capital invested on the other. (We may leave out of account salaries and fees paid managers, foremen, legal counsel, etc., as not bearing on our problem.) As we have said, the desire of human beings for goods which are limited in amount is quite expansible and almost

impossible to satisfy. Expressed in our terms, the instinctive impulses or interests of men in present-day society are so organized that an indefinite amount of wealth can be utilized in their satisfaction. And comparatively few people are content with the satisfactions afforded by any attainable amount of wealth, however large it may be. Laborers and capitalists are quite alike in this regard, although the interests of the two demand quite different amounts of wealth for their (relative) satisfaction. Wealth is now measured in terms of money, and both laborers and capitalists desire ever larger incomes in order to attain what are deemed to be greater satisfactions. Since both normally desire greater incomes than they already have, and since the incomes of both are derived, so far as concerns our problem, from the earnings of the given industrial establishment, they both will desire a greater share of those earnings than they are getting at any given time. And both capitalists and laborers will attempt to secure larger shares, unless factors operating in the contrary direction neutralize or counteract this tendency. But there are or may be such counteracting factors, and we can determine what the resultant of all these factors will be only by carefully identifying, estimating and balancing the effects of the two opposed groups of factors.

If we were seeking only to determine whether or no there is normally a conflict between capital and labor over the distribution of the product, no such calculation as this would be necessary, as experience shows that there is such a conflict. What we have to determine is the larger meaning of this conflict, and the direction in which it is tending. Let us first assemble and evaluate those factors which combine to produce this conflict, follow-

ing which the contrary factors may be assembled and evaluated.

We shall find the more potent impulses associated with hunger, sex, self-assertion, acquisitiveness, fear and pugnacity making for conflict, while impulses associated with the gregarious, parental, constructive and inquisitive tendencies are seen operating both for and against conflict. Play and submissive tendencies are likewise divided in their influence, but are inclined, on the whole, against conflict. Tendencies associated with the instinct of repulsion have no very direct bearing on this question, except as they enter into standards of taste which have a pecuniary significance. Intellectual processes are ancillary to the tendencies operating in both directions, and the influences of habit, tradition and hedonic factors are also divided.

Instinctive Impulses Operating to Produce Conflict Over Distribution.—Hunger, sex, parental and self-assertive tendencies are organized into a powerful interest known as the standard of living. The gregarious and fighting tendencies also enter conspicuously into standards of living which are competitive, as our Western standards are, while habit and tradition (custom and convention) are prominent elements in every standard. Other psychological factors are also represented, but those mentioned are the more significant.

Now, so far as our problems are concerned, food-getting, sex and parental tendencies function mainly within the complex of interests so designated, and the self-assertive tendency also finds there one of its most potent expressions. Our standards of living also represent various degrees of comfort and freedom from toil (hedonic factors). Whatever the complex of motives underlying any particular standard, improvements therein are

usually dependent on an increase in money income. And if the standard of living is the chief economic exponent of the food-getting, sex and parental tendencies, as also a potent expression of the self-assertive tendency, then the impulsion to improve the standard of living will have the combined force of all these impulses back of it. The struggle between capital and labor over the distribution of the product will be intense and determined in proportion. And these tendencies, be it noted, are the most fundamental of all, considered from the biological point of view, and hence the most potent of all.

Moreover, we must not forget that the acquisitive impulses function almost exclusively in the support of this interest. These impulses doubtless enter into the pursuit of knowledge, goodness and reputation as well, but such manifestations of those impulses are of minor importance compared with their economic manifestations. The chief object of these impulses under our money economy is money income or income-producing property in one form or another. We may say, indeed, that just because property or income provides the means for gratifying the powerful instinctive impulses represented in the standard of living, and because of a general tendency in human nature to exalt means into ends, the acquisitive impulses exercise a hegemony over other instinctive impulses in so far as they motivate economic activity. To understand fully the rôle played by acquisitive impulses in modern life we must add to the instinctive impulses represented by the standard of living, the demands laid upon the acquisitive impulses by other self-assertive tendencies, particularly those expressed in the exercise of political or financial power, as also by less egoistic impulses derived from the parental, gregarious, constructive and inquisitive tendencies, depending for their gratification, as they

largely do, upon the property or money income at one's disposal. Acquisitive impulses are less conspicuous and potent in the economic activity of the wage-earner, for owing to the economic insecurity in which he is placed, fear rather than acquisitiveness exercises the hegemony over instinctive tendencies motivating his economic activity.

In so far as standards of living are competitive and invidious, and they are typically so in our society, the impulsion to improvement thereof, and struggle for the necessary means, is an unending one, for only in exceptional cases is a level reached above which it is not desired to go further. Where motives of increased comfort or freedom from toil are operative the impulsion to increase income and improve the standard is given an added momentum. Habit enters as a potent force when the standard actually maintained is threatened. This is usually the case when wages or profits are in danger of being curtailed or wiped out altogether. One would explain by this factor the greater determination displayed in fighting threatened reductions of income than in striving for increased incomes. Struggles between capital and labor over the distribution of the product generally carry this implication for one party or the other, and this doubtless accounts for much of the animus which characterizes these struggles.

Perhaps a distinction should be made between laborers' and capitalists' standards of living in respect to the underlying motives. Veblen has insisted¹ that invidious display in the form of a conspicuous consumption of wealth is the most pronounced element in leisure-class standards of living. If that be true, these standards are differentiated psychologically from the laborer's standard in

¹ Veblen, T., *The Theory of the Leisure Class*.

respect to the rôle played by self-assertive tendencies. This greater self-assertion manifested in leisure-class standards is offensive both to the competitors in the same social circle who find themselves outdistanced, and also to laborers and others beneath them with whose standards these standards of conspicuous consumption are in such marked contrast. Competitive elements enter, of course, into the laborer's standard, but in a less invidious and offensive form. On the other hand, hedonic elements (desire for comfort and release from toil) are naturally more conspicuous in the laborer's standard than in that of the capitalist.

The bearing of the instinct of repulsion on standards of taste and expenditure has been indicated already. It is more conspicuous in class relationships having no immediate reference to the distribution of the product.

The instinctive tendencies thus organized are dependent, in the last analysis, on the fighting impulses for their satisfaction, since the tendencies of the one economic group interfere with and obstruct the tendencies of the other group. Both groups desire ever larger incomes for the realization of ever-receding standards, and a larger income for one group means a smaller income (relatively) for the opposing group. If, as we have seen, fighting impulses are apt to be aroused by the obstruction of other instinctive impulses, and to be active in proportion to the number and strength of the instinctive impulses obstructed, then obviously a strong fighting spirit will be aroused on both sides by this situation.

We may note, as a not unimportant detail, the operation of the fighting instinct in the *expenditure* of the income which falls to one's lot, wherever standards are competitive and invidious. This is seen in the "keeping up of appearances" so characteristic of shabby gentility

the world over, and in the emulative display of yachts, motor-cars and useless retainers among the select circles at the top of the social ladder.

Fear, like pugnacity, enters all along the line, for the anticipation of thwarted desires, and hence of annoyance and dissatisfaction, is generally present in a situation like this where partial failure and disappointment are the rule. Fear is, however, a pronounced element in the situation only when the standards already attained are threatened by reductions in income. And it is a dominant element where, as in the laborer's case, the bare necessities of life may be cut off at any time by a complete stoppage of income. This element may be said to *force* a conflict, for, as we have seen, the laborer has no means of escape from this situation. Fighting is his only recourse.

The gregarious tendency enters in two ways to sanction and intensify this conflict. First, the standard of living, in so far as it is invidious or competitive, is motivated by the desire to win the applause of one's social circle, and this motive is referable to the gregarious as well as to the fighting and self-assertive tendencies. This, as we have seen, is an exceedingly powerful motive for securing an increase of income, making a better showing in this competitive game possible. And, secondly, in the struggles over the distribution of income, the gregarious tendency operates to bring about greater solidarity in the group and to sanction the efforts of its members in their struggle for a greater share of the product.

Instinctive Impulses Tending to Eliminate Conflict Over Distribution.—But there are impulses associated with the parental, gregarious and other powerful tendencies, which might conceivably compose this struggle, or at least mollify it.

Considering first the gregarious tendency in this con-

nection, we may say that in so far as capitalists and laborers are members of the same herd (the given industry, or society at large), and respond to the appeals of this herd, they will seek to compose the issues which divide them and to find an equitable method of apportioning the product between them. This tendency may be quite potent, at times, as the occasional effect of appeals on behalf of the public, when a serious industrial dispute impends, shows. Experience demonstrates, however, that at normal times the gregarious tendency is more potent in supporting group interests than in promoting the welfare of the public. Such a functioning of the tendency is supported by the secondary rationalizing processes seen on both sides, which lead each group to believe that its interests are identical with the interests of the public.

A gregarious tendency referring to the industry at large, or to a particular industrial establishment, including both managers and men, is sometimes manifested, but such manifestations have no very great significance for our problems, as they are quite exceptional. Nor are they likely to become general, as we have attempted to show.

In view of these considerations we may say that the gregarious tendency is not likely to function in any very potent manner to allay the conflict over distribution between capitalist and labor groups.

The parental instinct also functions as a pacifying influence, for it sometimes leads employers to assume a protective attitude toward their men, and to accord them such shares in the product as may seem just or expedient. But wage-earners are not, for employers or employers' wives, the primary object of the parental instinct, and solicitude in their behalf grounded on this instinct is far less potent, in virtually all cases, than is their solicitude for their own offspring. For the latter are the primary

object of the instinct, while the former come within the scope of the instinct, if at all, only as secondary objects. How potent are the pecuniary demands of the instinct, in its primary form, our discussion of the standard of living will have made clear.

This secondary functioning of the instinct is more efficacious where the labor of women and children is concerned, for many employers as well as a large proportion of the "general public" are sympathetically disposed toward efforts to alleviate conditions for these weaker members of the laboring class. These efforts are not to be discounted, and we may expect a great deal more to be accomplished thereby as time goes on. But such efforts serve rather to raise the plane of the industrial conflict than to obviate or allay that conflict. Moreover, efforts such as these are generally in behalf of laborers who by themselves are unable to secure recognition of their claims for a juster share of the product. They do not bear vitally on the issues which we are considering. Indeed, restrictive laws against children's and women's labor by limiting the possibilities of increasing family incomes through such labor may make it all the more urgent on male wage-earners to strive for larger incomes. In so far as restrictive laws result in higher wages for women and children, rather than in limiting their opportunities for earning, the contrary effect is produced.

It will be seen, therefore, that the parental instinct is much more potent in motivating a struggle between laboring and capitalist classes than in producing harmony between them. Parental tendencies making for conflict are as much stronger than parental tendencies making for conciliation, as our solicitude for our own standard of living is greater than our solicitude for the standards of

other people. The former is incomparably more potent than the latter.

The constructive tendency has a certain significance for this question. In the absence of counteracting tendencies, this tendency would lead both managers and men to compose the issues between them in favor of a greater productive efficiency. Wage increases are in fact granted by employers in anticipation of demands for higher wages, and, more rarely, in order to enhance the physical, and hence the working, efficiency of their employees. The employees, on their side, occasionally forego wage increases which might be extorted from the management, because it is believed that the business itself would be crippled or handicapped thereby. As a general rule, however, pecuniary motives explain conciliatory tactics of this sort, whether on the side of the employers or of the employees. Similar motives underlie most profit-sharing and other quasi-coöperative enterprises, and this accounts no doubt for the relatively weak appeal which such projects have made to the workingman. The employer's constructive tendencies are directed generally toward the business side of the enterprise, and his policy toward his employees is usually dictated by business or pecuniary considerations. And when employees voluntarily forego wage increases, it is usually because of a belief that they stand to gain in the long run by so doing.

Appeal by or on behalf of the public for a more constructive policy on both sides doubtless has its effect, but the gregarious tendency normally sanctions group interests in preference to public interests. And under prevailing conditions, group interests necessarily have a pecuniary reference.

The explanation of the comparative impotence of the constructive tendency in this connection is doubtless that

offered by Veblen,² who holds that it is a feeble one, compared with other tendencies, and that it readily gives place to more elemental impulses when the situation seems to demand it. More elemental impulses are dominant in this situation, as we have seen, and the constructive impulse or tendency, on that account, plays a comparatively feeble rôle.

Indeed, we may say that this tendency, together with the inquisitive tendency, functions to *organize* the opposition between the two classes even more than it tends to bring them together. For it is probable that more thought and ingenuity are expended by each group in attempting to outmaneuver the opposing group than in devising means of healing the schism between the two groups. Both sides are for that reason more interested in developing their own bargaining (and fighting) organizations than in proposals for the arbitration of wages disputes, or other schemes of conciliation.

The inquisitive tendency, like the gregarious and the constructive, is on the whole an auxiliary to the pecuniary interests of the two groups, although it tends also to allay the opposition between these interests. As we saw in our discussion of the inquisitive tendency, our curiosity is for the most part canalized along lines set by the other instinctive impulses (or the interests into which they are organized), and but rarely does it dispose us to take an impersonal view of our interests in relation to the interests of others. Undoubtedly a few members of both classes do take such a view, but their cases are too exceptional to have any great significance for our problems. Since curiosity is generally subordinated or instrumental to instinctive tendencies already analyzed in connection

² Veblen, T., *The Instinct of Workmanship*, pp. 32-34.

with this problem, we shall not need to dwell on it further at this point.

The submissive tendencies appear to make on the whole for harmony rather than conflict between capitalist and labor groups. These tendencies have been at a great premium in the past, owing to the prevailing social and political conditions, and this has a profound influence on social and industrial relationships today. Powerful suggestioning agencies have adapted themselves to the exigencies of machine industry, with its manifold master-servant relationships, and so potent is the volume of suggestion proceeding from these sources in favor of humility and submission that a great proportion of mankind have been overborne by it. The gregarious tendency thus aids and abets the submissive tendency, and has given the latter much of its power in the political and industrial world today. We cannot stop to identify all the agencies by which this spirit is fostered and fortified. Suffice it to say that the churches and the schools have taught it, an omniscient state has insisted on it, while the press and other agencies of communication have raised their voices in its praise. And all these stentorian voices have met with an affirmative response from the tendency itself, or they would not have had the effect they have.

However, all the signs indicate that deference to authority as such is on the wane, and we may expect it to be a less potent force than it has been in the past. Despite the great rôle played by the submissive tendency in authoritarian societies, it is probably not of primary biological importance, and in the situation under consideration here, it is opposed by a number of tendencies more fundamental and more powerful than it can claim to be. The tendency in question cannot therefore be expected to override these more potent tendencies, save

where the suggestioning agencies which support it still retain their sway.

Play impulses, in so far as an outlet is provided for them, tend to mollify the industrial conflict rather than to aggravate it. They do not seem, however, to have any very decisive influence one way or the other. Play activities, by relieving tensions and repressions, do promote a more harmonious spirit between managers and men, and this has its bearing on the question we are considering. On the other hand, pecuniary considerations militate against any substantial realization of play possibilities, such as would give play activities their greatest pacifying effect for distributive and other industrial problems. For employers are as a rule opposed to the requisite outlay for play facilities, either under their own or under the community's auspices, and to such reductions in hours as would permit workers to avail themselves fully of opportunities that might be provided. In so far as the play program is carried out, however, it will tend to mollify, not to aggravate, conflicts over distribution and other industrial problems. Let us not forget, however, that play does not touch the more serious tensions and repressions entailed by the present system of production and distribution.

We may note, as a detail, the fact that play and recreational motives enter into the standard of living and hence serve to sharpen the demand for a larger money income wherewith to maintain the standard.

Other Factors Affecting Processes of Distribution.—

The bearing of habit, tradition, intellectual processes and hedonic factors on this particular question has received a good deal of incidental discussion already. A few details only need be added here.

Habitual modes of thought and action, considered in

themselves alone, tend to support the *status quo*. In one sense, habits *constitute* the *status quo*. If real incomes remained constant, therefore, habit would add no stimulus to efforts for an increased share of the product. Habit here operates as a powerful positive force only when reductions in income are threatened, for habitual modes of living would then have to be abandoned or modified. The impulsion to increase one's real income comes from other sources, although increases actually secured will have as a result the establishment of new habits which in turn will become a conservative force.

Habit often acts as a distinctly *reactionary* factor, for to meet an industrial change which threatens certain habits, modifications in other habits are necessary, and these are opposed by the inertia of habit itself. This reactionary effect of habit is seen, I think, in the persistence of the craft union in many industries where it has ceased to be effective, and in the disinclination of many wage-laborers, notably the professional workers, to form themselves into labor organizations. Other tendencies are of course operative in such cases, as our analysis will have shown. While the influence of habit itself is conservative, and sometimes reactionary, the very inertia of habit often leads to conflicts which overstep the limits sanctioned by habit itself.

Tradition tends in a similar direction, for it is in large part the same thing as habit, considered from another point of view. As already stated, legal traditions (of property and contract) established under the discipline of handicraft production have carried over into the era of machine industry and given rise to distinct classes controlling different categories of productive factors, whence it is inevitable that a conflict should arise over the distribution of the product. These traditions may

be replaced in time by principles more consonant with machine industry, but meanwhile the class struggle attributable in part to those traditions will go on. Certain other traditions which also arose in the handicraft period sanction this conflict, and motivate movements to reconstruct those property and contract traditions which are responsible for the conflict. These are the traditions of liberty (self-government) and equality. Finally, tradition operates to the same effect as habit, not only in supporting outworn types of labor organization, but also in deterring many workers from joining the labor movement.

Hedonic factors are correlated with the other tendencies analyzed, and need not be canvassed anew in the present connection. It is the dissatisfaction or unhappiness associated with balked desires, or with the anticipation of their being balked, the annoyance which supervenes when habits are disturbed, and the like, and, on the other hand, the satisfaction or contentment which ensues when instinctive tendencies function normally, and habits are undisturbed, which, taken together, render intelligible industrial relationships and industrial conflicts. The presence and sanction of hedonic experiences may be assumed wherever original tendencies are at work, or any of the habits, interests or other products of development in which these tendencies are represented. The hedonic factors will therefore be divided in their influence on industrial questions in the same ratio as are the instinctive impulses, habits and other mental factors which we have considered.

We have already indicated the bearing of the intellectual processes on the problem in hand. They are auxiliary, as we have seen, to the several instinctive tendencies, or to the interests which represent those tendencies.

Their influence will then be apportioned according to the operation of these tendencies.

We saw that intellectual activity has communication as its principal function, and that it is therefore intimately related to gregarious impulses or to interests based thereon. But it has also an adaptive function of value to individuals, as such, and this function has a most important social significance as well. Yet even this group of functions, so far as they bear on problems like ours, will have reference to ends or goals set by instinct, interest, habit and other elements in the will-organization of human nature.

Where great intellectual capacity is associated with a curiosity which has freed itself to a certain extent from the narrow thralldom of the instinctive impulses, and if leisure and other conditions favorable to the employment of these powers are not wanting, they may function as a dispassionate research into social and industrial problems, and lead to conclusions which are just to all the interests involved. But only a small proportion of the capitalist and laboring classes manifest an intellectual activity of this type; and intellectual processes do not therefore exhibit any marked tendency to bring the two classes together. On the contrary, intellectual processes serve the purposes of the conflict itself, since they are subordinate to mental functions which have combined to produce the conflict.

The significance of intellectual leadership is largely of the same order, as the intellectual leader must fall in with the interests of the one class or the other, if he is to make himself felt. Thinkers there are, of course, who dream of bringing the two classes together and of adjusting their differences without disturbing the foundations of the present order; and these thinkers exert some

influence in the adjudication of the issues at stake. But our analysis tends to show that their efforts will eventually end in failure, for the instinctive tendencies upon which they rely are not equal in number and potency to the tendencies working against them. Their efforts may and doubtless will serve to mitigate the violence of the conflict, though it cannot serve to terminate it. Their influence would be referable to instinctive tendencies already analyzed, notably tendencies associated with the gregarious, parental and inquisitive tendencies, as well as impulses of a feebler sort originating in constructive, submissive and play tendencies. The major influence of these instincts, save only the submissive and play tendencies, is thrown on the side of conflict, and when to them is added hunger, fear, sex, self-assertion, repulsion, pugnacity, the balance tips heavily in favor of conflict. Habit and tradition, it is true, offer a counterpoise, but not one to restore the disturbed balance. For even their influence is not wholly on the side of peace, and they are, moreover, but derivatives or auxiliaries of the instinctive tendencies, and, sooner or later, must accede to the demands laid upon them by these tendencies.

We have not deemed it necessary to resume in this connection our discussion of the physical environment, for the influence it exerts will have been made clear. The limitations of the environment, and particularly the pre-emption of free land, when added to the exigencies of machine production and the schismatic tendencies of property and contract institutions, have produced the classes whose relationships we have analyzed. These factors have, so to speak, created the class problem, whereas the mental functions operative therein have given that problem its specific character.

Resultant Tendencies of Factors Affecting Distribution.—Glancing back over our survey of the factors involved in the distribution of the industrial product, we observe that cultural and geographic factors have combined to create an acute problem of distribution; and that, by and large, the more fundamental and potent tendencies in human nature combine to engender and sustain a conflict over the issues presented. On the other hand, mental factors of a secondary, derivative or less fundamental character, and hence of a lesser potency, operate to allay or mitigate this conflict.

Assuming, as we must, that hereditary human traits will remain what they are and have been, and that the limitations of the physical environment will be no less serious in future than they are at the present time, we must conclude that this conflict will continue as long as the cultural factors which have coöperated to produce it shall remain what they are. We may assume, I think, that the industrial arts are not likely to develop in such a way as to allay this conflict, and that the popular doctrines of liberty and equality will not become less potent with the masses than they have been in the past. If these assumptions are correct, only changes in property and contract institutions can allay the conflict; and if the conflict is to be terminated altogether these changes must be such as to connote the disappearance of labor and capitalist classes as we know them.

Problems Not Directly Related to Distribution. Instinctive Impulses Making for Conflict.—The foregoing survey of factors bearing on the distribution of the product will serve, *mutatis mutandis*, in our consideration of problems not directly related to distribution. But tendencies not bearing directly on the former problem are significant for these others. As before, let us identify

and assess both those factors which make for conflict over the issues presented, and those which function in the interest of a peaceful adjudication of these issues.

Fear, repulsion, sex, pugnacity and self-assertion make for such a conflict; the parental, gregarious, constructive and inquisitive tendencies are divided in their influence; while play and submissive tendencies make on the whole for peace. Habit, tradition and the intellectual processes operate now on one side, now on the other, as we found them doing where distributive problems are involved. The hedonic factors are fairly neutral, being correlated with other tendencies having a positive significance for the one side or the other.

We saw that, owing to the economic insecurity in which the laborer finds himself, all instinctive tendencies are repressed whose expression would evoke the displeasure of managers or foremen, or which run counter to the pecuniary motives underlying modern industry.

The self-assertive tendencies of the worker are repressed because they normally arouse the anger of, and provoke punitive measures by, the manager or the foreman who has the worker under supervision. On the other hand, offensive forms of self-assertion on the part of the management tend to arouse a counter self-assertion by the worker, but this tendency likewise must be repressed, if the worker is to retain the managerial favor, and hence his own hold on the means of subsistence. The self-assertive tendency therefore finds but little outlet for the wage-worker under modern industrial conditions.

The constructive impulse is repressed, even where there might be an outlet for it, as its exercise would run counter either to the pecuniary interests of the employer or to those of the employee himself. To heed its promptings would usually mean either a greater labor cost or greater labor time per unit of product, and in the one

case the employer would stand to lose, while in the other case the worker himself would lose. Moreover, it might mean dismissal of the worker who indulged the impulse, in favor of one who would turn out a larger product in the given unit of time. The machine itself has its functions, we must remember, and a squeamish operative who stood in the way of its performing those functions to the best of its capacity would not be as valuable from a pecuniary point of view as one who coöperated with the machine (or with the machine system) to the fullest extent.

We saw that, even in the absence of such motives, but little outlet could be provided for the constructive impulse under modern industrial conditions. The divorce of ownership from the thing produced, the physical debility of the worker, due to overwork, undernourishment, unsanitary living and working conditions, the want of any just proportion between the worker's efficiency and the worker's reward, disgust at the pecuniary propensities of the employer himself, all tend to counteract and repress a tendency which, be it remembered, is not one of the more potent instinctive tendencies. More important than any of these conditions, however, are the exigencies of machine industry itself, connoting, as it does, the monotonous repetition of the same processes over and over again rather than that flexible adaptation of means to ends which is the essence of workmanship.

We canvassed a number of proposals looking to the amelioration of these conditions, and concluded that none of them are calculated to correct the conditions which are chiefly responsible for the repression of this impulse. These conditions are the mechanical nature of large-scale production itself, and the pecuniary motives which underlie modern industrial organization.

The most significant effect of the repression entailed by these conditions was seen to be the alienation of the worker's sympathies from the industrial concern and the industrial system incapable of providing him with a genuine creative interest, and the direction of his attention to movements aiming at the amelioration of this situation.

Closely related to the constructive impulse in this situation is the instinct of repulsion. The monotony of mechanized labor, and the excessive fatigue of mental functions involved in machine-tending arouse the laborer's disgust toward his job and toward the men and the system deemed responsible for its attendant pain and monotony. The instinct of repulsion is itself repressed under the conditions given, since the laborer cannot remove or reject the objects which arouse the impulse.

This tendency functions in a more general way in the hate, contempt and loathing which laborers and managers often entertain for one another, as also in the repugnance of sensitive people for the misery and oppression which the present system seems to entail.

The sex instinct, we decided, has only an indirect bearing on the problems now under consideration. There was found to be a certain affinity between the feminist movement, so called, which aims at a reconstruction of marriage institutions and property relationships permitting a more normal functioning of sex and parental instincts, and the radical labor movement, which aims also at a reconstruction of property relationships, though on grounds more general than those on which the feminist movement rests. This support lent the labor movement by a movement growing out of repressions of sex and parental instincts, while indirect, was not deemed on that account to be unimportant.

We noted also that a large group of workers, the so-

called casuals, suffer from a specially severe repression of both sex and parental instincts, and that this tends to increase their animus against the conditions held responsible for these and other repressions.

Both sex and parental instincts are repressed to a degree by the economic insecurity in which the worker finds himself, for we saw that the best type of family life is impossible under the conditions connoted by such insecurity. The more serious repressions under this head, however, are those entailed by insufficiency of income, and these we have already discussed in connection with the problem of distribution. Items not there summarized are the repressions involved in the postponement of marriage and the limitation of offspring entailed by inadequacy of income, or in a lowering of standards of living made necessary by the assumption of family responsibilities, either of which involves an indirect repression of sex and parental impulses in favor of more elemental sex and parental gratifications. A further item is the repression of these instincts entailed in the compulsory earning by wives and children for the purpose of enlarging the family income.

Events which are serious because of these repressions, and hence the misery and unhappiness which they involve, are likely to occur at any time, as the laborer's experience shows, and he therefore lives in constant dread of such things coming to pass. The fear tendencies thus excited are themselves repressed, as there is little or no escape from the conditions which excite those tendencies. Because of the number, seriousness and ubiquity of the contingencies anticipated, the fear excited is constant, voluminous and intense, and leads to protective reactions which are violent and determined in proportion. But all the repressions discussed under this head and in connec-

tion with the problem of distribution arouse the fighting tendency to a corresponding degree. And since escape reactions are not practicable under the circumstances, the workers' protective reactions against the dreaded contingencies take the form of a struggle against the system which is held responsible for them and for the ensuing misery and unhappiness.

Fighting reactions thus provoked will represent all the repressions of instinctive activity which we have detailed, and will tend to break down the obstructions which are responsible for them. These reactions represent also the daily repressions of the fighting tendency itself, in the factory, mine and workshop, as well as certain repressions of gregarious and play tendencies to be indicated presently. The conflict, once begun, normalizes and sanctions the fighting impulses, and these soon assume a significance equal to that of the fear impulses themselves. The gregarious tendency, already potent in both groups, sanctions and fosters the conflict. Fear is aroused among the employing group, and their fighting and self-assertive tendencies are given a new emphasis, being now directed against the rising insubordination of the laboring group. Both sides tend to become bitter, implacable and uncompromising.

Instinctive Impulses Tending to Eliminate Conflict Over Problems Not Directly Related to Distribution.—From the viewpoint of the tendencies analyzed the conflict between labor and capitalist groups would seem to be inevitable, intense, determined, and likely to endure for as long as the conditions which engender it shall prevail. What are the tendencies making for peace and harmony?

Our former canvass will serve here for the harmonizing tendencies derived from the parental, constructive and

inquisitive tendencies. The parental instinct is perhaps less potent here than where distributive problems are concerned. Antagonistic attitudes of the worker will seem to the employer more reasonable where higher wages are in question than where they are not, for both common sense and the employer's own pecuniary logic demonstrate the connection between income and welfare, whereas antagonistic reactions on other grounds, because their motives are less apparent, will seem unreasonable, if not inexplicable. And at best, as pointed out in another connection, wage-workers would be only secondary objects of the parental instinct, and to the feeble promptings of the instinct in this attenuated form will be opposed more potent impulses issuing from the self-assertive, fighting and gregarious tendencies, here concerned with objects which are primary rather than secondary or derived. These calculations should make it clear that the parental instinct will not triumph in situations such as this, save in isolated cases where it is abnormally strong.

Constructive tendencies will also prompt both groups, or members of both groups, to find a *modus vivendi* designed to obviate upsetting conflicts of the kind indicated. These tendencies, however, are generally instrumental to ends defined by more elemental tendencies, although it has claims of its own which seek satisfaction when the opportunity offers. In so far as specific gregarious and parental tendencies are operative which have reference to the society- or the industry-at-large, we may expect the constructive tendencies to operate in the direction of social and industrial peace. But other tendencies are more potent in this situation, as our analysis should have demonstrated. Sex, parental and self-assertive tendencies, as manifested in the standard of living, added to the self-assertion and repulsion aroused on both sides,

in the factory and workshop, together with fear, fighting and gregarious impulses which support these tendencies, are far more potent than the socializing influences derived from the parental and gregarious tendencies. And we may expect the constructive tendencies to serve the more potent group. Indeed its own repression has, in the worker's case, added momentum to the complex of tendencies making for conflict, and it will find in their service a certain outlet denied it in the first instance.

Likewise with the inquisitive tendency. It usually functions in the interest of more elemental tendencies, combining with the intellectual processes to search out the means or conditions for their gratification. A few employers and wage-workers doubtless do take an "objective attitude" toward one another and toward the economic system as a whole, but their number is too small to exert any very powerful influence on the policies of wage-earning and employing groups at large.

The rôle which the detached thinker plays in this situation is similar to that imputed to him in connection with the problem of distribution. He either falls in with the dominant tendencies of the one group or the other, or engages in an effort to harmonize the opposed groups of tendencies, relying in the latter case on a complex of tendencies which cannot accomplish what he expects of it.

Our former analysis of submissive tendencies will also apply here. Where they are potent, they make for industrial peace, although they often tend to defeat themselves by encouraging an offensive self-assertion on the part of those to whom submission is made, thus provoking reactions which may override the submissive tendencies themselves. As we have pointed out, these tendencies may be expected to play a less important rôle, or manifest themselves in less servile forms, in the future than they

have in the past. Where dominant, however, they will tend to restrict the area of the industrial conflict rather than to make that conflict less determined where it has once begun. For the submissive tendencies recede more and more into the background when struggles of the sort under consideration have been initiated. The restriction of the area over which conflict takes place, due to submissive tendencies, carries with it significant implications for those engaged in the conflict, as their methods must necessarily take into account the limitation of their number due to this and other causes. We refer, of course, to the labor group.

The play tendencies operate on the whole toward peace and harmony, as we have shown. In so far as specific tensions and repressions can be relieved by play and other forms of relaxation, their reaction against the conditions which have caused them will be less violent. Such relief has a positive value apart from its bearing on the industrial situation. But, as we undertook to show, play and relaxation do not affect the conditions which repress the instinctive tendencies in the first instance, and they can do little, if anything, to divert the animus thus aroused toward other objects than these same conditions. The anticipation of these repressions will excite the fear tendencies in just the same way as before, although the fear aroused might have less of a brooding, pathological character were a temporary escape provided through play; and the actual repressions of the tendencies in question will provoke the same sort of fighting reactions as before, although these, too, might be allayed temporarily through play. The fear and fighting reactions will in the main be directed against the specific situations which have aroused them.

We saw, on the other hand, that employers as a class

are not likely because of pecuniary considerations, to coöperate whole-heartedly in the realization of a general play program. And just as play motives enter into the standard of living to sharpen the demand for larger incomes wherewith to maintain the standard, so it enters also into working standards and sharpens the demand for a working day compatible with the gratification of play impulses. Directly, then, play tendencies make for industrial peace; but indirectly, and perhaps more potently, they make for industrial conflict.

We have already spoken of the harmonizing tendencies which are derived from the gregarious tendency. We are familiar with appeals on behalf of "the public," and the effect they have on both labor and capitalist groups, and particularly on the labor group. We have seen, on the other hand, how gregarious tendencies normally support group interests and group struggles, though, as we have seen, they function in the form of "public opinion" to raise the plane of group struggles.

We have to recall now certain gregarious tendencies which, like the submissive tendencies, serve to limit the area of industrial conflict, and to modify the tactics whereby this conflict is waged.

The dominant class in a society, through its control of the means of communication, and hence of suggestioning agencies, is able to impress its views on a large number of people whose interests are quite antagonistic to its own, or else neutral as between the opposed interests of the dominant and the subordinate classes. Moreover, many who are sympathetic to the claims of the labor group are deterred from allying themselves with this group by interests whose satisfaction depends on the maintenance of friendly connections with the opposing group. Others who are eligible to membership in the group are repelled

from it by the imputed social inferiority of the group, although they may be quite ready to concede the legitimacy of its claims.

These tendencies make it impossible for the subordinate (labor) class to attract to its standard many whose interests would ally them with it, and to secure the neutrality of others whose interests are indifferent to those of both classes. They operate therefore to exclude or restrict the use of political methods in the satisfaction of labor claims, including methods of persuasion which might win public support for the labor side in struggles waged by non-political methods. For the opposing group largely creates "the public" and its opinion, through its manipulation of the means of communication, and by the same means, together with other means supplied by its financial power, it dominates the political machinery. This necessarily forces labor to rely mainly upon methods which are not political, and to make such use of these non-political or "direct" methods as may be best calculated to attain the ends in view. The predominantly economic (as contrasted with the political) character of the labor movement in this country is thus to be explained, as also the drift toward industrial unionism, and plans for the establishment of a labor hegemony in the hands of workers employed in the basic industries.

In sum, then, the gregarious tendency operates to restrict the area of the industrial conflict, and to regulate this conflict in behalf of the public; but this influence is counterbalanced by the sanctions which it brings to bear upon industrial conflicts, and by methods employed by the labor group, calculated to offset the advantages accruing to the opposing group from its control of suggestioning agencies, and its manipulation of political machinery.

Let us note, finally, that if herds are formed on the basis of common experiences, then it was inevitable that "class-conscious" labor and capitalist groups should have arisen. And because the groups of relationships which they represent are antagonistic, as well as complementary, one to the other, these groups will, in the nature of the case, struggle as well as coöperate with each other.

Other Factors Affecting Problems Not Directly Related to Distribution.—Only certain details need here be added to our assemblage, in connection with the problem of distribution, of factors coming under the categories of habit, tradition, intellectual processes, physical environment, pain and pleasure.

Master-servant traditions carrying over from the handicraft period, in so far as their spirit still prevails, tend toward harmony rather than conflict. But class relationships under machine industry are radically different from those characteristic of handicraft production, and this difference creates or constitutes a new situation where the influence of tradition itself tends to disappear, while instinctive tendencies and other dynamic factors tend to become dominant. Property and contract traditions have served, as we saw, to create the capitalist and labor classes, and bring them into antagonistic (as well as coöperative) relationships with each other. The effect of tradition (or conservatism) in deterring many workers from joining the labor movement, and in determining the employers' opposition thereto, has the same significance here as for the problem of distribution. This tendency of tradition, like certain gregarious and submissive tendencies, serves rather to limit the area of industrial conflict than to mitigate this conflict where it does occur. The inertia of tradition also serves to support methods of waging industrial conflicts which are no longer efficacious in promoting

the aims which motivate the conflict. Traditions of liberty and equality function in the one case as in the other to motivate movements for the correction of conditions deemed incompatible with these traditions.

Habit works out to the same effect, in so far as we are to identify it with tradition. We should note as an additional effect of habit, but without attaching any particular significance to it, the opposition it offers to the continuous change in methods of production so characteristic of modern industry. Habit is also seen in the worker's reluctance to change a trade or a job to which he has become accustomed. This obviously tends toward a measure of caution and docility calculated to insure the worker's continuance in the same trade or the same job. Habits, however, are normally less potent in the situation here considered than are other factors operative therein, owing both to the derivative, auxiliary nature of habit itself, and to characteristics of modern industry which deprive habit of much of its force.

We may pass by the intellectual processes with the simple reminder that they are subordinated and auxiliary to instinctive tendencies and other mental functions already analyzed. They are even less efficacious in leading to objective conclusions on matters not pertaining to distribution than to those which do. As represented by the intellectual leader they have a significance not to be discounted, but this we have already attempted to identify.

Hedonic factors are correlated with other mental functions analyzed, and their influence distributed in the same proportion as theirs was found to be.

The physical environment, having passed under the ownership of a limited number of people (property-holders), those dependent on this environment, but having no legal right to it, are brought under the dominion of

those who do have this right. This leads to conflict between the two over the pecuniary and other conditions which the owners of the environment attempt to impose on others who seek access to the environment. But these propertyless people control another factor equally necessary with property to the production of merchantable commodities, and this enables them to urge their conflict against the property-holders with some measure of success.

Resultant Tendencies of Factors Affecting Problems Not Directly Related to Distribution.—Looking back over our canvass of factors bearing on industrial issues not directly correlated with distribution, we see, again, that the factors making for industrial conflict are more potent than those which make for industrial peace. Of the instinctive tendencies involved in the situation the more elemental are on the side of conflict, although certain impulses derived from the gregarious and parental tendencies operate in the direction of peace. Fear, repulsion, sex, pugnacity and self-assertion are almost wholly on the side of conflict, while the more potent impulses associated with the parental, gregarious, constructive and inquisitive tendencies operate in the same direction. Where these latter tendencies operate in the direction of peace, their effect is generally to limit the area of industrial conflict and not to mitigate that conflict when it does occur. The same is true of the submissive tendencies. Play impulses, when given an outlet, tend to diminish the virulence of the laborer's fear and fighting tendencies, but they cannot divert the animus of the latter from the conditions which have provoked these tendencies. And both the play and the submissive tendencies often operate, though indirectly, in the direction of conflict. Impulses associated with the parental, gregarious, constructive and inquisitive tenden-

cies do tend to allay industrial conflict, but more potent impulses derived from these tendencies operate in the opposite direction.

Other factors are divided in their influence. While both habit and tradition act as conservative forces, it is the inconsistency of certain traditional factors (property and contract) with certain others (the doctrines of liberty and equality) which predetermines the conflict, while habit is deprived of much of its conservative force by the continuous change characteristic of modern industry, to which the laborer must adapt himself, and by the involuntary mobility of the worker, due to his general economic insecurity.

The intellectual processes are also divided, but they tend on the whole to support the industrial conflict, being correlated with a complex of tendencies which incline in that direction. The control of the physical environment in accordance with property and contract traditions is a determinant of industrial conflict, while the environment now offers but little escape for those who would flee this conflict. Hedonic factors run with the others, whether for or against conflict.

The Future of Private Capitalism.—To conclude our survey of the factors making for and against class conflict under machine industry, we have shown that on the most scrupulous comparison of the two complexes of factors, the balance is decidedly in the direction of conflict. The analysis shows that the rise of "class-conscious" capitalist and labor classes, and a struggle between them over distribution of the product, and over working conditions, were inevitable. We have assumed that the industrial arts will not, in any calculable future, so develop as to obviate this conflict; that the physical environment can furnish no corrective of it; that the human organism will

react in the future as in the past, when confronted by the same or similar situations; that the doctrines of liberty and equality are not likely to relax their hold on the popular consciousness; and that, therefore, the struggle between the capitalist and labor classes will continue as long as those institutions of property and contract, which, together with other factors, have determined the conflict, shall endure.³

It is outside the scope of our inquiry to consider at any length the current proposals for a readjustment of relationships between capitalist and labor classes. What we have been concerned to do is rather to analyze the factors operative in the industrial situation and determine in what direction they are tending. If our analysis has been correct, proposals which assume the possibility of a harmonious cooperation between capitalist and labor classes are doomed to failure. Those proposals all contemplate one form or another of "industrial government" designed to harmonize the interests of the two classes, or programs of "labor legislation" viewed as a means of satisfying, or at least of placating, the labor group. There is no doubt that these measures would tend to mitigate the virulence of the industrial conflict, but they would not abolish the underlying causes thereof. These causes are the geographic and traditionary factors we have analyzed, and the conflicting psychological tendencies of the labor and capitalistic groups. And any machinery which may be established to harmonize these conflicting forces, while it may serve to register changes which they produce, can do little or nothing to harmonize those forces themselves.

³ Substantial modifications of these institutions are in process of being introduced. See Roscoe Pound, *The Spirit of the Common Law*, pp. 185 *et seq.*

The legal recognition of property in the job, as proposed by Professor Commons,⁴ would accomplish more, for it would do much to alleviate that economic insecurity which intensifies the worker's reactions against the prevailing conditions. Such a measure would be a long step toward the adaptation of property and contract institutions to the exigencies of machine production. So fundamental a change in the worker's status, and in the worker's interest, could probably be effected only by the workers themselves, and against the opposition of the capitalist group; for all the dominant instinctive tendencies of this group, with the traditions and habits of thought which support them, would in all probability rise up in protest against it. And even so fundamental a change would not terminate the conflict between the two groups, as we should then have two forms of property, both necessary to the production of merchantable commodities, and each clamoring for a greater share of the product.

If, in conclusion, we may assume that no permanent equilibrium between such gigantic forces is possible, and that one set of forces is likely to increase its strength at the expense of the other—assumptions which seem to be warranted by the analogies of history—then the outcome of the present situation will probably be the complete ascendancy of the one class or the other. We are perhaps not in a position at the present time to say which alternative it will be. But the growing power of the labor movement would seem to indicate the eventual ascendancy of the laboring class, and a corresponding decline of the capitalist class. Judging from historical experience, however, that would not mean the total disappearance of private capitalism but only its relegation to a subordinate place in the economic system.

⁴ See *ante*, p. 39.

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CHAPTER XXIII

CONCLUSIONS: THE NATURE OF POLITICAL ACTION

LET us recall, in approaching our political problems, that human behavior is everywhere largely determined by instinct, habit and tradition, and that these normally have reference to the personal and the immediate rather than to the more remote and impersonal. But we must recognize factors in political behavior which have a broader reference than have the majority of habits, traditions and instinctive impulses. Our task is to compare the two sets of factors in relation to politics, with a view to ascertaining the nature of political action, and its degree of competency in dealing with issues between social classes, and, more particularly, the issues between capitalist and labor classes in this country.

Many instinctive tendencies have but little direct bearing on political behavior, although they are represented in economic or other interests which do have an important bearing. This group of instinctive tendencies includes hunger, fear, repulsion, acquisitiveness, constructiveness, sex and parental instincts, and play tendencies. The larger significance of these tendencies for political behavior will come out in our discussion, in that connection, of the interests into which these tendencies have been organized. More direct influences of these tendencies on political behavior will, however, be noted presently. Of greater direct significance for politics are the fighting, self-assertive, submissive, inquisitive and gregarious impulses, particularly the inquisitive and the gregarious.

Irrational Factors in Politics.—Except when there are

serious food shortages hunger has no direct bearing on political questions. It has never been a serious political factor in this country and probably will not be in any future period which we can now foresee. It does enter in a modified form in the political attitudes of the lower-income groups, particularly in periods of rising prices, when dietary and other elements in the standard of living are apt to suffer.

Nor has fear any great immediate bearing on political questions. It does operate, probably, to deter many people from allying themselves with labor or other radical parties, as people known to be affiliated with such parties are often penalized for it in one way or another. There is no means of determining how much influence fear exerts in this connection, but I suspect it is greater than would commonly be supposed. Doubtless fear also leads the major parties, or the powers that stand back of them, to placate those dissatisfied with and liable to repudiate those parties, by the promise of reforms calculated to retain their allegiance. As we shall see, however, party performances rarely come up to party promises, so that fear operates here to modify the tactics employed in the pursuit of political power, more than to determine the uses of that power after its acquisition.

Repulsion is occasionally quite conspicuous in political behavior, as when a party leader or public official has made himself obnoxious to the public by an apparent disregard of the public's sentiment. This sentiment is itself largely manufactured by the "organs of public opinion," though other factors contribute to its formation, while the agencies of opinion are not themselves homogeneous in respect to the interests and the prejudices which they represent. Want of popularity neither proves nor disproves, there-

fore, any actual disregard of public interests on the part of the unpopular official, or party leader.

The normal procedure when a public official has made himself obnoxious to the public is to turn him out and put somebody else in, usually some one from the opposing party. As a rule, this does little or no good, but the instinct of repulsion will nevertheless have had its way. There is not even this satisfaction in the case of the obnoxious party leader, unless perchance he has made himself obnoxious also to the group of partisans upon whom his power depends.

With nation-wide woman suffrage, sex motives and differences may be expected to play a more potent rôle in politics than they have in the past. I confess myself unable to suggest with any degree of confidence just what the difference will be. Perhaps politics will be made "cleaner." It is possible, too, that by bringing a greater measure of intelligence to bear on public questions, politics will be made more rational. But there will be a greater lump (the electorate) to be leavened by this greater quantity of intelligence, and it may be that no great accession of rationality will ensue.

The parental instinct will doubtless exert a greater influence in politics than it has in the past. And where evils are fairly obvious and simple, as, for example, the exploitation of female and juvenile workers, we may expect a prompter remedy than the men have ever been disposed to supply. Perhaps a more comprehensive program of labor legislation will now be possible, owing to the political power of the women. Housing, sanitary, educational and recreational needs are also likely to be more amply provided for. Political action may therefore be more competent in dealing with such matters than it has been in the past.

It is not likely by virtue of the women's influence alone to deal more effectually with the fundamental issues between capital and labor. The parental instinct is usually divided against itself where these issues are involved, and its more potent tendencies will support in the future, as in the past, the pecuniary demands of one's own family, not the claims of an oppressed group. The more egoistic promptings of the instinct will therefore normally override its more altruistic impulses, when the two come into conflict on the political arena.

The chief significance of the acquisitive tendency for our problems lies in its connection with economic interests, particularly the pecuniary interests of capitalist and labor groups. This tendency has, however, a more direct significance for these problems which we must attempt to identify.

Our political machinery is such as to permit, and even to require, a class of professional politicians whose function it is to keep politics going.¹ Many public functions are, of course, exempted in large measure from their influence, as the extension of the merit system in the civil service, among other things, demonstrates. But the determination and execution of policy is largely in the hands of these professional politicians.

Now, politics is viewed by the average professional as a business, a more or less congenial business, it is true, but nevertheless a *bona fide* business, and one which is conducted according to the principles and usages which prevail in the business world generally. This amounts to saying that the average or typical politician has his pecuniary interests to serve just as has the business man in

¹ Cf. Henry Jones Ford, *The Rise and Growth of American Politics*, especially Chaps. XXIII-XXV; C. E. Merriam, *The American Party System*; M. Ostrogorski, *Democracy and the Party System*; James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth*, Part III, etc.

other fields, however much the politician may like the game for its own sake. I do not imply that men do not often enter politics from other motives, such as the desire to render a public service, or to win fame or power. I am only attempting to state the general rule. Nor do I imply that the politicians themselves are generally "corrupt," if by corruption we mean a disregard, from venal motives, of prevailing moral standards; for the politicians normally conform to the moral standards which rule their world (the world of business).

Success in the political business means taking whatever opportunities of gain may be offered by and through the use of political connections. In utilizing these opportunities the politician takes care to pay that measure of respect to the law or to prevailing moral standards which is deemed expedient, just as do other business men. These opportunities, for the most part, are afforded, and could only be afforded, by business interests, the interests, that is to say, of the dominant class. This is so mainly because the dominant class knows what it wants from these politicians, knows also what the things wanted are worth, and hence what they can afford to pay for these things. And they can afford to pay more handsomely for the things they want than could the subordinate class, or its members, for things they might want. And it is good business to accept the highest bid in all matters of this kind. Again, we do not imply that any of these people are corrupt, in the correct sense of that term; they would be adjudged corrupt only by people who insisted on applying standards to their conduct which they themselves do not accept. And this would be a bit disingenuous, as all these business men would admit.

We have here, if I mistake not, part of the explanation for the failure of political parties and party politicians

to redeem promises which go counter to the interests of the business men, and more particularly of those business men who can pay most handsomely for what they want.

The acquisitive tendency plays the same rôle here as it does in the business man's pecuniary interests. It seems, that is, to exercise a hegemony over the other impulses of the politician, in so far as they enter into his political business. The gregarious tendency (in its convivial form) appears to be more potent in the average politician than in other business men, which doubtless accounts for his predilection to politics rather than to business of a different cast.

The immediate significance of the constructive tendency for our problems can be readily indicated. Let us recall that this tendency is normally instrumental to ends or purposes defined by more elemental tendencies, although, having its foundations in original nature, it has claims of its own which seek satisfaction. Regarded in either aspect, however, the tendency will function, in the political domain, within the limits imposed upon it by the more elemental tendencies (or interests) which are there dominant. It occasionally happens, of course, that a man comes into power who reaches out beyond these dominant interests and accords a measure of recognition to other interests more or less opposed thereto. It happens, too, that men in power oftentimes conceive the idea of adjusting antagonistic interests, to the end of their greater serviceability to the community at large. These are, of course, expressions of constructive and other socializing tendencies which must be taken for what they are worth. They are exceptional, however, and of but small significance for our particular problems. More often the tendency is in the opposite direction, as our analysis will have shown; for subordinate groups which are powerful

enough to affect the selection of candidates, and to secure pledges from these candidates in behalf of their interests, are not able, as a rule, to secure the redemption of these pledges, and for the reason that the interests opposed to theirs can bring the greater pressure to bear on the candidates who are elected to office.

We need only note, in addition, the significance of the constructive tendency for those governmental functions which are accepted by all classes as legitimate, and which are therefore largely exempted from the pressure of class interests. These functions have only a minor significance for our problems, but they must be taken into consideration later on when we attempt to define the limits of political action.

Play tendencies enter into political activity in a number of ways, but these have no great significance for our special problems. The politician has been quick to seize upon the play impulses and exploit them in the interests of his machine, as the use he has made of the saloon, the clubhouse and the picnic will show. Play motives also add much to the zest of a political campaign, for those who share its enthusiasm, and for many, no doubt, the sporting features of the political campaign constitute its chief value. Moreover, the desire to be on the winning side accounts in part for the powerful appeal made by the major parties, and the correspondingly weak appeal of all minor parties. The part which the "band wagon" plays in political caricatures is a recognition of this all too human desire to be on the winning side in the end. A closer analysis would no doubt refer this impulse to the self-assertive, fighting and gregarious tendencies, for it connotes the familiar tendencies to act with the crowd and to impose one's will upon one's fellows. The significance of play

for political behavior is of the same order therefore as that of the tendencies which enter into play impulses.

Provision for play needs is an increasingly important function of government, and leisure-time activities are now recognized to have a far-reaching political significance, as movements to exempt these activities from the exploitation of party machines and commercial interests will testify. I cannot convince myself, however, that such movements have any great prospective value as solutions for problems such as ours.

The submissive tendencies have the utmost importance for all forms of social activity, political action included. A state would be impossible without them, and so would an economic system. We cannot undertake here to trace out the significance of these tendencies for politics generally, but only for our particular problems.

As we have said in another connection, submissive behavior has been at a premium in the past, and it is so today for a large proportion of people, and particularly for those dependent on their wages for a livelihood. For the latter constitute a *subordinate* class, and this means that they are obliged to submit themselves to their superiors, it matters not how unwilling that submission may be. For the penalties of insubordination are so serious that few are disposed to incur them. Only by matching the power of the dominant class can a subordinate class venture to challenge that power, and in so far they will have ceased to be a subordinate class.

The same analysis applies to the state and its subjects. The latter are obliged to submit without overmuch complaint to the authority of the state, unless they are in a position to challenge and hence to modify the state's power.

Now, the traditions supporting the authority of the modern state are very much more powerful than traditions upholding the authority of a dominant class considered independently of the state. And in this country the state is further strengthened by the broad suffrage upon which it rests, for this gives it the appearance of representing all classes of citizens, and hence of deserving their allegiance. Moreover, the state has more potent sanctions at its command than has the dominant class, for it may deprive the subject of his life or liberty, whereas the dominant class can only deprive him of his livelihood.

For these reasons many of those who are subordinated both to the state and to the dominant class will challenge the authority of the one when they would not think of challenging the authority of the other. Indeed there is a growing tradition in support of the right to challenge the authority of the dominant class, while there is only a feeble tradition in support of a right to challenge the authority of the state.

The significance of this difference for our problems is readily indicated. The state inclines in its action toward the interests of the dominant class, but it is not to be identified wholly with that class. And its partiality to the interests of that class will not be recognized by a large proportion of those subject to state authority. On the other hand, a considerable proportion of the subordinate class will recognize this partiality of the state to the interests of the dominant class, and this will tend to undermine their loyalty to the state. And they will be prepared, eventually, to renounce their allegiance to the state in those matters wherein it is believed to be partial, when the situation offers a favorable opportunity for so doing. We shall then have this result: A large proportion of the subordinate class will be prepared to challenge the author-

ity of the dominant class, when not inhibited therefrom by the state itself; while a smaller proportion of the subordinate class will be ready, on occasion, to challenge the authority of the state as well.

This analysis suggests the existence of limits to political action where class antagonisms are concerned, and indicates the possibility of the state being unable to make good its authority where vital class issues are involved. For in crucial situations involving issues upon which the disaffected section of the subordinate class is unwilling to compromise, the authority of the state may be repudiated, and what amounts to a new political power may be established. Obviously, however, such a result will ensue only when that section of the subordinate class which stands ready to defy the existing state has the power to overcome the state and make good its claims to a superior authority. A development such as this is seen in the growing political power of the laboring class in Great Britain and many parts of continental Europe. Whether a similar development will take place in this country depends on a number of circumstances, many of which have no parallel in European conditions. This is a question, however, which goes beyond the limits of our inquiry, although one raised by the consideration of our special problems. In any case our further discussion should throw some light on it.

It will be convenient to consider together the fighting and self-assertive impulses, so far as they bear directly on the problems in hand. We shall content ourselves, in this connection, with recalling the bearing of pugnacity and self-assertion on the formation of political opinion. We saw that they play a less important rôle in the formation of political opinions than in the support and justification of opinions emanating from other sources. When a man through interest, habit or family tradition identifies

himself with a political opinion or a political party, that opinion or that affiliation becomes, so to speak, a part of his personality, and he tends to fight for it and impose it on others as he does other desires or ideas of which he has become possessed. This phenomenon is seen, in its collective aspect, in the heated political struggles into which our political campaigns are apt to develop. The gregarious tendency is also manifest in these phenomena, for it serves to weld members of that same party, or people of the same opinions, more closely together, and to intensify the passions associated with party and political opinion.

The most potent impulses in political behavior are those derived from the gregarious tendency. We shall perhaps get a clearer picture of the part played by this tendency in politics if we consider it in conjunction with habit and tradition as also operating in politics.

We have seen that man, because he is a gregarious animal, tends to identify himself with the herd in matters of opinion; that the traditional opinion, because it has possession of the field to begin with, is the opinion accepted by the herd; but that nevertheless new opinions will be accepted (and acted on), provided they are not dissociated from the herd to which the individual belongs. The acceptance of statements not definitely dissociated from the herd is, as we saw, a normal reaction of the human mind.

Now, the interests of the dominant class are for the most part bound up with the *status quo*, or the traditional; and the gregarious tendency will therefore normally support the interests of this class, providing there are no powerful suggestioning forces operating in the contrary direction. But the dominant class largely controls the suggestioning agencies of society, and is thereby enabled

to protect itself against hostile suggestioning forces. By the same token the dominant class is able to procure the adoption of new opinions when its interests so require, for it can put the necessary suggestioning force behind the opinions it desires to have prevail. That is to say, the dominant class can put a greater volume of reiteration behind its opinions than can the opposing class, and it is the volume of reiteration which normally decides the issue represented by conflicting opinions. For just the same reasons that faction of a crowd which can shout loudest and longest will rule that crowd. There is here no intention, of course, of impugning the motives of either the dominant or the subordinate class, for secondary rationalizing processes lead them both to believe that their opinions are altogether just and reasonable.

This analysis explains, in large part, how political opinion originates, and how it functions. Most of it is traditional opinion, which on the whole supports the *status quo*, and whatever in it is new originates for the most part in suggestion, and this also generally supports the interests identified with the *status quo*.

Political opinion is expressed by party organizations, which are themselves largely the product of tradition, and representative of it. Habit and *family* traditions come in here to lend their support to political traditions, and to the gregarious tendencies which sanction these traditions. Party affiliations are inherited along with the family property, and are held on to even more tenaciously than is the latter, while party affiliations entered into on other grounds are apt to become habitual and, in their turn, to give rise to family traditions in politics. It matters little if the party organization itself has in the course of time radically changed its character, for party loyalty is more in the nature of an allegiance to party names and shibbo-

leths than of a devotion to the principles for which the party really stands. Under the manipulation of the dominant interests parties do change, and change radically (largely to meet the requirements of those interests), but that does not serve to alienate the support of any considerable number of those allied to these parties by habit or family tradition. People's interests may be diametrically opposed to the interests for which these dominant parties stand, but this does not often serve to weaken their attachment to these parties.

Summary of Irrational Factors in Politics.—It will be well, before considering the inquisitive tendency and other factors which tend to counteract habit, tradition and the gregarious tendency in the generation of political opinions, to summarize our discussion of other tendencies in their more immediate bearings on this question.

Hunger we dismissed as having but little direct bearing on political questions. Fear, as we saw, deters many who entertain opinions which are too critical of the *status quo* from publicly supporting these opinions, or, in other words, from affiliating themselves with radical parties for giving effect to these opinions. Repulsion plays only a minor rôle in politics, serving merely to determine (in part) oscillations of power between the dominant parties, although it adds a certain force to radical reactions against both parties.² Sex motives cannot be relied on to work any great change in politics, except perhaps in the direction of a vague "purification" thereof. The parental instinct, owing to the entrance of women into politics, will play a greater rôle than it has in the past, but it can operate only to correct more obvious evils which have little or no connection with vital class interests; it cannot be relied on to alter in any fundamental way the connection

² Cf. *The New Republic*, August 18, 1920, pp. 320-322.

between class interests and political action. The fighting and self-assertive tendencies operate to confirm rather than modify political opinions derived in the main from other sources. The acquisitive tendency, in its more direct bearing on politics, represented, as we recall, by the pecuniary interests of the professional politician, serves mainly to defeat the realization of promises, extorted under duress of the political campaign, from the two dominant parties. The constructive tendency is normally instrumental to objects, or interests, defined by more elemental tendencies, although tending, occasionally, to integrate these interests in a broader program of community welfare. Play impulses have but small part in the genesis of political opinions, although, as we saw, they are exploited by the professional politician (hence by the interests that stand back of him) in the upbuilding of party organizations. The submissive tendencies operate to confirm and support political power, however established, although a small minority will emancipate themselves from the more servile of these tendencies, and stand ready to repudiate political authority when circumstances seem to warrant such action.

The net effect of these tendencies, considered in their more direct bearings on political action, is considerable, but quite secondary in character to that of habit, tradition and the gregarious tendency, also considered as directly determining political action. But their resultant effect is to support these latter factors in the establishment and the furtherance of group interests.

In the foregoing analysis we have taken for granted the operation of these various tendencies in the form of group interests, and their significance, as such, for political action. A few words only will be needed to make the assumptions under this head more explicit.

We have assumed, first, that financial power largely determines the influence of the press and other suggestioning agencies, and that the greater part of this power, and hence the greater part of this influence, are exercised by the dominant class in its own interest. This assumption will be considered at length in a later part of the discussion.

We have assumed, secondly, that the dominant class will utilize its financial power more directly to manipulate political machinery in the furtherance of its interests. This assumption follows logically from the conclusions yielded by our discussion of certain factors operative in economic activity, and found there in the form of class interests. It will be admitted that, in so far as these interests wage their conflict on the political arena, each group will employ the resources at its disposal in its own behalf. And since the dominant class has far greater resources for waging this conflict than has the opposing class, political machinery will be more amenable to its control. This assumption, also, will be supported at a later point in the discussion.

Rationalizing Factors in Politics.—We come now to the factors which operate in the contrary direction, and which tend, therefore, to make political action more competent in dealing with the vital interests of society, and particularly with conflicting class interests. These factors are the inquisitive tendency, the intellectual processes, certain gregarious tendencies and certain political traditions, although, as we shall see, other factors to be subsumed under the same general categories operate to a contrary effect. There are, in addition, the subordinate group interests themselves, which tend to *counteract* the resultant tendencies of the irrational factors just analyzed.

We have seen that inquisitiveness is a comparatively feeble disposition in most people, and that it is normally instrumental to ends set by more elemental tendencies. Perhaps it was not altogether an accident that "interests" was the term coined to denote these ends, for these are the objects of interest, or curiosity, for the great majority of mankind. We saw, too, that but few people have the intellectual capacity to think through complicated questions, and arrive at independent conclusions thereon. A much smaller number of people will have a strong curiosity *in the right direction*, plus the requisite intellectual capacity, energy, leisure and training to equip them for research leading to well-grounded opinions on political questions.

We explained on biological grounds the incompetency of the human intellect in dealing with the complicated questions of modern politics, for we saw that the situations with which our primitive ancestors had to deal were incomparably more simple than analogous situations today, and indeed that the prevailing conditions in that early period were such as effectually to repress intellectual activity of the order called for by our own civilization.

Perhaps the point can best be emphasized by pointing to the backwardness of political science. Serious thinkers on political questions would be conceded to approximate nearer than others to the conditions laid down as requisite to the formation of valid opinions on complex political questions. And although serious thought has been given to political questions for more than two thousand years, we have made woefully small progress in the establishment of a serviceable political science. How few of the many who have written on political questions have gone beneath the surface of those questions and seen what was going on there! With what difficulty naturalistic methods

make their way in the domain of political inquiry, especially where the more fundamental problems are concerned! Some few there are who do penetrate beneath the surface of these problems, and these people have their influence, often a very great influence, on the disposition of these problems. But the political opinions of all but a very few are determined in the main by factors of an altogether different kind.

We cannot say, then, that the inquisitive tendency and the intellectual processes which function with it offer any great counterpoise to habit, suggestion or other factors operating in the opposite direction. The intellectual processes and the inquisitive tendency (in combination with altruistic impulses associated with the parental and gregarious tendencies) do, however, have an influence more extensive than the number of able thinkers on political questions would signify. For the results of their inquiry are passed out in a diluted form by suggestioning agencies and affect the opinions of great masses of people. They have their more decisive effects, however, when they fall in with vital group interests, or with powerful social traditions, save in the rare cases where they themselves serve to initiate a tradition destined to become powerful or give rise to a powerful group interest. The chief significance of the thinker for our problems, at any rate, lies in the more intelligent direction he gives to group interests, or, considered in another aspect, in the new or more vital material he supplies to suggestioning agencies. These latter are the more fundamental and potent, as we shall now endeavor to show.

As we have indicated, there are likely to be thinkers who will see and point out to the subordinate group the political implications of its economic interests. Many members of the labor group will themselves have recog-

nized the incompatibility of their interests with dominant political traditions, while an even larger number of this group will be prepared by the disappointments and humiliations incident to their daily labor to break away from these traditions, once a movement in this direction is initiated.

These factors in themselves would not lead to independent political action, were there not, in addition, suggestioning forces to counteract similar forces emanating from the opposite camp. The existence of such counter suggestioning forces connotes the prior formation of a labor herd, as suggestioning forces are bound up with and derive their effect from herd impulses. As the labor herd grows it will be easier and easier, barring the operation of neutralizing tendencies, to convert its members to an independent political program. Moreover, such a movement would connote the formation of new habits and traditions which tended to become as serviceable to the new political groupings as the older habits and traditions had been to the old. So that, we shall have opposed to the forces of habit, tradition, suggestion and interest, which serve to support the *status quo*, forces of the same order working to modify the *status quo*. Other factors previously analyzed will likewise be divided in their influence on this situation. Our problem, then, is to compare the two sets of forces in order to determine, if that be possible, what their eventual outcome is likely to be. This we can proceed at once to undertake, for the factors involved have already been analyzed, and we need only assemble and appraise them with reference to the question in hand.

Resultant Tendencies of Rational and Irrational Factors in Politics.—The major advantages from habit, tradition and suggestioning forces lie unquestionably with

the dominant class. This class represents, or at least appropriates, the older and supposedly more valid political traditions. Its party organizations are supported by political habits and family traditions developed and crystallized through many generations; it controls by far the greater volume of suggestioning forces (reiterations of opinion); and, largely by this means, it appears to represent the larger, and hence the more appealing, of the groups which compete for political support.

Many additional advantages enjoyed by the dominant class are to be noted: pugnacity and self-assertion in the form of sport, so potent, with many, in political campaigns, operate to the advantage of the dominant parties; the play, fear, acquisitive and submissive tendencies, in their more direct bearing on the situation, operate mainly to the advantage of the dominant parties, with but feeble counteracting impulses derived from the sex, parental, repulsion, constructive and inquisitive tendencies. The power of money, so far as it can be used in the manipulation of the electorate, is for the most part on their side; after election, money, prestige and official favor are mainly on the side of the dominant class, while our traditional constitutional principles support the interests of this class before and after elections. The influences of intellectual processes and hedonic factors are distributed in corresponding proportions.

We shall consider hereafter the chances of successful political action by our subordinate class. We will here only prepare the ground for that discussion by identifying the factors making for and against the success of a labor movement in politics, leaving their detailed analysis to the later discussion. We shall consider especially the possible growth, in this country, of a strong labor party, or rather of various political groups formed to

further the interests of the laboring class. The general classes of factors bearing on this question have already been compared. Let us consider in greater detail the rôle these factors are likely to play in the future.

Generally speaking, the growth of a labor party will be limited by the size of the labor group itself. A certain number of people will, as we saw, ally themselves with the labor group, whose interests are indifferent or even opposed to the interests of this group. The number of these people, however, will be comparatively small, as habit, tradition and the powerful suggestioning forces controlled by the dominant class, plus the economic interests of people not identified, by interest, with the labor group, will serve to keep most of these people hostile or indifferent to the labor group.

Furthermore, a great many of those whose interests, considered in themselves alone, would identify them with the laboring class cannot be won over to the organization of that class. As we saw, fear, the gregarious tendency (in its invidious form), submissiveness, individualistic traditions and habits, operate to deter many allied in interest with the labor group from actually identifying themselves with the group, so that the organized labor group will be able to enroll in its membership a proportion only of those eligible to membership therein.

We must add to this the fact that those whose interests are patently opposed to the interests of the dominant class constitute, in this country, but a minority of the population. For the farmers, small tradesmen and professional classes, together with the dominant class itself and those closely associated with it in interest, constitute, and will long constitute, a majority of the population, and hence a political majority.

We must add, further, the operation of habit and family tradition in deterring a large proportion of the organized section of this minority class from giving their support to a labor party. For a large proportion of the members of this group will have been habituated in their youth to the support of one or the other of the dominant parties, and this habituation will be as potent here as we have shown it to be elsewhere in determining political behavior.

Finally, as labor's own experience has shown, political action in labor's behalf, whenever it has been possible at all, has yielded but very meager results, and this will serve also to deter many members of the labor group from giving their support to an independent labor movement in politics.

Considering all these things—the numerical minority of those whose interests are patently opposed to the interests of the dominant class; the inability of the organized labor group to enroll in its membership all of this minority; the operation of habit, family tradition and suggestion forces in determining the affiliation of a large proportion of the labor group with the dominant parties; the relative inefficacy of political action itself in the furtherance of labor interests,—the chances of ultimate success for a labor party in this country are too small to offer any solid foundations for a future labor policy.

If, now, labor cannot look to politics for the realization of its aims, what will be its attitude toward political action? How will it react to the established political authority under which it lives, but in which it shares so little?

We have seen that political action is a function, or resultant, of habit, tradition, suggestion, financial power, etc., which normally supports the interests of the dominant

class, wherever its interests are in question. To support those interests means to handicap, restrict and defeat the interests of the opposing class. Now, labor may be expected to adjust itself in time to this situation, in so far as its true significance is realized, and a considerable proportion of labor may be expected, sooner or later, to realize the significance of this situation.

Wage-earners cannot be indifferent or neutral toward political authority which functions in the interest of the opposing class, because their own interests are at stake, and they are likely to defend those interests with whatever means may be at their disposal.

Their adjustment to an antagonistic political authority would seem to depend, among other things, on the degree to which they may have emancipated themselves from the domination of traditions and suggestioning forces which make for submission to authority; on the extent of the support seen to be afforded by political agencies to the class opposed to theirs, with the reactions which this may provoke; on the several proportions of the laboring class which remain loyal to the old parties, uncritical of the government, or hopeful of success for independent labor action in politics; on the radical or conservative nature of the aims cherished by those who have learned to distrust the government, and who are nevertheless convinced that the government cannot be captured for their class by prevailing constitutional methods.

It is too early as yet to say what weight these several factors will have in determining the final outcome. A large proportion of labor will no doubt continue to support the Republican and Democratic parties, while another large proportion will set their hopes on the development of a powerful labor party. Those who are quite disillusioned as to political action under the existing consti-

tutional system will be divided into radical and conservative groups. The latter will be apt to confine its participation in politics to the defense of legal rights previously secured, and to the promotion of the more urgent reforms demanded by changed conditions. This modest program it will be able to realize in large part, through the pressure, political and economic, which it can bring to bear on governmental agencies. The radical group which eschews politics will take a more aggressive attitude, for it will aim at the eventual displacement, or subordination, of the capitalistic system, and this necessarily commits it to a revolutionary policy toward the existing constitutional system, since, by the hypothesis, it will have recognized the inutility of existing political methods in the accomplishment of radical aims. The radical group will probably be only a small section of the laboring class, and this may be expected to have an important bearing on the methods pursued in the furtherance of its aims.

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CHAPTER XXIV

CONCLUSIONS: THE ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY

THE conclusions yielded by our inquiry into political action should throw some light on the embattled doctrine of economic determinism, or the economic interpretation of history, as it is often called.

It will have been recognized that our own interpretations, many-sided though they be, have a good deal in common with the economic interpretation. We venture to think, however, that the points of difference are as significant as the points of agreement, and that the time has come to revise and elaborate the famous doctrine, and perhaps to give it a new name.

For the hypothesis in its present form would seem to suffer from an over-simplification which leads to results not altogether fortunate. By taking the economic system as the primary social factor, and other factors as secondary or derived, the hypothesis discourages a more searching genetic inquiry into social phenomena, and underestimates the importance of many social factors which only such an inquiry could properly evaluate. Consequently, the hypothesis, when taken at its face value, is calculated to mislead those who read their history by its light.

The criticisms of the theory which we have to make will be drawn from a comparison of the methods implied by the theory with the methods we have employed in the present inquiry. Our task is to bring the two into juxtaposition and let the results speak for themselves.

If it be true that instinctive tendencies in their endlessly varying forms, innumerable habits and traditions, satisfiers and annoyers of various kinds, intellectual processes of many different types, sex, race, age and individual differences, the manifold conditions of the physical environment, have each and all their part in the determination of social and economic activity, then no hypothesis can be maintained which does not accord to each of these factors its due weight, and which, moreover, does not *insist* on a specific analysis for each one of them in reference to any social situation which is to be the subject-matter of a scientific inquiry. If the economic interpretation can be stretched to meet these demands, well and good. Only, it ought then to be called by another name.

Historic Significance of Economic Determinism.—As a matter of fact, the theory represents a serious attempt to establish the naturalistic method in political inquiry, for, in Antonio Labriola's words,¹ "it must be remembered that the meaning of this doctrine ought, before all else, to be drawn from the position which it takes and occupies with regard to the doctrines against which it is in reality opposed, and particularly with regard to the ideologies of every sort; that the proof of its value consists in the more suitable and more appropriate explanation of the succession of human events which is derived from it; that this doctrine does not imply a subjective preference for a certain quality or a certain sum of human interests, but that it merely affirms the objective coördination and subordination of all interests in the development of all society."

Now, in so far as the economic interpretation is to be regarded as a contribution to the naturalistic method of social research, there is, from our point of view,

¹ *Essays on the Materialistic Conception of History*, pp. 97-98.

nothing to criticize. But much water has flowed under the bridges since the theory was first propounded:² the biological sciences have been reorganized and developed in the light of the evolutionary theory; a science of human behavior has been established, and already yielded results quite indispensable to workers in the social sciences; detailed inquiry into the influences of the geographic environment has been undertaken, and the nature and extent of those influences largely determined; and, in fact, all the natural factors which we have considered in this inquiry have been investigated and their operation in social life better understood.

Many of these contributions to the science of society have been recognized by the original propounders of the economic interpretation, especially Engels, as also by their successors. For, as E. R. A. Seligman points out,³ Engels maintained, in letters to various correspondents between 1890 and 1894, "that Marx had often been misunderstood, and that neither he himself nor Marx ever meant to claim an absolute validity for economic considerations to the exclusion of all other factors. He pointed out that economic actions are not only physical actions, but human actions, and that a man acts as an economic agent through the use of his head as well as of his hands. The mental development of man, however, is affected by many conditions; at any given time the economic action of the individual is influenced by his whole social environment, in which many factors have played a rôle. . . . He was careful to point out that the actual form of the social

² Marx and Engels are here considered the authors of the theory, as they were the first to analyze more or less systematically the influences of economic factors in social life. Others before them, notably Harrington and, in a way, the classical economists, had stressed these influences.

³ *The Economic Interpretation of History*, pp. 62-64.

organization is often determined by political, legal, philosophical and religious theories and conceptions. . . .

"It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that these concessions, undeniably significant as they are, involved in the minds of the leaders an abandonment of the theory. . . . The upholders of the doctrine remind us that, whatever be the action and reaction of social forces at any given time, it is the conditions of production, in the widest sense of the term, that are chiefly responsible for the basic permanent changes in the condition of society. Thus, Engels tells us that we must broaden our conception of the economic factor so as to include among the economic conditions, not only the geographical basis, but the actually transmitted remains of former economic changes, which have often survived only through tradition. . . . He even goes so far as to declare the race itself to be an economic factor. And while he still stoutly contends that the political, legal, religious, literary and artistic development rests on the economic, he points out that they all react upon one another and on the economic foundation."

"The theory of economic interpretation thus expounded by Engels must," says Seligman, "be considered authoritative. He tells us that Marx never really regarded the situation in any other light."⁴

These passages we have quoted at length in order to exhibit the theory in its later, more scientific form, a form which takes express account of the criticisms directed against the theory as originally propounded, from the standpoint of later scientific developments. The theory in this later form may seem to approach our own theory so closely that a detailed comparison of the two would be a waste of effort. For it will be seen that Engels

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 66.

recognized the bearing on social development of psychological, cultural and geographical factors which could not be subsumed under any general economic category. Yet I think the theory is defective in the respects already specified, and that it must be corrected, elaborated and perhaps renamed if it is to be altogether serviceable in future historical investigations.

Defects of the Doctrine.—To begin with, the theory has so far spoken in very general terms such as "race," "political, legal, religious, literary and artistic development," "geographical basis," "conditions of production in the widest sense of the term," "transmitted remains of former economic changes," and the like. Such terms cover a multitude of specific factors, no two of which operate in just the same way or produce the same results; and these terms are therefore no longer serviceable in the more exact investigations which our knowledge of these specific factors makes possible. In other words, the acceptance of the hypothesis in the form in which it is now offered would commit us to a less exact type of investigation than the actual resources of our knowledge would permit. The theory, therefore, while conceding the operation of the general classes of factors mentioned, actually discourages the use of more refined methods of research which our present knowledge of those factors makes available.

This not only has unfortunate theoretical consequences, when the doctrine is taken too seriously, but it has untoward practical consequences as well. For one thing, the terms of the theory suggest the view that political action is a secondary phenomenon, which is to be referred, for an explanation, to prevailing economic interests. This deduction from the theory has, in fact, been very widely accepted as a basis for the interpretation of political

developments.⁵ But it is certain that this view of the facts is too simple, and misleading because of that. We found it necessary to add to class or economic interest, in interpreting political action, a number of factors for which the theory in question does not adequately provide. We saw that to class interest must be added political habits, family and local traditions in politics, suggestioning influences associated with the gregarious tendency, and impulses derived from many other instinctive tendencies; and that, although these same factors have a vital bearing on economic interests, and are potent causes of economic changes, nevertheless their significance would be misapprehended if they were correlated, in an exclusive fashion, with economic interests. For we saw that, contrary to what one might expect on this theory, these factors operate in opposition to economic interests as often as in their support, considering the matter from the standpoint of the individuals involved. We showed, for example, that political habit, sectional traditions in politics, and current suggestioning forces serve to detain in the political camp of the dominant class many whose interests are diametrically opposed to the interests of that class.

Neither would the theory explain the subordination of economic interests, in times of war or other public crises, to interests having a broader reference and a different motivation; nor the subordination of pecuniary interests on the part of many, in normal times, to broader interests motivated by parental and gregarious impulses. Nor could the theory supply an explanation of the fact that many wage-earners fail to organize themselves for the protection of their class interests, or of the fact that they refuse to become "class conscious."

⁵ Cf., for example, Beard, Charles E., *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States*, *Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy*, and *The Economic Basis of Politics*.

I say the theory could not supply an explanation of such facts. It would *concede* them, but there is something wrong with a theory that must defend itself by mere concessions, especially in regard to the matters that are central to the theory itself. A theory that is to stand must be so comprehensive and pertinent, that admission of its inability to explain significant phenomena in its own field will be unnecessary, for a theory which allows properly for all these phenomena will eventually displace it.

To take one more illustration, the theory not only could not explain, but if taken literally would disallow, the fact that legal and political institutions are often, perhaps generally, a whole epoch behind the prevailing "conditions of production." How would it attempt to explain the anomaly of our attempting to combine the methods of large-scale production with institutions of property and contract adapted to handicraft production, and the failure of the handicraft system itself to establish legal and political institutions in harmony with the system until after that system had begun to decline?⁶ Again, the theory would have to fall back on concessions; in this case, no doubt, it would be concessions to "the actually transmitted remains of former economic changes."

This latter case suggests perhaps wherein the theory falls short. It offers explanations of social phenomena in terms of phenomena which are themselves in need of explanation. If, instead of making economic activity, or the conditions of production, primary, a genetic, or naturalistic, interpretation of these very factors were first undertaken, we should be able to understand the incongruities between methods of production on the one hand, and property and contract institutions on the other hand,

⁶ See Veblen, T., *The Instinct of Workmanship*, pp. 283-298, 340-344.

and would not be reduced to a concession thereof as mere qualifications of the theory. This amounts to saying that the primary rôle in historical phenomena must be reserved to the various natural factors which are operative therein, and not to derivatives of these factors, such, for example, as "the conditions of production in the widest sense of the term." Many natural factors will have coöperated in the production of these secondary phenomena, and neither these phenomena nor other phenomena with which they are correlated can be accounted for without first understanding the primary factors which have given rise to them. And an understanding of these primary factors itself involves a detailed naturalistic analysis such as, on its level, the present inquiry may be taken to exemplify.

These criticisms could be elaborated by showing from a canvass of the present inquiry, how, at every point in a given social process, the specific modes of action of all our primary factors had to be taken into account, and their exact bearings on the situation in question ascertained. But the present question is not central to the main purposes of our inquiry, and enough will have been said to make our criticisms clear.

Restatement of the Theory Needed.—The theory of economic determinism is a crude though, with the important reservations already noted, a true empirical generalization, a generalization based on a candid and penetrating study of historical development; and the theory has admittedly done yeoman service in the cause of a genuine historical science. It has done this because its spirit has been naturalistic, even when its methods have been less exact, and less naturalistic, therefore, than was necessary. It needs only to bring the theory up to date; to make it square with the results and the methods of positive science in other fields, particularly psychology, geography and

sociology; in short, to make the theory completely genetic and naturalistic, and thus adapt it to the needs and opportunities of historical science today. If this amounts to a supersession of the theory by one bearing another name, that will not detract from the credit due the theory itself, but will, on the contrary, redound to its credit; for it will have been recognized as a potent influence making for more objective, more exact methods of social research.

Engels' own later formulation of the theory opens the door for such a restatement,⁷ while Marx himself in a passage in *Das Kapital*,⁸ although insisting on the economic basis of the social structure, pointed out that this basis reveals "endless variations and gradations due to various empirical facts, natural conditions, racial relations, and external historical influences without number—all of which can be comprehended only by an analysis of these conditions as they are disclosed by experience." An adequate analysis can only be some such analysis as we have attempted to exemplify in this inquiry, one that does not leave the economic basis itself untouched, but traces it and all other social processes back to the specific natural factors which have had a part in their genesis.

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⁷ See Seligman, *loc. cit.*

⁸ Quoted by Seligman, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-49.

CHAPTER XXV

POLITICAL LIBERALISM: REASON AND JUSTICE IN POLITICS

THE conclusions yielded by our inquiry carry critical implications for certain political philosophies current in our time, and it may be of interest to set forth such implications in a more or less methodical order. This will serve not only to suggest needed revisions of the philosophies in question, but also to anticipate criticisms of our own theory from the standpoint of those philosophies.

Perhaps the most important of these philosophies, and one to which all others of which our theory is critical might be reduced, is that known as political liberalism. To political liberalism, then, we shall now address ourselves. In this evaluation of the liberal philosophy our analysis will necessarily take on a somewhat controversial tone, but this should not be taken to mean that we are departing from the naturalistic, or objective, method pursued hitherto. Our whole purpose, indeed, is to criticize, from the naturalistic standpoint, a doctrine or philosophy which apparently does not square with the canons of a naturalistic method.

Another caution will be in order. Political liberalism is not only a system of philosophy, it is a system of institutions as well, and the two cannot be considered separately. We must therefore criticize these institutions as well as the philosophy which underlies them, and which defends them against their critics. In offering these criticisms we may appear to be sharing in partisan attacks on these institutions, but such is not our purpose. We

shall merely be subjecting these institutions, and the liberalist claims for them, to the test of the facts. This, again, is in pursuance of a naturalistic method, and as such should exempt us from any suspicion of partisan bias.

The Assumptions of Political Liberalism.—It is perhaps not possible to frame an acceptable definition of political liberalism, owing to its variegated nature and to the varying emphasis placed on its constituent doctrines by different liberal thinkers. We shall, instead, resort to a characterization of the liberal position, but one which, for the purpose in hand, should be acceptable to the liberals themselves as well as to their critics.

Liberalism relies, as we all know, on "freedom of discussion," universal suffrage, "representative government," and other so-called democratic processes for the establishment of justice between social classes and the introduction of political or other institutional changes demanded by social and industrial evolution. Liberals do not, of course, believe that any machinery will automatically perform these functions. Rather, they impute a higher efficacy to ideas, and to the tendencies in human nature which make for harmony and coöperation; and the machinery which they advocate and defend is more to facilitate the development and propagation of ideas, and the expression or organization of these tendencies, than of itself to render any positive service.

From this general statement of the liberalist position, we may deduce at least five assumptions as underlying liberal thought on political questions. *First*, liberals assume that divergent social interests can be integrated or harmonized by means of ideas or intellectual convictions arrived at through discussion. *Secondly*, they assume that a majority of people are capable of arriving at sound conclusions in regard to public questions. *Thirdly*, they

assume that these conclusions will be normally determined by considerations of social justice or social expediency. *Fourthly*, they regard "freedom of discussion" as a guarantee that political proposals all have a substantially equal, or at least a fair, chance of getting themselves considered and disposed of on their merits. *Fifthly*, they believe that democratic political institutions may be made to translate into action the wishes of the people as thus rationally and ethically determined.¹

These assumptions are not often so explicitly stated in liberalist writings, but they are nevertheless implicit, when not deliberately made, in all the liberal's thinking and writing on political questions. We may go even further and say that liberals *must* believe all these things, as a rejection of any one of them would convert the liberal theory into something quite different. In the philosopher's language, they are *postulates* which are never seriously brought in question. Upon them the whole liberal edifice is founded.

These postulates or assumptions we have to examine in the light of our previous analysis, and of evidence not there adduced, respecting their validity. To anticipate somewhat our conclusions, we shall find that these assumptions are based on an incomplete, or rather an antiquated, analysis of human nature and of other factors operative in political behavior, and that they can therefore no

¹ This characterization of the liberalist position, together with the deduction, from it, of the assumptions underlying liberalist thought, has reference, primarily, to current political discussions by liberal thinkers. No attempt is made to trace the genesis of the liberalist views discussed in the text, though this would of course be valuable. As the term implies, the liberalist philosophy is conceived in the interest of human freedom or, more specifically, as a demand and a program for the establishment of self-government in matters social and political. L. T. Hobhouse's *Liberalism* is a convenient manual of present-day liberalism so conceived.

longer be regarded as reliable guides to political thought and action.

These several assumptions are not, of course, independent of each other, but it will conduce to clarity if we consider them separately.

Reason in Politics According to the Liberal Theory.—

First, then, liberals are intellectualistic, rationalistic or whatever equivalent of these terms we may care to apply to them. This defect of liberalist thought does not usually appear on the surface of liberal writings, but it is nevertheless to be found in all they write or say on political questions, so far, that is, as they are consistent with their principles. There is always the implication that conflicting groups can be reconciled to one another if you can only bring them together, and keep them together long enough, to talk over and settle their differences; or at least if such groups cannot be brought into intellectual agreement, they can be persuaded to compromise on the issues between them, and compromise as often as may be necessary to safeguard the interests of the public at large. Labor, for example, should not and will not, if it is reasonable, press its claims to the point of violently upsetting the social order. Capital, likewise, should and will, if it is wise, make such concessions to labor as will obviate the necessity of any too upsetting conflict between them. The "public" ought to and will, if well advised, hold the balance between the two and cudgel into submission either party to the conflict which proves itself refractory to the counsels of reason and justice. In all this it is assumed that the actions of most people are or may be rationally determined, and determined in the interests of society at large. The anomalies of conduct would be, for the liberal, not consistently rational behavior, but behavior which was, somehow, perversely irrational.

Such a conception of human nature is now hopelessly discredited, both by the newer psychology and by the empirical facts of social life. For both psychology and the facts have shown that political and economic behavior is largely determined by habit, tradition, suggestion, class interest and other factors having little or nothing in common with reason. Only on such a view can we understand facts open to the most casual inspection, as, for example, the fact that political behavior, in a large proportion of cases, is a function of early habit or of family tradition in politics; that the political opinions of the average man are similar to those expressed in the editorials or insinuated in the news columns of the paper he reads; that there are proportionately more conservatives among capitalists than among wage-earners; that both capitalists and wage-earners obstinately refuse to compose their differences and go on fighting over the issues which they deem to be vital.

It is not so much that the views of the liberals on particular questions are unsound; it is, rather, that they are unable to give effect to their views or to frame practicable programs for giving effect to them. They begin and end with ideas and ideals, and assume in effect that ideas and ideals are self-effectuating, whereas psychologists now know that ideas and ideals are secondary and derived, that they have hidden roots reaching far down into tradition and instinct, and that they are not so much suffused with sweetness and light as liberals are prone to suppose.

More precisely, liberals believe that ideas and ideals may reconcile or synthesize interests which are plainly opposed to each other, interests which can secure their maximum satisfaction only at the expense of other interests, and which therefore cannot be harmonized in the way that liberals desire. In psychological terms, the lib-

eral makes the will side of human nature subordinate to the ideational side, whereas the real relationship is more nearly the reverse. To put it differently, liberals hold that ideas are or may be social or synthetic in the broadest sense, whereas ideas are generally expressive of, or instrumental to, interests of a much narrower range than that.

The Function of Thought in Politics.—We may grant that ideas, properly understood, do rule, but it is not the ideas of the professional thinker, and least of all the ideas of the liberal thinker. It is the ideas of classes who stand to gain or lose a prize that is cherished, and not the ideas of a detached thinker who dreams of a perfect justice or the liberation of all the oppressed. Whenever vital class interests could be said to be harmonized through ideas, it is where one set of ideas are given a victory over other ideas, and because the victorious ideas have superior *power* on their side. The victors may, of course, be content with something less than the extermination of their opponents; they may absorb the latter, or be willing to let them occupy a subordinate position, or they may even be willing to pursue a policy of live-and-let-live and accord to them a position of coördinate dignity and power. Whichever policy is adopted will depend on the nature of the issues between the contestants and, it may be, on their relative strength, but only in a secondary sense on the ideas or ideals which pass current on either side.

The function of thought, so far as the world of affairs is concerned, is to search out means for the gratification of whatever interests happen to be ascendant at the given time and place. Ideas are the products of these thought processes and will be as compatible or incompatible with each other as the interests in whose furtherance thought has its function.

If all mankind were motivated by liberal ideals, then the liberal program would not be as footless as it is; but mankind being what it is, we must talk a great deal more in terms of interest and power, and a good deal less in terms of ideas and ideals. The liberals are tender-minded, to use William James's term, and are ever doomed to defeat by the tough-minded people who actually get things done.

This is not to deny all positive value to liberalist activity. Liberals do render an important service in exposing injustice, in showing that the status of a class or a group ought to be improved, but their service stops at this point, except in the rare cases where they hold the balance of power between conflicting groups. And it may be doubted whether they have ever determined the final decision on an issue of prime importance, at least where vital group interests were concerned. The positive function of the liberals is to furnish light on certain kinds of political questions, but they are wanting when it comes to furnishing heat, and particularly the heat that generates steam.

Explanation of the Liberalist Misconception Respecting Reason in Politics.—It might be instructive to seek an explanation of the liberal belief in the synthesizing function (in a broad sense of the term) of ideas and ideals, for assuredly a belief held by so many able thinkers must be explained before we can fully understand it and, understanding it, presume to reject it.

A partial explanation is to be found, I venture to think, in the tendency, everywhere present, to overemphasize the value of the functions which one happens personally to represent. Just as Mr. Baker, to the pained surprise of his friends, turned militarist, probably because of his absorption in military functions; and just as physicists and

chemists are apt to explain the world in physicochemical terms, and theologians in spiritual or religious terms; so the liberal thinker, approaching political questions as a detached critic, and being a good deal of an idealist to begin with, explains political life in intellectualistic and idealistic terms. Becoming absorbed in theories and hypotheses, ideas and ideals, he comes to regard them, doubtless without realizing it, as of the very essence of reality, while the instinctive impulses, habits, traditions and interests which constitute the will side of human nature are relegated to second place; thereby failing to see how refractory these latter are, as compared with the former, to any sort of unification. That many serious thinkers on political questions are not liberals does not invalidate such an explanation of the liberalist bias: these may be regarded as significant illustrations of the fact that thinkers sometimes take a detached view of the thought processes themselves, and assign them their true function and value.

If one were seeking a more comprehensive explanation of the rationalistic bias from which liberal thought suffers, a good share of it would no doubt be attributed to habit, tradition, suggestion and the secondary rationalizing processes which so largely determine the beliefs and the prejudices of mankind at large. Liberals are but little, if any, more exempt from these influences than is the generality of mankind. The liberal tradition has enjoyed an enormous prestige for several generations, and it has been the most natural thing in the world for those who seriously concerned themselves with political questions to be fascinated and captivated by that tradition. Moreover, the tradition was often passed down from father to son, coming in such cases under our category of family traditions in politics. Or, once accepted and made the

basis of one's thinking, it acquired something of the inertia of all habit, proving more or less resistant thereafter to newer influences which might have undermined it. Again, it constitutes for democratic countries their accredited official philosophy, and as such has the support of the powerful suggestioning agencies associated with the *status quo*. Lastly, the liberal philosophy falls in comfortably with the illusion from which all human beings suffer to some degree, that their actions, however ill-adapted they may be in reality to the interests or the needs of others, are inherently and demonstrably just and reasonable.

The Nature of Political Thought According to the Liberal Theory.—The second assumption of political liberalism which we have to examine holds that a majority of citizens are capable of forming sound conclusions in regard to political questions. While this assumption is related, in the liberal system, to the assumption just criticized, it is not necessarily dependent thereon; and being an assumption of the highest importance, it deserves consideration on its own account, and quite apart from any system which includes or excludes it. The assumption holds that, *whatever* the premises of political thought, the average citizen can arrive at conclusions concordant therewith.

This assumption, like the first, has been decisively refuted by the investigations of modern psychology as well as by the most palpable facts of social life. That the average man does not and, indeed, cannot, under present conditions of miseducation, arrive at sound conclusions in regard to political questions is amply demonstrated by Graham Wallas, Ross, Trotter and other students of political psychology, as well as by the ubiquitous propa-

ganda which has largely ruled the world since the outbreak of the Great War.

We have shown that impulses, habits, traditions, interests, etc., provide the premises of political thought for the great majority of people. This being true, no credit would be reflected on the liberal theory were its second assumption proved true. For people's political opinions would then be no better (or worse) than the premises from which they set out, and these are what we have shown them to be. But taking these premises for what they are (bad as they are), the political opinions of the average man are far from being concordant therewith.

A large proportion of the people who now vote the Democratic and Republican tickets do so because their fathers voted tickets labelled by the same names before they were born, or because they themselves began voting these tickets on other (more or less irrational) grounds, in their own youth. In so far, the premises of political thought (to call them that for the moment) lead to their appropriate conclusions.

A considerable number of farmers, capitalists and wage-earners will, however, support parties whose policies bear some more or less appropriate relation to their several interests. This number is probably a great deal smaller than those who vote from habit and family tradition, but, where mediated by intellectual processes and not by habit, tradition or mere chance, their political conclusions (as expressed in their vote) will have proceeded from the premises of their political thinking. The vote determined mainly by the prestige, and hence the greater appealing power, of the dominant parties will also be in accordance with political premises as we have provisionally accepted the term. In fact, the voters' party affilia-

tions seem in a majority of cases to accord with the premises of their political thinking.

But there is another side to the story. For what has happened in these cases, save only those assumed to have thought out the political implications of their interests, is merely the adhesion of the voter to a certain *name*, *label* or *slogan*. Political thought has not been involved at all, except in a very loose and inexact sense of the term, for all these cases, with the exceptions noted, are determined in their political behavior by factors which have little or nothing in common with reflective thought. Habit, tradition and suggestion may be said to act *directly* in these cases, with only that modicum of cognition, or intelligence, necessary to give these factors their effect. The liberals do not, of course, mean thought of this type when they assume that the political conclusions of the majority will be concordant with the premises of their political thought.

How about political conclusions not determined by habit or tradition? How congruent are such conclusions with the premises from which they proceed? The conclusion to which we are forced by the facts is that such a question assumes conditions that are for the most part non-existent. For the average Republican or Democrat, except in occasional moments of irritation or lucidity, will *accept* without question the opinions expressed by his party leaders or his party newspaper, and ready acceptance of this type is to be credited to herd impulses rather than to reflective thought. For the average voter his party is a herd of which he is a member, and he normally accepts without question opinions emanating from accredited party organs, or spokesmen.

The same is true of political opinions not closely associated with one's party. Here it is some other herd,

usually that vague public for which the church or the newspaper speaks, which supplies the voter with his opinions. We should have to add to this process functions associated with other instinctive tendencies, but enough will have been said to establish our point. To use Graham Wallas's terms, *alogical* processes are far more potent in the world of politics than are the logical processes which alone can lead to well-grounded conclusions.

It will thus be seen that we are dealing in terms that are not of general validity, when we ask the question whether the political conclusions of the average man are in accordance with the premises of his political thought. For there are no premises and no thought, in the eulogistic sense of these terms, save for the group aforementioned; or at the most premises and thought play but a minor rôle in the determination of political opinions and political behavior. This general conclusion applies to opinions determined by habit and family traditions in politics as well as to opinions determined by current suggestioning forces.

There are, as we have said, many cases where real thought plays a part, often a decisive part, in the determination of political opinions and political behavior. One group of cases has been cited already. Another group (really a sub-group of the first) includes those people who have been able to transcend their own interests, in the narrow sense of the term, and accept as the premises of their political thought and action some more or less comprehensive conception of the public welfare; and who arrive, by real thought processes, at conclusions more or less concordant therewith. The number of these people is certainly very small, comparatively, but they are the only people who fulfill the requirements of the second (and third) assumptions of political liberalism.

It is in all probability a consideration of such cases, often exemplified in their own persons, which have led liberals to make their second (and third) assumptions. Of course the influence of habit, tradition, suggestion, etc., spoken of as accounting, in part, for their first assumption, is operative here also.

If we add to this small group of cases the first group, or those who work out (and act on) the political implications of their interests (in the narrow sense of the term), we shall still have only a small, probably a very small, minority of people whose political conclusions are based on real premises and mediated by real thought.

And, probably, under the most enlightened system of education possible of attainment only a small proportion of people would be qualified to deal intelligently with the complex questions of modern politics. For, consider, as an example, the vapidness of much that passes for thought in our colleges and universities. The sway of tradition and suggestion is only a little less potent there than with the "man in the street." Add to all this the fact that the dominant class can limit the power of thought in all sorts of ways, and we shall begin to realize how small a rôle genuine thought plays in determining the political behavior of the mass of people.

Let us recall, in leaving this question, that habit, tradition and suggestion, which we have identified as the chief determinants of political opinion and behavior, inure mainly to the advantage of those interests which are bound up with the *status quo*. And a considerable proportion of the opinion and behavior mediated by real thought also supports the *status quo*, for it will have proceeded from premises supplied by *interests* identified with the *status quo*. It will be seen, therefore, that the factors determining political opinions and political behavior are

not calculated to do justice to the interests incompatible with the *status quo*. For only those opinions will favor these interests which are premised on a just and adequate conception of the public welfare, or on these interests themselves. And opinions so determined are, as we saw, necessarily in the minority, and likely to remain so.

The Liberal Theory of Justice and Expediency in Politics.—If habit, tradition, suggestion and interest determine the political opinions and actions of the great majority, it follows that their opinions are not determined by considerations of justice or expediency, as the third assumption of political liberalism would require. We could leave the matter in this form without more ado, but some additional observations bearing on the rôle of habit, tradition, suggestion and interest in politics will not be out of place.

Political action based on the just claims of economic groups is homogeneous, in a sense, with action based on grounds of justice and expediency, and liberals might, with some plausibility, hold that such action bears out, or at least does not contradict, the assumptions of liberalist theory, particularly its third assumption. The liberals might also claim a certain support from political action determined by habit, tradition and suggestion, but which nevertheless falls in with action based on considerations of justice and expediency. But such claims would not come within the terms of the third assumption properly understood. The opinions which really fulfill the requirements of this assumption bear, as we saw, a very small ratio, numerically, to opinions which really contradict the assumption. The assumption does not stand the test of the facts, therefore, and must be abandoned.

Political conclusions proceeding logically from premises based on interests are by no means as common as is

generally supposed, for habit, tradition and suggestion override, in the vast majority of cases, any genuine intellectual tendencies which may be operative; so that the number of opinions based on interests whose claims are just must be correspondingly limited. It should be of interest to observe how this works out in one particularly important situation, a situation involving economic interests which are not homogeneous, but not on that account antagonistic.

For the mass of men at the present time *their own particular* interests are the only phase of the social problem which can be comprehended with any approach to clarity. There is not the type of curiosity, the intellectual ability, the political training, the leisure, which, taken together, would fit men for understanding the interests of other groups than their own. Farmers will think in terms of high prices for farm products and low-priced consumers' goods; industrial workingmen will think in terms of high wages, shorter hours, better working conditions and, latterly, democratic control. But the farmer is prevented from understanding the workingman's problems, or the workingman those of the farmer. Not understanding, it is easy to make them distrust each other, and that is just what is done, and done systematically. In discussing the Plumb Plan with a New England farmer, I found him violently opposed to it and to the beggarly unions who had the "gall" to propose it. Now, the explanation of this farmer's attitude probably was that he read, and his opinions were largely supplied by, a local newspaper which always took its cue from big business, whereas the Plumb Plan was certainly entitled to his consideration, if not his support, for his real interests, to say the least, were as compatible with the interests of labor as with those of the opposing group.

That is typical of what is happening all the time. This inevitable misunderstanding between groups having different problems but interests which are really harmonious makes certain sorts of action for the furtherance of their several interests impracticable, and almost necessarily prescribes other sorts of action. Despite some indications to the contrary, industrial labor in this country, for example, will probably not be able to rely on the coöperation of other groups in the promotion of interests common to them all; and the same could be said of the farmer group, except that political methods are perhaps more available to the latter than to the former.

When to this effect of current suggestioning forces in blinding people to their true interests is added the operation of political habit and tradition to a like effect, it is clear that political opinions determined by interests, whether just or unjust, bear a small ratio, numerically, to opinions determined by those other factors. But let us not forget that habit, tradition and suggestion operate mainly on the side of the *status quo* and therefore in opposition to interests which demand a modification of the *status quo*.

We have said little about considerations of expediency as determinants of political behavior, but what was said under the head of justice will apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to expediency as well. Considerations of expediency enter in wherever thought, in the more eulogistic sense of the term, is present, and tend to qualify the conclusions mediated by thought, whether or no these conclusions proceed from premises based on interest, in the narrower sense of personal or class interest, or on some more or less inclusive conception of the public welfare. When thought is quite competent in this connection, it takes into account

opposing interests and seeks some sort of *modus vivendi* for them, and this irrespective of whether one takes the viewpoint of one's own personal or class interest, or of a broader, juster conception of the public welfare.

Viewed thus, considerations of expediency qualify one's conception of his interests or of the public welfare (as the case may be) and tend to bring about an adjustment of interests, or better adapted conceptions of the public welfare. In so far, the requirements of the liberal's third assumption will have been met. But, like considerations of justice, considerations of expediency (in the broad sense) play a comparatively small part in the determination of political opinions and political behavior.

The doctrine that considerations of justice and expediency determine the political opinions of the majority is thus shown to be without foundation. The average man believes that justice, at any rate, is on the side of *his* interests. The sentiment of justice is thus a derivative of interests, generally speaking, and does not determine the latter. Justice rules in the sense that when men believe injustice to have been visited upon them, they are generally moved to do something about it. If we want to speak in terms such as these, we should have to say that injustice, and not justice, is the moving force in politics. And the battle for justice is fought for the most part by those believing themselves to suffer injustice. But to speak in less deceptive terms, the sense of justice is aroused by any injury, real or fancied, to our interests. The subordinate classes have no monopoly of this sentiment; I dare say that Mr. Gary feels it as often and as keenly as any workman in his mills.

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CHAPTER XXVI

POLITICAL LIBERALISM: FREEDOM OF DISCUSSION

THE keystone of the liberalist edifice is the liberal's faith in "freedom of discussion." I fancy this faith has been rather severely shaken since 1914, and in many cases destroyed altogether; but it is a faith that dies hard, and we may expect it to persist for a long time, to come to influence and, as I think, to confuse political discussion. Liberals would admit that political discussion has been seriously restricted during and since the war period, but they might claim, with some degree of plausibility, that such restriction is only temporary and proves nothing as to the possibility and value of unrestricted political discussion as a normal public policy.

Is the liberal's faith in freedom of discussion altogether unfounded? If not, what basis in human nature and political experience has it? In what sense is political discussion free as a matter of fact? What specific function and value has freedom of discussion in the sense wherein it is found to obtain? These questions, raised by the fourth assumption of political liberalism, must now be considered.

Final answers to these questions must await a more thoroughgoing investigation than has yet been undertaken. One can do no more at the present time, therefore, than set forth tentatively the answers supplied by the general evidence at our disposal. A brief analysis of the term freedom of discussion will first be necessary.

Different Meanings of the Term Freedom of Discussion.—This term may be taken in two important

senses: First, a legal or formal freedom, connoting an absence of legal restrictions on political discussion; secondly, a freedom in the positive sense of *facilities* or *opportunities* for political discussion.

The first sense of the term must not be identified exclusively with constitutional or statutory guarantees, but broadened to cover popular toleration of unwelcome ideas. There may be an entire absence of constitutional or statutory limitations on political discussion, and freedom of discussion in the legal sense, as we have defined it, still be wanting. The sentiment of a community may be and often is such that discussion is more effectually restricted than it could be by constitutional or statutory prohibitions. Freedom of discussion in the legal sense is analogous to the individual laborer's freedom of contract as defined in constitution and statute, or as these are interpreted by courts of law. Freedom of discussion, so regarded, like its analogue, the laborer's freedom of contract similarly regarded, *implies nothing as to the use which can be made of this freedom*. It merely means that an individual or a group may speak and publish whenever they desire to do so, *provided* they can secure the requisite opportunities or facilities. It is, so to speak, freedom of discussion *in vacuo*.

Freedom of discussion in the positive sense, in the sense of opportunities or facilities for discussion, begins where freedom in the other sense leaves off. It depends, of course, on legal freedom, but legal freedom will not guarantee this positive sort of freedom, just as the laborer's (legal) freedom of contract does not secure to the laborer a positive, that is a real, freedom in his contractual relationships. For freedom of discussion to be of value, it must be a freedom in both senses of the term.

Freedom of discussion without opportunities or facilities for discussion obviously cannot amount to much.

The Functions of Freedom of Discussion.—But, it will be said, opportunity of discussion is open to every one who wants to discuss anything. Granted: we can always find an audience when we have anything to say; we all of us have a few friends at least who are good enough to listen to us, and who are more or less influenced by what we say. *But the nature and size of our audience will depend on the kinds and amounts of the facilities for discussion at our disposal. Now, this command of facilities will not itself depend, as a rule, on the validity of the ideas to be expressed or the knowledge and understanding with which they are supported.* These will have some effect; but assuming them and other things, such as histrionic and literary skill, to be equal, the size of our audience will be determined mainly by our *class* connections. One identified with or friendly to the dominant class will, other things being equal, have an incomparably larger audience than one identified with or friendly to an opposing class. This claim will be supported further on in the discussion. We are here only anticipating the objection of those who will say that freedom of discussion in the legal sense guarantees freedom in the positive sense. While they are right in saying that legal freedom carries with it *some* positive freedom, they will be wrong if they say that this “some” is enough to constitute positive freedom properly understood. It is the *kinds and amounts of positive freedom* that make the vital difference. For a positive freedom of discussion to be a reality, *equally large and constant* audiences must be available to rival ideas and programs, for otherwise one set of them may have so great an advantage over the other set that the latter will not have a fighting chance of victory.

It may be objected at this point that the more valuable idea or program will win out in the long run, even though it cannot be pressed on the attention of people as often as a rival idea or program conceded to be less valuable. Every idea or program for which a real case can be made out is eventually brought to the notice of the entire citizen population, it will be urged, and the majority of people may be depended on to consider each idea or proposal on its merits, so that the superior idea or proposal will in the end win the victory over the inferior. This view rests on assumptions already criticized. Many people can and do consider ideas on their merits, while a considerable number are drawn to the superior ideas for other reasons, but under present educational conditions and even under the most favorable conditions for the establishment of which there is any prospect, the great majority of people will accept the ideas which have the *largest* volume of reiteration or mass suggestion behind them.

And where an idea or movement is so appealing as to have a chance of victory despite the limited (positive) freedom of discussion which conditions it, the dominant class will, if such idea or movement seriously menaces its position, take vigorous steps to compass its defeat. In such case, the advocates of the change will, as a rule, respond by other than measures of persuasion which have thus been rendered nugatory. The struggle between the two parties will thus have been taken out of the intellectual realm, where discussion and compromise are the method of adjustment, and carried over into the realm of physical force where discussion plays a subordinate rôle.

This, in fact, is the course which the struggle between two classes for power usually takes, when the opposition between them is vital and irreconcilable. We may go even further and lay it down as a broad historical generali-

zation that the final act in the struggle between two hostile classes (with their opposing ideas and programs) is accomplished by an economic or military struggle, actual or threatened—understanding by the “final act” the subordination of the class hitherto dominant, or the decisive defeat of the class opposed to it.

Discussion has, as regards vital issues between opposing classes, two functions: (1) It serves to prepare “reforms” in the system based on the prevailing class relationships, reforms which may be in the interest of either party to the struggle, but which signify no fundamental change in the system itself; (2) it is instrumental to the better organization of classes, and hence preparatory to their final struggle for power.

Having defined the two senses in which the term “freedom of discussion” may be taken, and sketched in general terms the respective functions of the two kinds of freedom, let us examine the liberalist claims for freedom of discussion. In which of the senses distinguished does the liberal take the term? To what extent is freedom in that sense possible? What value has political discussion of the scope thus delimited as a method of settling political issues?

The term is generally taken to mean, and liberals take it to mean, the absence of constitutional, statutory and popular restrictions on liberty of discussion. It is true that many liberals dream of a positive freedom of discussion, but whenever they purport to deal with political realities, the term is taken in its legal or formal sense. With two important qualifications to be stated presently, such freedom does obtain at normal times in so-called democratic countries.

Legal Restrictions on Freedom of Discussion.—Freedom in this sense is restricted by (1) popular (as distin-

guished from legal) intolerance of ideas which represent too sharp a break with the existing order, and (2) constitutional or statutory restrictions on the more obnoxious ideas of the same class. Examples of (1) are to be found in the virtual exclusion from our educational institutions, our pulpits and, to a lesser extent, from the theater, the press and the platform, of all shades of radicals, particularly the more obnoxious sorts. We ought to distinguish here between such exclusion as dictated by the dominant class, and the same sort of exclusion as reflecting the general sentiment of the community. Only the latter would come under our first category of restrictions. When the dominant class dictates such exclusion, it would either come under the second category or be referred to a third category, that of the *direct* exercise of power by a class.

Examples of (2) are seen in the arrest and prosecution of radical propagandists, labor leaders and "agitators" generally by officers of the law. This is done by bringing the obnoxious activities under such legal categories as contempt of court, disorderly conduct, sedition, "criminal anarchy," incitation to unlawful acts, and the like. This second sort of restriction is not, in countries like the United States, specially important in normal times, but it may become exceedingly important in war-time. In view of the fact that it is during war-time that radical propagandists are most active and most likely to meet with success, such restrictions may be of the greatest moment to the radical party.

What value has legal freedom of discussion as thus qualified and restricted? It has value for reforms in the existing order, but it has little or no value for radical purposes except, as before pointed out, in the preparatory work of recruiting and disciplining a radical class, and

this only to the extent that the legal freedom is complemented by a positive freedom.

This inapplicability of the discussion method to more radical undertakings doubtless explains in part the great value imputed to it by the liberal party. The method is serviceable for the reforms which liberals are interested in, but it is not serviceable for the more radical changes to which they are so often opposed. Moreover, a legal freedom of discussion is an express recognition of those intellectual functions which liberals are so prone to magnify. Despite these counts in its favor, many liberals would be opposed to the legal and positive freedom which we ordinarily have, did they recognize the value, albeit very limited, which it does have for radical purposes. Many former liberals are, as a matter of fact, opposed to it at the present time and favor, like good reactionaries, the rough and ready methods, recently perfected, of dealing with the communists, the I. W. W.'s and others of that stripe.

Limitations on a Positive Freedom of Discussion.—We have anticipated somewhat our consideration of the question to what extent positive freedom of discussion does or might obtain. The restrictions on legal freedom of discussion, some of them normally present, others not so, will, of course, limit positive freedom. When popular intolerance of outspoken radicals debars them from the churches, the colleges and the universities, then positive freedom is to that extent limited. Positive freedom is also limited by the extraordinary legal restrictions of war-time, and by whatever direct surveillance of opinion the dominant class may choose to exercise at normal times.

Subject to these restrictions, there are a number of avenues along which a considerable measure of positive freedom might be had. In the first place, the subordinate

class can set up competitive organs in the form of labor colleges, labor churches, and the like. This they are now beginning to do. How much positive freedom can be achieved along these lines? Not enough, it must be confessed, to match the freedom of the dominant class and its adherents along the same lines. It requires a lot of money to establish and maintain colleges and churches, and a propertyless class can scarcely compete with a propertied class in the provision of money for such purposes. The capitalist class can have, so long as it retains its financial power, more attractive and hence better attended churches and colleges than any the laboring class can establish and maintain. Add to this the fact that those who by virtue of their class interest might be converted to a radical position are usually unable to avail themselves of such educational opportunities as may be offered, and we shall realize how handicapped the subordinate class will be in competing along this line with the class in power.

A similar analysis would apply to educational institutions supported by the state, except that the control of the dominant class is there less direct. That it is not less effective, as a general rule, any one will recognize who understands how thoroughly state legislatures, city councils and boards of education are dominated by business interests or business points of view.¹ A powerful ally of the dominant class in this work is the daily press. It fosters the sentiment, the good will, which secures to that class an assured control. The press has, of course, a far greater significance than that, for as a medium of communication it has no rival.

¹ Cf., in regard to colleges and universities, for example, T. Veblen, *The Higher Learning in America*, especially pp. 180-190, and Upton Sinclair, *The Goose-Step*, A Study of American Education.

What measure of positive freedom can a subordinate class achieve through the press? The press is different from the churches, schools and higher institutions of learning in that at normal times there are fewer and less serious legal, or popular, restrictions on the radical press than on radical propaganda through agencies of the other classes. Consequently, more attention has been given to, and greater success attained in, the establishment of a radical press than in the establishment of radical churches and schools. The fact that radicals and conservatives can quarantine themselves from each other in the matter of press propaganda may account for the greater latitude allowed to the radical press than to radical factions and leaders working through other agencies of opinion. The conservative can tolerate the radical when he is, like the skunk, removed to a comfortable distance. But he will not tolerate him at close quarters. If the radical is to function effectively through schools and churches, it must, under present conditions, be through the *same* particular institutions as his opponent, the conservative, and this is not to be tolerated.²

Because of this greater latitude allowed the radical press, it has been the principal avenue along which radicals and spokesmen for the subordinate class generally have sought a positive freedom of discussion. What has been achieved, and what further is possible, along this line?

Our analysis here parallels quite closely the previous analysis of radical churches and schools. The newspaper business is today predominantly a "big business." It depends for success on large capital and voluminous advertising, which latter is itself dependent on capitalistic

² The movement for workers' education through so-called labor colleges may be taken as qualifying this general statement, but not, I think, as refuting it.

support. The truth of this contention is attested by the rapid consolidation of newspapers, the commercialization of the periodicals, and the passing of formerly "independent" newspapers and magazines under the control of powerful financial interests. It cannot be denied that the financing of large-scale newspaper and magazine enterprises depends, with very few exceptions, on the good will of the business community. This good will cannot be had without falling in with the interests of the business community.

Radical organs depend for success on the good will of an entirely different group, and this group has but little money available for the support of these publications. The result is that we have on the one side a great number of well-equipped newspapers and periodicals with large circulations, and on the other side a small number of poorly equipped publications with small circulations. Better equipment, and hence greater attractiveness, multiplied by large circulation, gives an invincible combination compared with inferior equipment multiplied by small circulation. You consequently have a radical press occupying a position analogous to the radical church or school. The conservative press can, like the established churches and colleges, make an enormously more impressive, and hence a more powerful, appeal than can the radical press. I am of course referring to appeals directed to neutrals who might theoretically be attracted to either camp.

Who can doubt what the outcome will be? The conservative press gets itself accepted as the voice of the people and therefore carries the people before it, saving only the remnant whose attitudes are not determined by the mere volume of suggestion or reiteration playing upon them. This outcome is the more inevitable in

that the deliberate policy of the conservative press, and, for that matter, the radical press as well, is to withhold, emphasize and color facts in such a way that the policies or interests which they severally represent will seem to be favored thereby. So few people are really equipped for newspaper reading that the bulk of conservatives and radicals alike think in the medium of alleged facts created by the conservative press. The conservative press is thus enabled to compete with the radical press in the latter's own territory, because the conservative press has the machinery for collecting (and purports to collect) all the significant news, whereas the radical press has not. And the radicals are dependent, or think they are, on these better equipped news-collecting agencies.

Since the political opinions of the great majority of the unthinking, and hence the great majority of all the people, will be largely determined by the conservative press, what chance has the press which speaks for a subordinate class? Compare the volume of printed matter put out by the conservative press upholding the *status quo* with the volume put out by the radical press in criticism of the *status quo*. For every line put out by the radical press there are ten or a hundred lines put out by the conservative press. If, as we have insisted, the great majority of people are swayed by mass suggestion rather than by the real evidence in the case, what will positive freedom, as attainable through a radical press, amount to?

Obviously, such freedom considered in itself alone offers no hope of success. The radical press will, of course, have a powerful ally in the misery and humiliation suffered by the subordinate class, and will be able with the aid of this ally to convert many of the class to a radical position. But the powerful influences operating in the contrary direction make any very substantial suc-

cess impossible. I refer, of course, to political habits, to family and local traditions in politics and to suggestioning forces emanating from the conservative press itself. The net result is that the radical press, with the radical churches and schools thrown in, cannot hope to convert more than a proportion of the class in whose behalf it labors, together with a small number of people outside the class whose sympathies predispose them to its support.

Whether a greater and more serviceable freedom along these lines is possible seems doubtful. Legal restrictions will almost automatically come into play as the facilities for radical propaganda are multiplied. We cannot afford, however, to be dogmatic regarding the possibility of a greater positive freedom for radical propaganda. It is too early as yet to say whether we shall repeat the Russian experience with violent revolution as the final act in the class struggle, or whether we shall follow what is supposed to be a British method of discussion and compromise, with the more violent type of revolution, as a final act, avoided.

Liberalist Claims for Freedom of Discussion.—If the foregoing analysis be correct, then liberalist claims for freedom of discussion must be very seriously modified. The degree of legal and positive freedom actually attainable is, of course, to be valued, since, as we have seen, it will be serviceable for certain purposes. But a radical policy cannot be based upon it, although freedom of discussion may be availed of up to a certain point in the promotion of radical movements. The machinery of communication, like all the accredited institutions and mechanisms of a given society, is too much under the control of the class in power for any decisive use thereof to be made by a subordinate class. Vital class issues are

not yet to be settled by political methods, by the methods, that is, of discussion and compromise.

Such a conclusion should not be regarded as pessimistic. We must, if we are to be effective, deal with realities. But the nature of reality itself may change. A large positive freedom of discussion may come, and issues of a sort not now adjudicable by political methods may some day be brought within the domain of political action.

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CHAPTER XXVII

POLITICAL LIBERALISM: THE NATURE OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

WE COME now to the fifth and last assumption of political liberalism. This assumption holds that democratic political institutions are capable of translating into action the wishes of the people, which, according to the preceding assumptions, will have been rationally and ethically determined.

It is necessary, in considering this fifth assumption, that we should bear in mind our criticisms, in previous chapters, of the assumptions which logically precede and underlie it.¹ We there set up in opposition to the rule of sweetness and light pictured by the liberal a less lofty but, as we maintained, a truer conception of political life. The conclusion forced itself on us, that the great majority of people are determined in their political behavior by habit, tradition, suggestion and interest rather than by considerations of social justice and social expediency, although these latter were found to be potent with a small contingent of people. We saw that those factors operate mainly on the side of the *status quo*, and that, as the case stands, interests incompatible with the *status quo* are doomed to defeat, so far as the use of political methods is concerned. Although we saw that habit, tradition, suggestion and interest constitute the premises of political thought for the great majority of people, we could find no warrant for the belief that political opinions are normally concordant therewith. Or, rather, we concluded that it is inappropriate to speak of premises and conclu-

¹ Chaps. XXV, XXVI.

sions where habit, tradition and suggestion are concerned, since these are *alogical* rather than logical processes. More specifically, we found that political habit and tradition determine loyalty to accredited party *names*, *labels* and *slogans*, and that changes in the policies associated with these symbols do not serve, as a rule, to undermine the voter's loyalty to the symbols themselves. On the contrary, the party leader and the party newspaper are able to procure, within broad limits, the voter's assent to any opinions which it is desired to associate with those symbols, by virtue of the fact that the party is a *herd* to whose voice its members normally respond, without hesitation. Opinions not associated with the party usually proceed from the newspaper and other suggestioning agencies speaking for other herds, such as the "general public," the labor union, or the employers' association; and have much the same character, therefore, as party opinions.

Now, as aforesaid, the bulk of these factors play into the hands of interests identified with the *status quo*. Political habit and tradition, and the historically accredited parties (or party names, labels or slogans) which they support, stand, as regards the *status quo*, in the relation of part to whole or, better stated, they are *organically* related to, or *organs of*, the *status quo*. And new opinions having a political import proceed in large part either from these dominant parties, or organs which speak for them, or from other suggestioning agencies which are allied with the interests of the *status quo*. We excepted from this analysis, of course, that contingent of people whose opinions are based on considerations of justice and expediency, or on interests whose claims are assumed to be just, as also people whose actions or opinions are determined by what might be called minority

traditions and habits in politics, and minority suggestioning forces. But these have little chances of success, as we thought, against the overwhelming forces of the same order on the opposing side.

What Do Democratic Political Institutions "Represent"?—This being the situation, what precisely do democratic political institutions represent, and what is it possible for them to represent?

We can say, for one thing, that democratic political institutions cannot annul the political attitudes and opinions whose genesis we have traced. If they really *represent* those attitudes and opinions, and translate them into action, as the fifth assumption of political liberalism would require, we should have a state of affairs which not even the liberals themselves would countenance, for representative political institutions would be found to support, mainly, the interests identified with the *status quo*, and to defeat interests incompatible with the *status quo*, however just the claims of the latter might be. The validity of the liberal's fifth assumption, considered from the liberal's own ethical standpoint, therefore, turns on the validity of the prior assumptions. When these are refuted, the fifth assumption would be untenable, ethically, as it takes for granted the validity of the other assumptions.

But our analysis cannot stop here, as democratic political institutions are never fully representative of the people's wishes, which, according to the assumption, they are calculated to translate into action. They might function to correct those wishes and thus to deal more justly than the electorate would demand, with interests deemed to be incompatible with the *status quo*. Or they might not deal as justly with those interests as the electorate would demand. Or, again, they might on the whole carry out the wishes of the electorate in this regard, however just

or unjust they might be to interests incompatible with the *status quo*.

It is not to be supposed that the acts of a democratic government fall altogether in any one or any two of these categories; that they consistently improve on, conform to, or fall short of the wishes of the electorate, or divide themselves between any two of these classifications. How, then, are the acts of a democratic government distributed as among these several categories? Are electoral mandates faithfully executed, for the most part, or are they not? Does the machinery of a democratic government function to weaken or to strengthen further the power of the dominant class?

It would be a rationalistic error to suppose that there is any very close correspondence between the political mandate and the political performance. Judges, legislators and executives are as human as other church-goers and newspaper readers, and only a little, if any, less susceptible than is the average man to the suggestioning influences brought to bear by these agencies. If the mandate to judges, legislators and executives is distasteful to any interest having the support of these agencies, then those sharing that interest will have some grounds for believing that the execution of the mandate may be defeated or modified. And our own American system of government is so beautifully checked and balanced that if one department of the government at a given time takes its mandates too literally, there are grounds for assuming that some other department will not.

This is not to say that those working against the execution of the mandate will always succeed, as by a fortuitous combination of circumstances all the branches of the government may be determined to carry out the mandate, or a certain branch may have it in its power to

force the coördinate branches to come up to the letter of the mandate, if not to its spirit. There are many instances in our history where the mandate has been faithfully executed. I think, for example, we should have to admit that Mr. Roosevelt during his Presidential period did on the whole carry out the country's mandates to him, and himself largely created a number of mandates in the public interest. Mr. Wilson also stimulated similar mandates and in some cases executed them.

Such instances do not, however, prove a great deal, as they are rather exceptional. For it is notorious that in this country the two dominant parties are brought into power, one after the other, on the strength of promises for progressive reform, but that the promised reforms are rarely realized in any substantial way. It is inevitably so. The dominant class has the means of defeating such mandates just as it has been the means of preventing the mandates themselves from being too radical. It has a loyal press to confuse and outwit the electorate; it has an army of retainers to defeat unfavorable legislative measures and to secure favorable court decisions;² it has a thousand ways of compassing the defeat of administrative officers who would enforce the law to its detriment.

But, it will be said, the other side has also its means of influencing governmental action in the way desired, and the efforts of the two sides will largely balance each other. There is truth in such a claim: reformist groups are able to secure many approximations to the mandates of the electorate and to defeat many intended violations thereof. But no competent observer can doubt which of the two sides has the better resources at its disposal for deter-

²It is not implied that judges and legislators are "corrupted" by the dominant class. The methods employed by the dominant class are usually characterized by a more delicate finesse than that.

mining the outcome nor where the balance of victory usually lies.

An indefinite number of examples could be cited. To take just one: Political parties and party leaders have in recent years repeatedly promised reductions in the cost of living, and they have all failed as repeatedly in making good this promise. And they often attempt, with more or less ingenuousness, to justify their failure. President Wilson, for example, propounded the "vicious circle" of high wages causing high prices, and informed the workingman that he could not on that account benefit by wage increases, whereas a candid and intelligent advocate of the workingman would have construed the vicious circle to mean that high prices signify lower (real) wages and that therefore prices should in some way be reduced or restrained from soaring higher, or else that wages should be made to correspond. And if the business interests concerned had lent their sanction, one or the other remedy could have been applied. But the vicious circle meant in practice that the bituminous coal interests, for instance, were earning profits ranging from fifteen to two thousand per cent. per annum,³ while the bituminous miners received far less than a subsistence wage⁴—with this arrangement officially blessed by the government.

It will be said also that public officials have every

³ Statement issued by former Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo, November 24, 1920.

⁴ This statement can be readily verified by comparing the earnings of the bituminous miners as reported by the Federal Bureau of Labor Statistics in a bulletin entitled *Wages and Hours in the Coal Mining Industry in 1919*, with the cost of maintaining a subsistence standard of living as reported by Prof. W. F. Ogburn, under date of July 12, 1918, to the National War Labor Board, taking into consideration the increases in prices of living necessities during the interval between the two investigations. The miners offered to accept an increase in wages considerably smaller than the difference between actual wages and the cost of a subsistence standard of living, while the operators offered a much smaller increase than that demanded by the miners. The government supported the stand taken by the operators.

reason to make good on their promises as their continuance in power will largely depend on it. This claim, too, has truth in it. When performance is at a larger remove than usual from promise, so that "the people" cannot be fooled into believing that an approximation to promise has been achieved, then the people will turn one set of officials out of power and bring another set in.

Again, however, the class in power can prevent too much mischief from being done. It can do so by making public officials of whatever party subservient to its interests, for it has at its disposal a full repertoire of means to this end. Moreover, the press can, as a rule, so befool the voter that he will not know whether he has been "sold out" or not. The outcome will largely be determined, not by the facts in the case, but by an assiduous playing-up of half-truths and actual lies until the real truth is discernible to but very few. Lying is not only a European power, as has been said; it is a world power as well, and a most formidable power at that. This is not to say that the spokesmen of the dominant class, whether or no they be newspaper men, are more mendacious than others: they see what their class bias will let them see, and they are perhaps as veracious as others in reporting what they see. But the point is that the dominant class has the means of getting its lies and its half-truths accepted as the real truth, whereas its opponents have not.

Public officials can thus be quite effectively shielded from the punishment of their sins by the people who aided and abetted them in their wrongdoing. Two circumstances make this deception of the public easy. The first is the extraordinary complexity of modern governments, and, correspondingly, of the functions they are supposed to serve. This renders any very confident appraisal of their work impossible to any but the trained

investigator, and we have not hitherto insisted, as we might have done, on the competent authoritative appraisal which properly qualified experts might make.

The other circumstance is the lack of any real standards whereby to test the performances of a given party or set of government officials. For the level of past performance has been so low that a basis for an illuminating comparative study is wanting. Performance fluctuates around the level actually established in the past and, measured by that level, the dominant parties are of approximately equal competency. This condition is one for which the dominant class itself is largely responsible. It has so consistently and successfully opposed a governmental performance squaring with the electoral mandate, that the dominant parties are both incorrigibly delinquent, and the people have come to believe that it must be so in the nature of things.

Proposed Remedies for the Defects of Representative Government.—It would take us too far afield to consider in detail the remedies which have been proposed for or actually applied to this situation. If I were to attempt to sum up in one sentence the reasons why they have all so largely failed, I would say that it is because they have all operated (whether actually tried out or only advocated) in a *medium* (to borrow a term from the physical sciences) largely determined by the very class whose power they were designed to restrain. The dominant class had after as well as before any new remedy was tried the same facilities for determining the political attitudes and opinions of the mass of people; the same facilities for seducing, punishing or destroying political leaders and public officials; the same facilities for befooling the public as to the performance of the party in power or the promises of a party whose power was to be established.

Extensions of the suffrage, popular election of senators, graduated income and inheritance taxes, the initiative, referendum and recall, direct primaries and nominations, corrupt practices acts, the short ballot, "municipal research," have none of them, and for this reason, seriously menaced the position of the dominant class. These innovations at the most resulted in but moderate social and economic reforms. They did not lead, and could not have led, to any very fundamental reforms. The class in power, because it is in power, can operate such methods or devices more effectively than can an opposing class or group. With its control of the press and other media of communication, its unrivalled facilities for controlling partisan, legislative, administrative and judicial action, the dominant class can practically determine the outcome of most issues before they come up for a formal decision.

If perchance the opposition scores a point against it, it immediately recoups itself in some one of the many ways always open to it. Higher wages exacted by workmen offer an opportunity of reaping greater profits than before by a differential increase in prices.⁵ If it is proposed to regulate prices or rates, the class moves heaven and earth to defeat the proposition; but if the proposition is partially successful, it imposes through cajolery, misrepresentation and threats of sabotage its own standard of profits on the price-fixers. We could go through the entire list of "reforms" and make a similar analysis for each one of them.

The truth of the matter is, the dominant class is society's *mentor* and *deus ex machina* in one. It dominates the social consciousness and operates the social

⁵ Cf., for instance, W. Jett Lauck, "Profiteers," *The Socialist Review*, Vol. IX, 1920, pp. 49-53; also Hayes, E. C., "The Social Control of the Acquisition of Wealth," *Pub. of the Am. Sociological Soc.*, Vol. XII, 1917, pp. 111-130.

machinery. To put it differently (for the point is worth laboring), *the class in power largely forms the minds of the people*. It is in the position of an educator, or of a philosopher king, who had been given a free hand in carrying out his ideas. This is not to say that the ideas and the methods of the dominant class do not change and become more humane, if not more just. The class is composed of human beings and, as such, it is bound to share in the spirit of the age in which it flourishes. But it stays at the helm of affairs, and precisely because it is composed of human beings, it steers in the direction of its own interests.

We except from this general analysis, of course, that portion of the subordinate class, and the few intellectuals, whose thinking is not done for them by the dominant class and its official mentors. They constitute the nucleus of the reform party, the resolute minority that would sweep away the *deus ex machina*, and the crowd *mentor*, and inaugurate in power a new class—a class, it must be admitted, which would in its turn be a new mentor and *deus ex machina*, and destined to travel much the same road as the class it displaced.

The conclusion must be that democratic political institutions do not, and indeed cannot, accurately represent the expressed wishes of their constituencies. Just as the class in power largely determines the wishes of the constituencies themselves, and prevents them from being too radical, so it intervenes before these wishes, however determined, can be translated into action, and secures a result even more consonant with its interests.

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CHAPTER XXVIII

POLITICAL LIBERALISM: THE RADICAL PARTY

ONE device for securing a more representative government deserves special consideration. This is the radical political party, and particularly, as offering some hope of immediate success, the independent labor party. Perhaps a majority of liberals favor the organization in this country of some such party, and as this newest deliverance of liberal thought might be offered as an answer to our criticisms of the liberal theory, a consideration thereof will be germane to the present inquiry.

Moreover, many radicals rely on liberal methods for the accomplishment of their purposes, and it will be instructive to inquire into the applicability of these methods to radical programs such as they advocate. In fact, an application of liberal methods to radical aims supplies a crucial test of political liberalism, and the liberalist philosophy will largely stand or fall according as it meets or fails to meet this test.

If our previous generalization be accepted as well grounded, that the consummation of a radical program can come only through an appeal to physical or economic force (such, for example, as the general strike), then we should have to concede to radical parties only functions preparatory or instrumental to a final struggle in which physical force was the arbiter. But not to settle the question in a deductive manner, let us consider as an independent problem the prospects of radical victory through the agency of a political party. To be concrete, we shall restrict our discussion to the present situation

in this country, although our analysis should apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to other countries as well.

Labor's Experience in Politics.—Any one who is at all acquainted with the history of labor in this country would concede that even if all class-conscious workingmen were committed to a well-considered political program, including the development of an independent labor party, it would by no means follow that their program would be realized in any substantial way. Let us take a glance at labor's experience in politics to see what light it throws on the problem in hand.

The idea of a labor party is in this country almost as old as the labor movement itself. Resolute attempts have been made time and time again to build up a strong labor party, but no more than a passing success has ever been achieved. Causes of the failure were in part peculiar to conditions here, but conditions paralleled elsewhere also played a part. Attempts to organize labor parties have usually followed on some signal defeat of labor as a class. Widespread failure of strikes, wholesale unemployment, a general reduction in wages, the weakening or destruction of labor organizations which followed as a result—these have been the occasions for the organization of labor parties in this country. When prosperity returned and it became feasible for labor to increase wages and shorten hours by direct methods, interest in the labor party was apt to wane. This was in part due to labor's greater familiarity with direct methods, itself due to historical circumstances presently to be explained, and partly to the inefficacy of political methods as compared with direct. Why were the political methods ineffective?

Political inexperience and want of able leadership were partly responsible. Labor had so little leisure to play politics, and the wage-earning class constituted so

small a minority of the voting population, even after the general enfranchisement of their class, that any very successful participation in politics was out of the question during the period when political traditions were being established in this country. Not being adepts at the political game, the infant labor parties were used by the professional politicians for their own purposes.

The desire on the part of the labor parties for quick results played into the hands of the politicians. Leaders of the dominant parties, who naturally wanted the labor vote, would first fuse with the labor parties, promising them immediate reforms, and then proceed to absorb them. Or the dominant parties would bid for the labor vote, often quite destructively to the labor parties themselves, by incorporating in their platforms the more popular of labor's demands. So meager were the results secured to labor by these means, and so assured were the returns from the direct method, when favorable conditions for its exercise returned, that the unhappy and unfamiliar ways of politics were speedily abandoned for the familiar and successful methods of economic action. Even when substantial legislation was secured it was, as a rule, not adequately enforced or it was declared unconstitutional by the courts.¹

During all this time powerful political traditions were being developed, traditions assimilated by labor equally with the rest of the country. Party names and catchwords have now become venerable, and have acquired a hold on the average man beyond the reach of rational argument. Labor has become largely absorbed in this tradition. The tradition has, for labor, two aspects: First, there is a strong presumption against organized political action by

¹ Reference for the foregoing sketch, Commons, John R., and Associates, *History of Labor in the United States*, 2 vols.

labor as such; and, secondly, individual laborers are brought up as good Democrats or Republicans and vote the Republican or Democratic ticket in the same unreflecting way as do the farmers of New England or the Southern States.

The present veteran leaders of organized labor have themselves experienced the futility of independent political action, and they are naturally opposed to any new venture in this field. And their influence will have to be reckoned with for many a year to come. This, together with the strong hold of old-party traditions on the individual laborer, will probably operate to prevent a considerable proportion of labor from joining a new labor party.

Future Prospects of a Labor Party in the United States.—Add to these factors others already analyzed, and we have a powerful and, to my mind, an invincible combination of factors militating against the success of a new labor party. The dominant press will, as in the past, continue to befuddle the issues and succeed in preventing a large proportion of the laboring class not already tied down by habit and tradition from seeing where their true interests lie. A considerable proportion of labor, particularly the professional groups, will never realize their membership in the class. Farmers and small tradesmen will be deterred even more easily from combining with labor to serve their joint interests. Any legislative victories which a growing labor party may be able to secure will be rendered nugatory to some degree by our courts and executives, and this will tend to render ineffective the party's appeal to unconverted groups which substantial victories might attract to it.

Our consideration of labor's chances in politics, regarded as a crucial test of liberalism, might rest here, but it will not be out of place to indicate advantages that

might accrue from the political organization of labor, even though there is no prospect of its attaining a political majority. There would seem to be two possibilities. First, a labor party might be instrumental to a more efficient organization of labor for the use of economic or direct methods, a function which would be served through the propaganda activities of such a party. A labor party might constitute, so to speak, a substantial contribution to that positive freedom of discussion before considered. Secondly, a labor party might be instrumental in securing reforms which would be valuable in themselves, and which would have a propaganda value as well.

But these advantages might carry with them certain disadvantages. The tendency of a labor party, being a political organization, would be to emphasize political methods at the expense of the economic, or direct. Any substantial reforms which might be secured would make this danger all the more insidious, for the success (of its kind) of the political methods would thereby be demonstrated. The outcome might be that labor itself would be divided into two irreconcilable camps—the one favoring political methods; the other, direct—assuming, of course, that a fairly strong labor party could be developed.

It is not the business of a naturalistic analysis to chart a course for avoiding the dangers and reaping the advantages of a political organization of labor. The analysis indicates no prospect of a labor party securing within our time, if ever, a voting majority. Obviously, if it cannot, it will not be an instrument for the realization of labor's more fundamental aims. If the leadership of the labor movement should come to a similar conclusion, the economic organization of labor will be given the right of way, and political organization relegated to second place. Political organization would then find its function in

promoting a better economic organization of labor, and incidentally in securing reforms; but whenever it hampered a better organization of labor along economic lines, it would be set aside or its methods modified.

A separate discussion of socialist and other radical parties is not here called for, as they have essentially the same aims and employ the same methods as do the labor parties. They are indeed labor parties under other names. These several species of labor parties proceed, of course, on more or less divergent theories of economic reconstruction and make, because of that, a wider appeal to the laboring class. What has been said regarding the prospects of success for a labor party may be taken to apply to any possible combination of these several parties. Obviously whatever success is theoretically possible to a political labor movement will largely depend for its practical realization on the amalgamation of these several groups into one party. Although the time for such a move may not have come as yet, English experience would seem to indicate its eventual feasibility.

We may seem to have wandered off the subject of representative government. As before pointed out, however, the possibilities of a new political alignment supply a crucial test of political liberalism, and are worthy on that account of a painstaking examination. The discussion should have its significance for radicalism as well as for reformism, for most political thinkers have been under the spell of the liberalist philosophy for so long that it is apt to color the conclusions of all schools of political and economic thought. Liberals are to be found in all parties, including radical parties. The old-party liberal and the radical liberal agree quite closely as to method, although they disagree as to their ultimate aims. Both would seem to be doomed to comparative ineffec-

tiveness, especially the liberal radical, for, as we have maintained, liberalist methods have only a very limited application to radical aims.

In this discussion we have not purported, of course, to pass on the legitimacy of radical aims, but have merely considered them as a test of liberal methods. Radical aims *may be* legitimate, however, and no political philosophy can be deemed altogether valid unless it meets the test which radical aims supply.

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CHAPTER XXIX

POLITICAL LIBERALISM: INCURABLE DEFECTS OF POLITICAL DEMOCRACY

WE HAVE considered various remedies for the defects of political democracy. To complete our analysis, we must point out defects which are of the very essence of political democracy and in no wise to be explained as aberrations therefrom.

On the most favorable view of political democracy possible, the majority will rule, and the minority must bow to the dictates of this majority, however those dictates may have been determined. This theoretical possibility, being taken for the reality, is offered as the principal justification of democratic political institutions. But it is conceded that the majority may rule in its own interest, and to the detriment of minority interests to which it may be opposed. So, various devices may be put into operation for the protection of these minority interests. Such devices are usually provided for in the fundamental law, or constitution, and, in the special case of opposition parties, in the procedure of parliament or the legislative assembly.

The Political Protection of Minority Interests.—A number of significant observations are to be made regarding such devices. In the first place, the incorporation of provisions in the fundamental law protecting a certain group indicates that the group itself was powerful enough at the time to compel the grant of such concessions. It was either a very powerful minority, or else it was a majority which has since become a minority. According to our previous analysis a subordinate class possessed

of but little power would be unable to force through provisions of this nature. Nor would a subordinate class that had arisen after a constitution was adopted be able, by political means, to secure a recognition, in the organic law, of its special interests.

Moreover, the constitutional protection of minorities is chiefly of a negative character. It places the emphasis on acts against minorities which shall not be committed. It is not so much concerned with the prescription of duties as of rights, and the rights of the minority protected in the constitution, not being adequately balanced by the legal duties of the same minority, are apt to entail wrongs for another group that is unprotected. In any case the economic interest specially protected in our own constitution is the property interest,¹ and this, far from aiding the propertyless class in the accomplishment of its aims, makes the constitutional accomplishment of those aims exceedingly difficult, if not impossible.

These observations seem to warrant the conclusion that a political constitution, whether written or unwritten, cannot, as a general rule, do justice to minority interests which were not powerful enough at the time the constitution was adopted, or initiated, to compel a recognition of their claims, or to interests which may have arisen after the constitution was adopted but which have not had political power enough to secure revisions of the constitution in their favor; but, on the contrary, that interests which were powerful enough at the initiation of a constitution to compel a recognition of their claims may become the prerogative or privilege of a comparatively small class, and that this privilege, due to that original protection, may so strengthen and consolidate the political

¹ Cf. A. T. Hadley, "The Constitutional Position of Property in America," *The Independent*, Vol. LXIV, 1908, pp. 834-838.

power of this small class, that a revision of the constitution, by political means, in favor of a class with antagonistic interests may be quite impracticable.

The wage-earning class in this country comes within these specifications. Practically non-existent as a class, when the Constitution was adopted, while the property interest, which was later to be opposed to it, was accorded full recognition in the Constitution, the property interest has strengthened and consolidated its political power, whereas the wage-earning class has been unable to acquire any great political power, and unable therefore to secure a revision of the Constitution (or of constitutional law) in its favor. And if our analysis of the political prospects of the wage-earning class be correct, it will, in all probability, be unable in the future, by political methods, to secure a constitutional recognition of its claims.

Returning to the general question, and assuming that our account of the genesis of political opinions has been correct, we are justified in saying that it will probably be impossible for labor ever to attain a political majority in this country. Now, if the majority consistently supports the interests of the dominant class, as it may be expected to do, then the claims of labor cannot possibly secure recognition through the use of political means. We thus have an *impasse* which cannot be bridged. So far from this being a hypothetical eventuality, it is the only outcome possible to us under the Constitution, so far as we can forecast our future political development.

The Injustices of Majority Rule.—We seem justified in giving a more general extension to these conclusions than that indicated by the analysis from which they have been drawn. It has often happened, and will no doubt often happen again, that a subordinate group whose claims are quite legitimate was or will be unable by political means to

secure a recognition of those claims. Often, such a group, as defined by its interests (not by its awareness of those interests), will be in the minority, and with no prospect of becoming a majority, and its interests may be doomed to permanent defeat, so far as the use of political methods is concerned, by a majority with hostile interests or at least a hostile attitude. Or, again, a subordinate group (as defined by its interests) may be in the majority, or it might with other groups having harmonious interests constitute a majority, but unable, on account of the support afforded to opposing interests by habit, tradition and suggestion, to convert a large part of this majority to a political program based on its interests; while the opposing group, although really a minority, will be able, by keeping a *political* majority on its side, to disallow the claims of the group which, as defined by its interests, is in the majority. Political authority is generally a function of dominant economic interests, or rather it generally supports those interests, although those sharing these interests may be, and often are, in the minority; and this authority will be used, as a general rule, to defeat the interests of the opposing class, whether it is in the (economic) minority or majority.

These defects are of the very essence of democratic government, or rule by political majorities, and, as such, cannot be corrected by political means.

The Defects of the Territorial System of Representation.—Other defects of democratic government, not so irremediable, are to be traced to the territorial system of representation. This subject has been so fully discussed by recent writers (Cole, Laski, *et al.*) that we shall not enter into any extended analysis of it here. Certain aspects of the subject have not, however, received the attention which their importance demands. We propose

to examine one aspect only, the territorial system of representation viewed from the standpoint of the consumer. It has been claimed that the territorial representative cannot properly represent conflicting producers' interests, but that he might represent consumers' interests more or less acceptably. Let us examine this claim.

In the first place, this claim apparently sets up a somewhat artificial distinction between consumers' and producers' interests, for these interests are necessarily bound up together. Consumers and producers (or those sharing the product) are, in fact, the same people, and no problem can be well defined which assumes producers and consumers to be more or less independent classes of people with conflicting, or divergent, interests. The issue is not between producers as a class and consumers as a class, but concerns the distribution of the product among the consumers; or, put the other way around, the distribution of consumers' goods among the producers (or those sharing the product). The two terms, consumer and producer, are thus interchangeable. Even the distribution of general state services among different territorial areas could be expressed in terms of producers', as well as of consumers', interests.

The case is somewhat different, however, when we speak of producers and consumers of particular commodities. The consumer of a particular commodity, if he be not at the same time a producer thereof, will be interested in low prices and acceptable quality, the producer of this commodity in large profits, therefore in high prices (as conditioned by the elasticity of demand) for a marketable quality. The consumer and the producer of a particular commodity will thus have diametrically opposed interests in the matter of prices, if not of quality as well. For particular commodities, producers and consumers will

want, for a given quality, high and low prices respectively.

Which group will have the greater power over prices (the quality of the commodity being taken for granted)? The answer must be that the producers will have, and for two reasons: First, prices are fixed in the first instance by the producer; and, second, selling power is more readily organizable than is buying power. An exhaustive analysis of this problem would take us into an extended discussion of prices, wages, profits, etc., but it is enough for the purpose in hand to point out that the producer's control over prices is direct and is readily organizable, whereas the consumer's control is at most indirect and is not readily organizable. This analysis is evidently more applicable to consumers' than to producers' goods.

Labor is, of course, part of the producing group and can (mainly by *direct* methods, be it noted) extort higher wages from the employer, but this (and more) the employer passes on to the consumer in the form of higher prices. So that, there are two powerful organizable groups interested in high prices as opposed to one comparatively unorganizable group interested in low prices. It is true, of course, that from the viewpoint of the general distribution of the product, labor does not benefit a great deal, if any, by wage increases, as the increased prices, to labor, of consumers' goods counterbalance the increased money wage. It is the capitalist group, therefore, that chiefly profits by producers' control over prices.

Now, all groups have an interest in potential governmental action affecting the distribution of the product, whether regarded from the producer's or the consumer's viewpoint. Here is where the territorial representative comes in.

The Territorial Representative.—The territorial representative will normally respond to the interest which is

best organized, and which, therefore, can bring the greater pressure to bear upon him. Theoretically he represents the interests of all the people whether regarded as consumers or as producers, not alone the consumers' interests, as some say, because all his constituents have *both* interests. But this deliverance of theory does not correspond with the facts. The territorial representative, like everybody else, responds to the pressure brought to bear upon him. The *resultant* of the various pressures brought to bear upon him impel him in the direction of the producer's interest (more accurately, the capitalist's price-fixing interest). This interest is highly organized; it dominates through its money power the press, the political party, the selection of candidates from which the voter chooses, and, within broad limits, the vote itself. It has the power, therefore, to mar or make the politician's career. What chance has the unorganized consumer's interest as against this highly organized capitalist interest in prices?

It is not, of course, a question of deliberately corrupting the territorial representative any more than of corrupting the voter. There is corruption in a sense, in both cases, but, as a rule, neither the voter nor the representative realizes that he is being corrupted. Nor is it to be supposed that the makers of politics generally realize that they are corrupting either the voters or their nominal representatives. The representative's attitudes, like the voter's, are made to order. Neither has a great deal to say in regard to his political behavior. The territorial system makes this easier in both cases.

The territorial representative is in theory everybody's representative but, in reality, the representative of a very small class. The idea is sedulously fostered that he serves all the people. But the people have not the means of

compelling their representative to serve them, nor do they know *how* he could effectually serve them. The representative himself is as helpless as the people themselves in respect to both the knowledge and the means of service. Being a representative-at-large, and helpless in the bargain, the territorial representative is at the mercy of those who take advantage of his at-large character to lead and, if necessary, to drive him in the way he should go. We have seen how that works out in practice.

Since under our political system, economic groups cannot select representatives from the groups, themselves to serve them in legislative matters, the system almost automatically produces a class of professional politicians with a distinctive code of ethics and a set of working principles designed to meet the exigencies of their profession.

This code is on the whole a servile code, although, as we have seen, it can be regarded simply as a special business code. The politician nominally serves two masters, his constituents and the political party he happens to represent. In reality, there is but one master, the dominant class, though perhaps the people might be regarded as a sort of consort or mistress of this class. This mistress has to be placated on occasion and kept in a docile frame of mind. The politician must be able to ingratiate himself with both master and mistress.

His code and his principles will be determined by the exigencies of this situation. He must, to meet requirements, be a good "mixer," must learn to say that which will please, must be ready to promise and equally ready to break a promise, must be ready by any sort of camouflage to conceal the gap between his performance and his promise, and he must above all be obedient to his party

and the powers back of the party, and carry out their dictates loyally and without complaining.

These qualities do not make for independent thought and action. If perchance one who is independent gets into office he is soon relegated to private life, as a rule, or finds himself so outnumbered by his colleagues of the servile sort that he soon seeks more congenial and useful fields elsewhere. Should he care and be able to remain in public life despite these discouragements, he succeeds at most in elevating somewhat the standards of public service, but he does not revolutionize them. With rare exceptions, whether he likes it or no, he is tied hand and foot by the system in which he finds himself.

Possibilities of Industrial Representation.—The situation would be different, even in a capitalistic society, if economic groups were represented by men chosen from the groups themselves. For then the representative would at least *understand* the interests of his group, which the territorial representative does not. The interests of all important groups would then be interpreted to the legislative assembly, and that interpretation might count for something. The labor or farmer interest would be clearly heard even if it were not clearly heeded. Probably with the dominant class (organized capitalists) still in the position of *mentor* and *deus ex machina* no radical changes would follow, so that the practical value of industrial representation would be limited by the economic system itself. It would nevertheless have considerable reformist value and would therefore be a not unimportant innovation.

Theoretically, such a system could be introduced in this country through constitutional amendment, but practically it could be established only through an unconstitutional revolution. The present system has so powerful

a sanction in tradition, and the new system would (without reason) seem so great a menace to vested interests that nothing short of a general upheaval would make its introduction possible.

The Power of the Judiciary.—The same is true of any radical limitation of the power of the judiciary. Depriving them of the legislative functions which they have appropriated to themselves, while theoretically it could be accomplished by constitutional amendment, actually, like industrial representation, it could be accomplished by unconstitutional means alone. Tradition and fear for vested interests would control here as there. And, as in the case of industrial representation, the innovation would have a reformist value only, though an important one. That the judiciary functions in the main to safeguard the interests of the capitalist class rather than those of the consumer or of labor has become a platitude of political discussion. This is, of course, a count against our own system of government, though not against democratic government in general, for obviously this feature of our system cannot be called democratic in even the least eulogistic sense of the term.

Limitations of Representative Government Generally.—Our analysis of territorial representation, as also of industrial representation, would seem to apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to any economic system, not alone to the capitalistic system. The territorial representative in such a society as that pictured by G. D. H. Cole,² for example, would be no less susceptible to pressure from producers' interests than are territorial representatives in capitalistic societies. Such representatives would still have the at-large character discussed above, and where questions of distribution were concerned there would in all probability

² *Self-Government in Industry.*

be the same eagerness on the part of conflicting groups to capture the support of the territorial representative, with the more powerful groups overcoming the weaker.

The guild and the soviet might be better forms of *representation* than is representation by territory, yet when once instituted they would have the essential limitations of representative government in general. They could not serve as instruments of fundamental change but would, so long as they survived, be under the control of the class in power. Properly considered, therefore, the guild or soviet is merely a particular form of representative government associated with, but not indispensable to, an economic revolution, actual or prospective, signifying the political ascendancy of a class which was formerly subordinate.

We may now assemble our conclusions regarding liberal claims for representative government. We have seen that representative political institutions can do no more, at best, than express and give effect to the wishes of a political majority; but that, in reality, the performances of representative government rarely approximate electoral mandates, owing to the intervention of dominant economic interests; that electoral mandates themselves are largely determined by habit, tradition and suggestion, and that these factors normally support the interests of the dominant class.

We also considered various political devices for causing democratic governments to deal more justly with minority groups, but concluded that none of these devices could be depended on for the more fundamental changes which may be demanded by minority interests. For we saw that all such devices operate in a *medium* largely determined by habit, tradition and other factors which function in the interests of the dominant class.

We dealt at some length with the idea of a labor party, considered as a means of securing recognition for the claims of a subordinate class, and therefore as offering a crucial test of political liberalism; but we could find no warrant for the belief that a labor party could develop sufficient strength to assure the accomplishment of these purposes.

We pointed out, as an incurable defect of political democracy, that it is unable to deal justly with the claims of economic groups whose interests are vitally opposed to interests supported by the political majority, and that economic interests which are shared by a majority of the people are often defeated by the interests of a minority group because the latter has a political majority on its side; we concluded, therefore, that occasions will often arise where economic groups whose claims are quite just cannot secure a recognition of those claims through the processes of democratic government.

We saw that the territorial system of representation aggravates this situation, chiefly for the reason that the dominant class can bring greater pressure to bear on the territorial representative than can a subordinate class; and we thought that a better representation of all groups might be had through an industrial system of representation; but we could find no grounds for the belief that industrial representation would assure a just treatment to groups which constituted or were associated with a political minority. We concluded, therefore, that the soviet, guild or other forms of industrial representation are not exempt from the defects characteristic of representative government in general.

The Place of Liberal Theory and Liberal Institutions.—We have taken up, one by one, the assumptions or postulates underlying political liberalism, considered as

a political philosophy, and as a system of political institutions, and shown that none of them square with the results of modern psychology or with the facts of political life. The liberal theory and the rationalistic method which it represents must therefore be abandoned in favor of a theory and a method which does square with modern psychology and with the facts of political life.

In refuting the liberal theory, however, we have not denied all value to the political institutions which the theory claims to justify. We have attempted an evaluation of these institutions only in so far as they purport to deal adequately with conflicting class interests. Although they have failed to meet this test, other tests might be applied to them which would yield more favorable results. Representative political institutions *are* adapted to serve many vital functions of society, and they will find in these functions their proper sphere and their sufficient justification. While other functions will be exempted from their jurisdiction, that will be only to modify the claims made for these institutions, not to deny their validity altogether.

Nor have we minimized the historic importance of the liberal theory or of liberal institutions. They represented both a repudiation of the ancient régime, and the principles of the new order that gradually displaced it. They have therefore been identified for upwards of a hundred years with the march of history itself. As the political and intellectual expression of that progress, these institutions and this theory are scarcely a subject for criticism. They were part and parcel of a great evolutionary process which, under the given conditions, was largely inevitable. The aim of our analysis has been, not to show that liberal theory and liberal institutions have not played a historic rôle of the greatest importance, but that they are not

an adequate expression, intellectual or political, of the historical movement in which we are now living.

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CHAPTER XXX

THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL ACTION

IN THIS chapter we shall attempt to forecast the future of political action, in so far as its tendencies and its limitations have been revealed in the course of the present inquiry. Let us remember, in so doing, that we are not concerned to show what political action *ought to be* in the future, *much less to advocate any program for influencing the future course of political action, but that we are only seeking to determine where the tendencies analyzed in the preceding pages are likely to take us.*

Limitations of Political Action.—Certain important limitations of political action are indicated by our demonstration of its incompetency to deal with the more vital interests of antagonistic economic classes. As we have shown, habit, tradition and suggestion serve, as a general rule, to secure the political authority of the dominant class, and this authority is naturally used to the advantage of the class, and to the disadvantage of the opposing class. If that be true, there will not be wanting leaders who will undertake to impress the fact on the subordinate class itself, and their efforts may be expected to meet with a considerable measure of success. It will not be possible to convert more than a proportion of the subordinate class to this position, owing to the powerful traditions, with coöperating tendencies in human nature, which sanction established political principles and institutions. But the authority of those principles and institutions will be undermined for that section of the subordinate class who can be brought to recognize the incompatibility of these institutions and principles with what they deem to be

the just claims of their class. Consequently, this section of the subordinate class will probably disallow the claims of the political authority under which they live to adjudicate the more vital issues between their class and the class which is antagonistic thereto.

This section of the subordinate class will not be deterred by the popular sanctions accorded to these political institutions from pursuing whatever aims for the improvement of its class status it may have been led to accept, through its reactions to the industrial situation. These aims may be moderate or radical, and contemplate moderate or radical reforms in the economic system with which those institutions are bound up.

Whether the foundations of this system will be challenged, and, if so, just what success will attend the efforts toward a reconstruction thereof are questions which we are not in a position to answer. The issue will largely depend, of course, on the size, solidarity and strategic position of the radical group, as also on the force and determination with which its aims are opposed. It is enough for the purpose in hand to have pointed out that a considerable section of the subordinate class will in all probability disallow the claim of established political authority to deal with issues vitally affecting its class status.

We ought not, however, to ignore this probability that a considerable portion of the subordinate class will aim at nothing less than the complete emancipation of its class, and that it will stand ready to utilize whatever resources may be at its disposal in the accomplishment of this aim. Naturally, too, this radical group, should it be successful in overthrowing the given government, and in subordinating the class which had formerly dominated it, will take measures to counteract or render nugatory

the effect of habit, tradition and suggestion in supporting the old order, and their tendency to reinstate in power the old class and the old government. The more competent observers of the Russian Revolution will not have failed to recognize that just this is the explanation and the significance of its rigorous censorship of the press, the suppression of the Constituent Assembly, and other measures abhorrent to conceptions of democracy current among the peoples of Western Europe and America.

Should the radical program meet with success, the structure of the government would doubtless be modified more or less fundamentally, for the spokesmen of this group will not only have criticized the forms of government associated with the dominance of an antagonistic class, but they will have been developing positive political theories of their own which they will naturally attempt to put into practice, once the opportunity is offered. The terms soviet and guild denote such positive theories of government formulated by the intellectual leaders of subordinate economic classes.

As our analysis has shown, however, such forms of government are not exempt from defects inherent in government generally, and in so-called representative government in particular. Should any of these governmental systems prevail, therefore, they certainly could not function to the satisfaction of all groups in society, and the world would probably witness again a process of disillusionment respecting established political institutions, as also with respect to the political and economic ascendancy of the class in whose interest they functioned.

In the last analysis, this recurrent rise of new classes to power and the displacement of established forms of government by new forms are to be explained by, and perhaps rendered inevitable on account of, the dominance

in human nature of tendencies which make for conflict and disharmony, and the comparative impotency of tendencies making for peace and harmony.

Such transformations of power are not necessarily attended with conflicts of the more violent types. Indeed, certain peoples manifest a disposition to recognize as inevitable fundamental changes due to the growing power of a subordinate class, and to accept those changes without so prolonged and desperate an opposition as is seen in the case of other peoples. The claim is made, and supported by a good deal of evidence, that the English people manifest such a disposition to compromise with the inevitable, while the Russians, on the other hand, seem less capable of compromising on vital issues, and more disposed to accept armed force as the only arbiter thereof.

Other limitations of political action there are, and these it would be interesting to consider, but we should be transcending the limits of the present inquiry did we undertake to deal with them at any length. A brief reference to those limitations will suffice for the purpose in hand.

The unfitness of political action for dealing with religious belief, with scientific research, with intellectual activity in every field of human endeavor, with countless modes of human behavior, and especially with acts and beliefs rooted deep in instinct and tradition, has been demonstrated over and over again.¹ Political action is itself determined by forces of this order, and it cannot be expected to reverse the relationship between the two. Political action may guide these forces to a certain extent, simply because the same natural factors control both, but the general relationship between the two is of the sort

¹ Cf., for example, Laski, H. J., *Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty, and Authority in the Modern State*.

indicated. A juster way of putting the matter would be to say that political activity is only a phase of a more intricate complex of human activity, and that it is to be understood in the light of that complex, and not as giving the latter its specific character. As elsewhere, the part is to be explained by the whole, not the whole by the part.

As we have suggested already, the substitution of one form of government for another does not signify the repudiation of all the principles upon which the old form of government was based. On the contrary, the more substantial part of the new is likely to have been derived from the old, although the synthesis of the new elements with the old will be, in some respects, peculiar and distinctive. In the soviet and guild forms of government, for example, there is, in reality, no repudiation of republican or democratic principles, for, in ultimate intention at least, both forms of government rest on a quite broad suffrage basis, and are or would be conducted according to procedures laid down in a written constitution. There are, or would be, in both cases, temporary compromises, devices and expedients designed to secure the power of the new class which has or would have replaced the old.

It seems to have been recognized by the advocates of these and other modified forms of representative government that political authority is based on class interest (as well as on habit, tradition and suggestion), and they have naturally taken the position, therefore, that representative government cannot itself be a means of transferring power from one class to another, but only an instrument for serving economic interests which happen to be dominant (that is, so far as class interests themselves are in question). Not being available as a means of transferring political authority from one class to another, that function is served by other means; and the

form of government, whether ostensibly representative or not, is merely adapted to the needs or the ideas of the new class whose power was or is to be established.

Doubtless the advocates of such forms of government are more or less disposed to look upon them as final, or as nearly perfect as anything political could be. Such idealization of institutions with which a group or class identifies its fortunes or its hopes is seen in every age, and will probably always go with the advocacy of any form of government or general social organization, whether actually established or only projected for the future. Our analysis tends to show, of course, that there is no "perfect" form of government, and no final organization of society, but that any given social organization with its correlative form of government is likely to be replaced by a different organization and a different form of government, under the impulsion of a new class disadvantaged by the old, and become powerful enough to challenge its validity.

The Sphere of Representative Government.—What social functions is representative government calculated to serve acceptably? Answered negatively, and with a number of qualifications to be stated presently, representative political institutions may be said to serve, or to be capable of serving, acceptably social functions which do not interfere with, and hence are not subject to interference by, vital class interests. One could go through the list of social functions which come, or might be conceived to come, within the domain of political action, and see how they meet this test. As we have had occasion to suggest, such matters as protection of life and property, defense against external aggression, education, sanitation, the care of the dependent, delinquent and defective classes, and numerous forms of "public improvement" would

seem to come within the domain of political action. It is true that vital class or group interests may be involved in any one of these functions, but these interests are not often of such a nature as to disqualify governmental agencies from performing more or less acceptably the functions in question.

The performance of such functions is of course more or less affected by prevailing economic interests. Under our money economy, and the dominance of pecuniary motives that goes with it, many if not all these functions are seriously hampered by the unwillingness of the moneyed class to grant adequate revenues to those charged with the responsibility of performing those functions. This is seen, to take some conspicuous examples, in taxpayers' unwillingness properly to support public education and public health activities, or to provide suitable care for the dependent, delinquent and defective classes. In a different way, the function of national defense is often subverted by the dominant class in its own interest (real or fancied), so that military resources provided for purely defensive purposes are often utilized for purposes of aggression, as in the extortion of economic concessions from weaker peoples, the establishment of "spheres of influence" in undeveloped countries, and the like. Similarly but in less degree, perhaps, the function of protecting life and property within the given political jurisdiction is often perverted to the advantage of a group or class, most often of the dominant class.

Despite these qualifications, serious as they are, we seem to be justified in taking the position that social functions coming under the several categories indicated can be performed more or less acceptably by governmental agencies. There would be analogous limitations or handicaps under any economic system, but they would not seem

to be serious enough, save in isolated cases, to disqualify governmental agencies from dealing with these functions in a fairly acceptable manner. In any case no one except the anarchists would seriously propose that such functions be exempted from the jurisdiction of the state and delegated to the individual or to the social class.

To guard ourselves against misapprehensions, we must point out that governmental agencies often deal more or less acceptably with issues in which antagonistic class interests are involved, and not infrequently such issues are decided in favor of the subordinate class. This is an anomaly which challenges inquiry, for it apparently contravenes the theory of political action which we have set forth.

It will be found, I think, that all such cases come under one or more of the following categories: (1) Measures readily comprehended by, and compatible with the interests of, the average citizen—of the public, that is—and such, consequently, as the parental, gregarious, constructive and inquisitive tendencies are capable of reacting to effectively. Under this category would come laws restricting child labor, limiting the hours or increasing the wages of female laborers, and also, perhaps, laws regulating specially hazardous occupations in which men are engaged, or providing compulsory insurance against accident, invalidity, unemployment, old age, and the like. (2) Measures particularly calculated to win the political support of the subordinate class, such as mechanics' lien laws, (promised) limitations on the use of injunctions in labor disputes, and the like. (3) Measures extorted by the subordinate class through the use of direct methods, or through a threat of their use. A significant example is the passage of the Adamson Act establishing a basic eight-hour day on the railroads, a measure forced through

Congress under the threat of a nation-wide strike by the railway workers.

Allowance is made for all such measures in our general theory of political action. As we have shown, however, only minor or subsidiary issues, not the more vital issues between antagonistic classes, can be dealt with acceptably by the methods indicated. Measures coming under the third category are consonant with the general theory that political action is a function or derivative of economic power. In so far as an economic class is able to force through measures of this sort by the use of economic methods, it is in the position of a dominant, not a subordinate, class.

Political action will normally register the transfer of economic, and hence of political, power from one class to another, although, as we have seen, nothing like a complete transfer of power to a hitherto subordinate class is possible through political means themselves. At the same time the transfer of political power to a new class may be effected without any violent conflict between the new class and the old, or, indeed, without any express repudiation of existing political institutions. The display of a superior economic power by a hitherto subordinate class may be enough to convince the opposing class and the general public that a transfer of political authority is inevitable and that it would be futile to oppose it.

Other qualifications of our delimitation of the domain of political action are to be noted. Racial, national, linguistic, religious or other group divisions often limit the acceptable performance of the functions specified as coming within the scope of political action. Defense against external aggression is rendered necessary by just these factors. By the same token life and property are rendered insecure, and the function of protecting them often

rendered impossible of performance. Moreover, such divisions often condition, although they could scarcely be said to interfere with, functions coming under the general categories of education, sanitation, public improvements, provision of recreational facilities, and the care of the dependent, delinquent and defective classes.

Finally, the claims here made for political action are predicated on the assumption that the structure of government shall itself be adapted as well as may be to the functions coming within its purview. The distribution of public functions between local and general governments, the particular extension of the suffrage, the system of representation, the selection, training and organization of the government personnel, the methods whereby public servants are held to account for the discharge of their responsibilities, will all and several affect the competency of governmental agencies in dealing with the functions coming within the domain of political action. Many other factors enter in, of course, but enough has been said to indicate qualifications of this order upon our delimitation of the scope of political action.

Our inquiry is now complete, save for the consideration of some ultimate problems reserved for a final chapter. I have undertaken only to present a naturalistic interpretation of the American labor movement in its relation to politics, and to formulate, on the basis of this interpretation, a provisional theory of political action in its bearing on the divergent interests of economic classes. I have not purported to deal systematically with the labor movement in other than its political aspects, nor with political action except in relation to divergent economic interests.

Need for Further Study.—There is need for complementary studies, along somewhat the same lines, (1) of

the labor movement in relation to various types of direct or non-political action, and (2) of political action in relation to other than divergent economic interests. The results of our inquiry into the availability of political methods to subordinate economic classes have turned out to be negative for the most part. The inference drawn from these conclusions was that these classes will come to rely more and more on non-political or direct methods for the attainment of their more fundamental aims. But these direct methods may themselves be subject to serious limitations, and some of them may be more efficacious than others in the accomplishment of those aims. Only a naturalistic study of these several methods can serve to determine their comparative value for such aims. There is a place for studies, by similar methods, of political action in relation to the whole complex of social interests. Only through such studies can the nature of political action be elucidated, and its possibilities and limitations fully disclosed.

If such studies are to yield definitive conclusions, a systematic canvass must be made of all the more significant data bearing on the problems covered thereby. This will involve the examination and analysis, from a naturalistic standpoint, of the rise and fall of economic classes, and of the transformations and applications of political power, as these are revealed in the records of the past. Such studies will require, in addition, data of a type not hitherto available. Inquiry into the possibilities and limitations of political or other types of social action could not in the past yield anything like definitive conclusions, because empirical data of the type requisite for the testing of various hypotheses on such questions could not be, or at least were not, secured. The recent development of exact

methods of investigation in the social sciences has made possible a beginning in the collection of such data. Only through such methods can the scientific foundations be laid for the control of social change, in the measure to which that may be possible. Other types of investigation will not be displaced by such a development, but will be made incomparably more fruitful than they have been in the past.

CHAPTER XXXI

SOME ULTIMATE PROBLEMS

CERTAIN unsettled questions bearing on the analysis set forth in the preceding chapters are not there adequately considered, and the analysis together with the conclusions in which it issues is likely to be attacked by those who take different positions on these questions from those assumed to be correct as the foundations of our own analysis. This circumstance, added to the fact that this group of questions has been thrown in sharper relief by controversies arising since the body of the present work was completed, makes it desirable for us to undertake a critical examination of the conflicting views on these questions. This must be presented in a condensed and apparently dogmatic form, as a detailed examination of those views, together with the evidence bearing thereon, would require a volume in itself.

The questions referred to, while more or less distinct from one another, may be grouped around a single issue. This is the problem of the comparative rôles played in development by hereditary traits and environmental factors, respectively. The more specific questions may be succinctly formulated as follows:

(1) What is the nature of the mental traits or behavior patterns inherited by the human organism, and how do they function in development?

(2) What degree of plasticity or modifiability do such traits exhibit under the influence of intelligence, habit and the cultural factors constituting the "social environment"?

(3) To what extent may such traits function more harmoniously in the future under a better educational system and social environment generally?

The Nature of Hereditary Mental Traits.—The answers to the first question, which we shall now consider, are many and various. One party to the controversy, impressed by the diversity of customs, institutions and other cultural factors, seem disposed to minimize or even deny the existence of more or less specific inborn tendencies in man, and to account for his behavior by the particular complex of cultural factors under which he develops. Closely allied with this party and perhaps to be identified with it—if allowance be made for the somewhat different problems dealt with—are those who emphasize the part played in behavior by habit. The latter apparently make greater allowance, however, than does the cultural party for the rôle in development of responses to environmental stimuli not very definitely correlated with cultural factors. We may nevertheless consider together all those who give extreme emphasis to the importance of environmental factors, whether physical or cultural, in social and individual development. This general view, so characterized, is represented by Kantor,¹ Faris,² Ayres,³ Lowie,⁴ and many other ethnologists.

¹Kantor, J. R., "A Functional Interpretation of Human Instincts," *Psych. Rev.*, Vol. XXVII, 1920, pp. 50-72; "How Do We Acquire Our Basic Reactions?" *Ibid.*, Vol. XXVIII, 1921, pp. 328-355; "An Essay Toward an Institutional Conception of Social Psychology," *Am. Jour. of Soc.*, Vol. XXVII, 1922, pp. 611-627, 758-779.

²Faris, E., "Are Instincts Data or Hypotheses?" *Am. Jour. of Soc.*, Vol. XXVII, 1921, pp. 184-196; "Ethnological Light on Psychological Problems," *Pub. of Am. Soc. Society*, Vol. XVI, 1921, pp. 113-120.

³Ayres, C. E., "Instinct and Capacity, I: The Instinct of Belief in Instincts," *Jour. of Phil.*, Vol. XVIII, 1921, pp. 561-565; "Instinct and Capacity, II: Homo Domesticus," *Ibid.*, Vol. XVIII, 1921, pp. 600-606.

⁴Lowie, R. H., *Culture and Ethnology*, Chap. IV.

A second party to the controversy take a structural or materialistic view of the mind and its work, interpret behavior in terms of neural structure and functions, plus other bodily processes, yet regard instinct as a concept which may have been useful in the past, but which must now be discarded or at least radically modified, if the future progress of psychology is not to be hampered by it. Members of this party may or may not side with the party which emphasizes the rôle of habit and cultural factors in development, though their spokesmen appear quite sympathetic with the latter—perhaps because they are in conflict with a common enemy. This general position is taken by Dunlap,⁵ Bernard,⁶ Kuo,⁷ and by the behaviorists generally.

A third hypothesis imputed to certain psychologists is to the effect that man is born with a number of specific instincts, that these instincts retain all or much of their specificity throughout development, and that they are the primary determinants of human behavior in every stage of development. This hypothesis, as thus characterized, tends to minimize the rôle played in development by habit, intellectual processes and cultural factors. McDougall,⁸ Thorndike⁹ and their followers are alleged to be advocates of this general hypothesis. This hypothesis all the rival parties unite in combating, and the psychologists just mentioned are the principal target of the attack.

⁵ Dunlap, K., "Are There Any Instincts?" *Jour. Abnorm. Psych.*, Vol. XIV, 1919, pp. 307-311; "The Identity of Instinct and Habit," *Jour. of Phil.*, Vol. XIX, 1922, pp. 85-94.

⁶ Bernard, L. L., "The Misuse of Instinct in the Social Sciences," *Psych. Rev.*, Vol. XXVIII, 1921, pp. 96-119.

⁷ Kuo, Zing Yang, "Giving Up Instincts in Psychology," *Jour. of Phil.*, Vol. XVIII, 1921, pp. 645-664.

⁸ McDougall, W., *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, thirteenth ed.

⁹ Thorndike, E. L., *The Original Nature of Man*.

A fourth party take what may be called a middle-of-the-road position. They concede the reality of instinctive impulses and their importance for behavior, but insist also on the importance of habit, culture and environmental factors generally. The members of this party differ among themselves respecting the possibilities of an intelligent direction of behavior, and stress somewhat differently the part played in behavior by habit. Dewey,¹⁰ Cooley,¹¹ Geiger¹² and Hunter¹³ may be regarded as representatives of this party to the controversy. I should like to be counted a member of this party, though I fear my devotion to its principles will not be beyond suspicion. In any case I shall claim the privilege of dissenting from some of the views entertained by certain accredited spokesmen of this party.

These classifications, which will be sufficient for the purpose in hand, are by no means hard-and-fast ones, as they overlap in various ways, and particular writers might be assigned to two or even three of them.

The Cultural Theory of Mental Traits.—Faris, Ayres, Kantor and others of their party have made merry over what they regard as the excesses of some psychologists who believe in instincts, and maintain that the progress of the science would be promoted by virtually abandoning the idea that man is endowed with more or less specific instincts. We will pass by the merrymaking of these

¹⁰ Dewey, J., *Human Nature and Conduct*.

¹¹ Cooley, C. H., "Heredity and Environment," *Survey*, Vol. XLIX, 1923, pp. 454-456, 468, 469.

¹² Geiger, J. R., "Must We Give Up Instincts in Psychology?" *Jour. of Phil.*, Vol. XIX, 1922, pp. 94-98; "Concerning Instincts," *Ibid.*, Vol. XX, 1923, pp. 57-68.

¹³ Hunter, W. S., "The Modification of Instinct from the Standpoint of Social Psychology," *Psych. Rev.*, Vol. XXVII, 1920, pp. 247-269; "The Modification of Instinct," *Jour. of Phil.*, Vol. XIX, 1922, pp. 98-101.

gentlemen, and limit ourselves to an examination of their more serious (and substantial) arguments.

Faris suggests that instincts are explanatory assumptions and not observable phenomena,¹⁴ pointing out that an instinct in a developed human being could not be accessible to direct observation.¹⁵ The category would be a legitimate one, he thinks, were it interpreted as including hypothetical concepts only.¹⁶ Faris is disposed, however, to question its value, even when so regarded, on the ground that "no statement can be true of all men everywhere, so long as cultural inheritances differ so profoundly."¹⁷ The proper subject-matter of social psychology is, rather, "social values, social attitudes, desires, wishes, and organization."¹⁸ Temperament, in the opinion of this writer, is a more legitimate concept, as it emphasizes individual differences, and eschews the mass descriptions of individuals to which the instinct doctrine tends.¹⁹ It is unfortunate that the study of temperament has been so neglected.

Ayres delivers himself to a like effect. For instincts to have explanatory value, he says, they must steer man into "his various civilized activities, as animal instincts do." But there can be no "stereotyped reaction patterns" in man's case, similar to animal instincts.²⁰ Behavior has a culture content, not an instinct content.²¹ "Its technic of analysis invokes not organic tropisms . . . but beliefs and superstitions, crafts and arts, human associa-

¹⁴ "Are Instincts Data or Hypotheses?" *Am. Jour. of Soc.*, Vol. XXVII, 1921, p. 184-185.

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 193.

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 194.

¹⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 194.

¹⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 195.

¹⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 196.

²⁰ *Jour. of Phil.*, Vol. XVIII, 1921, p. 563.

²¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 605.

tions worked into the whole cultural-emotional life of a people by the practice of generations." ²² "Man is the meekest of the domestic animals," and the process of domestication is his unique distinction. ²³ "The only normal behavior of *Homo sapiens* is domestication; beyond that every act depends on the culture. Human behavior is the behavior of institutions." With this goes a "contempt and loathing for other systems of domestication than his own." ²⁴

Kantor is more circumspect in his opposition to instincts, but arrives in the end at much the same conclusions as the two writers just cited. In one of the earlier papers considered here, ²⁵ Kantor did not deny the usefulness of the concept in question, but insisted on the great differences between human and other animal instincts, and proposed to distinguish, in man's case, between instincts and instinctive behavior. Instinctive behavior he defined as a complex integration of early instincts together with acquired reactions. Later, however, ²⁶ Kantor abandons this distinction, and also the terms instinct and instinctive behavior themselves, as likely to be misleading, but he still holds to the distinction between hereditary and acquired reactions. The hereditary responses are in the nature of random movements or loosely organized reflexes, and these constitute the foundation upon which later behavior is developed. This paper emphasizes the rôle of environmental factors in the development of interests, and maintains that all the individual's behavior at any given time is an integration

²² *Op. cit.*, p. 565.

²³ *Op. cit.*, p. 602.

²⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 603.

²⁵ "A Functional Interpretation of Human Instincts," *Psych. Rev.*, Vol. XXVII, 1920, pp. 50-72.

²⁶ "How Do We Acquire Our Basic Reactions?" *Ibid.*, Vol. XXVIII, 1921, pp. 328-355.

of previous actions. In a later paper,²⁷ Kantor insists more strongly on the disutility of the instinct doctrine, arguing that it is utterly impossible to account for "complex phenomena by resorting to fixed instincts,"²⁸ and that a scientific psychology can recognize only the existence of "concrete reactions of a human being or a group of human individuals."²⁹ Instincts and impulses are unceremoniously dubbed "the *caloric* and *phlogiston* of psychology."³⁰

These references will have been sufficient, perhaps, to set before us the distinctive tenets of this party to the controversy which now engages us. All its representatives emphasize the diversity of human behavior, stress the rôle of habits therein, and allege the impossibility of identifying any very specific features or elements which are common to such diverse habits or behavior complexes. The hereditary factors in behavior, when identified by this party, are random movements, loosely organized reflexes, docility, susceptibility to domestication, or such like generalized tendencies. If more specific hereditary traits are recognized, as by Kantor,³¹ they are interpreted in biological terms, and their significance for social life alleged to be of secondary importance.

Appraisal of the Cultural Theory.—Our appraisal and criticism of this general view will be briefly indicated. We may concede that the writers cited have done social science a service by emphasizing the rôle of habit and custom in social life, and insisting on the dangers of employing an uncritical theory of hereditary impulses in

²⁷ "An Essay Toward an Institutional Conception of Social Psychology," *Am. Jour. of Soc.*, Vol. XXVII, 1922, pp. 611-627, 758-779

²⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 625.

²⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 759.

³⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 619.

³¹ "How Do We Acquire Our Basic Reactions?" *Psych. Rev.*, Vol. XXVIII, 1921, pp. 342-343.

the explanation of human behavior. But their thesis that there are no common features in behavior under diverse social environments, which can be traced back to hereditary impulses, is quite untenable. Hunger and food-getting activities, sexual intercourse and marriage institutions, the bearing and rearing of children, conflict between individuals and groups, more or less impulsive escape reactions, play of children and adults, the indefinite multiplication of habits themselves, are all sufficiently common features to refute any such view. Such common features in behavior cannot be accounted for in terms of environmental factors, social or physical, for they can be observed in the most diverse environments. Moreover, certain of these common features in behavior are associated with definite hereditary structures of the organism, which are also found in other animal species than man himself. And that they have a far-reaching social significance cannot be questioned, as industrial activities pertaining to the food supply, and the taboos, customs and institutions controlling sex relationships sufficiently testify.

One could elaborate the evidence in much greater detail, of course, but the result would be much the same. There are, it is true, many unsettled questions pertaining to hereditary human traits, and no one could reasonably claim that all such traits have been identified or their part in behavior correctly appraised. But this no more invalidates the general concept than unsettled controversies in other fields demonstrate the unreality of the data or categories there dealt with.

We might go even further and say that if any natural law can be formulated on the basis of inductive evidence, then instinctive impulses, as we have conceived them, are as real as any such laws can be. Instincts are inductive laws of behavior, which are referred, by way of explana-

tion, to the hereditary organization of the species, and because no other satisfactory account can be given of them.

Were we to take the culturists on their own ground, and ask them how human beings come to develop the customs, institutions, traditions and other cultural controls seen in different societies, they would be hard put to it to return an intelligible answer. Why have human beings engaged in war, made love, reared children, invented tools, and so on through the repertoire of human behavior? Why do not cats or dogs in the same environment learn the language, take part in the dances, enter into the marriage relationships, observe the taboos that their human associates do? There must be hereditary human traits that determine all such differences between the behavior of human beings and that of other animals in much the same environment. And these traits cannot be altogether generalized, or they could not serve to account for the more or less specific features common to human behavior under the most diverse social environments.

The validity of this general proposition culture historians themselves are beginning to recognize. They are more and more impressed with the common elements in culture, and are conceding the necessity of referring these elements, by way of causal explanation, to the original nature of man.³² But cultural factors are equally important with hereditary mental traits as determinants of behavior and, as a matter of method, it may be well to begin the study of a complex social situation by first identifying and analyzing the cultural factors therein.³³

The Structural Theory of Mental Traits.—The second

³² See Wissler, C., *Man and Culture*, especially pp. 73-97, 260 *et seq.*

³³ Ogburn, W. F., "The Historical Method in the Analysis of Social Phenomena," *Pub. of Am. Soc. Society*, Vol. XVI, 1921, pp. 70-83.

party to the controversy over our question also emphasize the rôle of habit in behavior, deny the existence of instincts or minimize their influence on behavior, and interpret in terms of neural or other bodily structure whatever hereditary factors in behavior may be assumed. Thus, Bernard maintains that inheritance is of organs, tissues or combinations of such, and that these determine the action patterns.³⁴ Action patterns so conceived may be termed instinctive.³⁵ An instinct is a unit character, and inconceivable apart from its structure. It is fallacious to define instinct in terms of its function, instead of its original structure.³⁶ It is common to regard relatively fixed or definite action patterns as instincts, whereas the action content of many such patterns is acquired.³⁷ "The child who has reached a rationalizing age is reacting in nine-tenths or ninety-nine one-hundredths of his character directly to environment, and only in the slight residual fraction of his nature directly to instinct."³⁸

Kuo goes the whole way along this road by denying the existence of instincts altogether. "The so-called instincts are in the last analysis acquired trends rather than inherited tendencies."³⁹ One cannot have a food trend before eating food any more than he can have the idea of a tree before seeing or learning about a tree.⁴⁰ The theory of instincts, like the doctrine of innate ideas, is based on the concept of an *a priori* relation between the organism and external objects.⁴¹ To call an acquired

³⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 96; also, "The Significance of Environment as a Social Factor," *Pub. of Am. Soc. Society*, Vol. XVI, 1921, p. 108.

³⁵ "The Misuse of Instinct in the Social Sciences," *Psych. Rev.*, Vol. XXVIII, 1921, pp. 96-97.

³⁶ *Op. cit.*, pp. 105, 109.

³⁷ *Op. cit.*, pp. 101-102.

³⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. III.

³⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 648.

⁴⁰ *Op. cit.*, pp. 648-649.

⁴¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 648.

trend instinctive is to confess our ignorance of its development.⁴² The same mechanisms may be combined in various ways to produce different end reactions termed instinctive. But such reactions, since they have no ready-made mechanisms, should not be called inherited responses.⁴³ "All the activities of the organism in later life are various organized reactions of elementary movements."⁴⁴ Sex or parental behavior, or the flying of young birds, is determined by the action system of the organism, together with the exciting stimulus, not by mysterious forces termed instincts.⁴⁵ Sex behavior, contrary to the accepted view, is largely determined by the social environment; there is no ready-made reaction to the other sex. "The motive forces of human behavior are largely shaped by society,"⁴⁶ and trends of action are the product of the interplay between the organism and its environment.⁴⁷ Different types of behavior simply result from different environmental demands.⁴⁸

Let us observe, before passing on to the third representative of this party, that Kuo does not deny the existence of hereditary factors in behavior, but interprets these in terms of bodily structure. Yet he assigns a much larger rôle in behavior to environment and habit, than to hereditary factors thus interpreted.

Dunlap writes to much the same effect. He criticizes psychologists for not distinguishing between instincts conceived in teleological terms, and instincts regarded as groups of physiological activities. Instincts in the former sense are only classificatory devices, and vary with the

⁴² *Op. cit.*, p. 650.

⁴³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 650-651.

⁴⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 652.

⁴⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 653.

⁴⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 656.

⁴⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 661.

⁴⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 662.

purposes of the classifier,⁴⁹ whereas there are instincts in the physiological sense. In his second paper, however, Dunlap takes back this concession,⁵⁰ apparently on the ground that the same specific activities enter into many complex series of activities, such as are termed instinctive. Even many so-called instincts may function as parts of other instincts, as, for example, flight, pugnacity and food-getting often occur as part of the parental instinct.⁵¹

Dunlap thereupon argues, with some apparent inconsistency, for the identity of instinct and habit. "I can see no way," he says, "of distinguishing usefully between instinct and habit. All reactions are definite responses to definite stimulus patterns, and the exact character of the response is determined in every case by the inherited constitution of the organism and the stimulus pattern. All reactions are instinctive: all are acquired. . . . Practically, we use the terms *instinctive reaction* to designate any reaction whose antecedents we do not care, at the time, to inquire into; by *acquired reaction*, on the other hand, we mean those reactions for whose antecedents we intend to give some account. But let us beware of founding a psychology, social, general, or individual, on such a distinction."⁵²

This remarkable proposition is grounded on two facts: First, all types of reactions are preceded by other reactions; secondly, the constitution of the organism at the time of any given reaction is such as to determine, together with the stimulus, that reaction and no other. The newborn babe's sucking reaction, for example, could

⁴⁹ "Are There Any Instincts?" *Jour. Abnorm. Psych.*, Vol. XIV, 1919, pp. 308-309.

⁵⁰ "The Identity of Instinct and Habit," *Jour. of Phil.*, Vol. XIX, 1922, pp. 88-89.

⁵¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 88-89.

⁵² *Op. cit.*, p. 94.

not have been evoked, had it not first been stimulated by cold air and responded thereto by the crying reaction. Likewise, the complex nest-building reactions of the robin are preceded by the stimuli and reactions involved in feeding, flying, etc. A temporal pattern extending back of any given reaction is always involved therein, and, consequently, there is no basis for any distinction between instinctive and acquired reactions.⁵³

Criticism of the Structural Theory.—This general view need not detain us long, as we have already dealt, in our criticism of the cultural party, with the argument from the influence of the organism's earlier reactions on its later behavior. Nobody denies such an influence, so far as I know, yet but few would conclude from this fact that no distinction can be drawn between hereditary traits and acquired habits. It is really absurd to suppose that there are no inborn tendencies toward eating reactions, sexual intercourse, nest-building activities and the like, and, were it not that reputable psychologists had espoused such a view, it would scarcely merit serious consideration. On this view there is no reason why the child's crying reaction should be followed by sucking reactions instead of by an obstinate refusal to take nourishment of any sort, or why robins should build nests instead of dropping their eggs on the ground. The earlier reactions simply do not account for *all* the specific features of the later reactions, and those that cannot be so accounted for must be referred to other factors.

Moreover, the fact that the organism as it comes into the world is obviously built for eating, reproduction and other series of specific reactions would seem to be an anomaly on the hypothesis proposed by Dunlap and Kuo. If sexual intercourse is a habit,

⁵³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 92-93.

as Kuo argues,⁵⁴ when did the habit become general? During the pre-human stage of our phyletic series, or since the human era was inaugurated? If the former, are there now no inherited tendencies to reproductive acts associated with the inherited structures obviously built for reproductive functions? If the latter, are there likewise no associated tendencies toward the same acts? There is here obviously a refusal to accept the patent fact that in a given species, its structures and the more fundamental features of its functional activity are not *produced de novo*, but only *reproduced*, in each generation, and that such reproduction is not exclusively a cultural or environmental process. Again, how account for the peculiarities of behavior characteristic of different species?

The argument from the fact that the same specific activities are involved in various complex series of reactions has quite as little to commend it. The fact that I use my arms in conveying food to my mouth, in assisting a toddler up a flight of stairs too difficult for it to make alone, or in repelling an attack by an enraged enemy, is no ground, so far as I can see, for the argument that specific instinctive impulses are not involved in these reactions. Yet it is on such facts that Dunlap and Kuo build up just this argument.⁵⁵

This argument is rather closely related to Dunlap's criticism of instincts as teleological groupings of activities, to Bernard's contention that instincts should be defined in terms of their structures, and to Kuo's proposed substitution of action systems for instinctive impulses as the fundamental concept of social psychology. These views commit their authors to the rejection of anything smack-

⁵⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 657.

⁵⁵ For an acute criticism of Dunlap's and Kuo's views, see Geiger's articles, cited above.

ing of teleological or functional interpretations of behavior, that is to diverse groupings of much the same specific activities adapted to attain different ends or satisfy different needs of the organism. That such functional groupings of specific activities occur is scarcely a debatable question. Can they be accounted for on the materialistic but non-instinctive assumptions of these authors?

I do not think so. The grounds for this belief cannot be fully set forth in a work of this character, but some general considerations in its support may be adduced. In the first place, the brain and nervous system do not exhibit a development paralleling the development of ideas, sentiments and interests in the individual. The most careful comparison of the brain and nervous systems of primitive and civilized men, or of the same individuals at different periods of their lives (were such comparison possible), would afford little or no clue to the differences in interests, ideas and sentiments correlated with these different nervous systems, or the same nervous systems at different times. We may remark, incidentally, that those holding to a neural interpretation of behavior fall into the sort of fallacy charged by many of them against McDougall and other psychologists, namely, that of assuming hard-and-fast instincts and explaining the most diverse types of behavior by them. For anything the anatomical and physiological evidence tells us to the contrary, the brain and nervous system are fully as specific and fixed as any instinct assumed by McDougall or other psychologist of the so-called instinct school.

Taking the controversy into the enemy's own territory, we may assert that the monistic neural interpretation of behavior rests on a pure assumption, and a confused one at that. No one has ever shown, and it is safe to say that no one can show, how demonstrable or even conceiv-

able changes in the nervous system, could account for the development of interests, ideas, sentiments and other types of mental phenomena. It cannot be denied that there is a correlation between the two series, but this correlation is not of such a nature as to support the deductions drawn from the fact of correlation.

The fundamental type of action in the brain and nervous system, when regarded as physical phenomena, is the mechanical motion of masses under the impulsion of energies such as are found in living tissues. Ideas, interests and sentiments cannot be represented by physical models of this character.

The masses and energies involved in the response of an organism to a stimulus may account for the specific movements of the bodies in this situation, but they cannot account for the general direction and order of those movements. The fact that the receipt of a letter or telegram may send me to Chicago or the next town is quite inexplicable in terms of the bodies and energies involved in these phenomena. The energies associated with the telegram, with my brain, nervous system and body generally, and with the objects in the immediate environment, certainly cannot constitute any material bond between my body and its future destination. It is the system of inferences, meanings, judgments and other cognitive processes that constitute the bond that exists between the widely separated bodies in this situation.

By far the greater part of our behavior conforms to the type of action just characterized. Many other evidences of the incommensurability of behavior with the masses and motions involved therein could be cited. The attempt to interpret thought of any sort in terms of the associated physicochemical processes leads to hopeless contradictions.

These considerations will perhaps be sufficient to warrant some scepticism respecting the possibility of interpreting behavior in exclusive terms of neural and other bodily structure.⁵⁶ The point has been worth laboring somewhat, I think, for the doctrines espoused by the party under discussion are the logical consequences of the materialistic assumptions from which they proceed.

Perhaps a word of warning suggested by these considerations will not be out of place. Sociologists, psychologists and, for that matter, investigators in other fields often assume as correct partisan positions on unsettled controversies in fields outside but contiguous to their own, and shape their thought in accordance with such assumptions. Bernard, for example, gravely informs us that present-day vitalism is only the survival of a doctrine long ago exploded, that Lamarckism has been definitely overthrown, and that all hereditary traits of the organism are transmitted according to Mendelian principles.⁵⁷ He seems to be unaware that vitalistic views are entertained by some of the ablest living biologists, such as Driesch, Wheeler and J. S. Haldane, that there has been a notable revival of Lamarckism in recent years, especially in Germany, and that a great many hereditary characters of the organism, including instincts as Bernard conceives them, have hitherto shown themselves refractory to the Mendelian analysis.

Such a procedure is as unnecessary as it is hazardous. There is little to gain, and a great deal to lose, by saddling ourselves with controversies outside our own field, whose merits we are not fitted to judge. No doubt many psychological questions are at stake in the controversy between

⁵⁶ Needless to say, I am not attempting here to settle this controversy, but only to make clear that the writers cited have accepted a *partisan* position thereon as a basis for their views on the psychological questions here under consideration.

⁵⁷ *Op. cit.*, pp. 108-109.

vitalists and materialists, but psychologists would do well to leave such questions alone unless they can fully acquaint themselves with the details of that controversy and the evidence bearing thereon. Otherwise they run the risk of having much or all their work vitiated by the outcome of the controversy. And there are many important psychological problems offering a fruitful field for investigation which need not be entangled in this particular controversy. Psychologists will be on safer ground if they restrict themselves to such problems, unless, as aforesaid, they are prepared to go thoroughly into the given controversy as affecting problems of the other type.

The Instinct Theory of Mental Traits.—We shall not tarry long over the doctrines imputed to the third party in our controversy. If McDougall, Thorndike and others of this party entertain the views of which they are accused by their opponents, then I shall have to side with their accusers, not with psychologists guilty of such views. But I do not believe they are guilty of much they have been charged with. The chief counts in the indictment against Thorndike, McDougall, *et al.*, allege that they assume relatively stable instincts or original tendencies, that they regard such instincts or tendencies as more or less sharply marked off from one another, that they over-emphasize the part played in behavior by these instincts or tendencies, and minimize the part played by habit, intelligence and environmental factors, especially cultural factors.

Criticisms of these psychologists vary with the party to which the critic belongs, as might be expected. Bernard, for example, condemns McDougall for defining instinct in terms of its sophisticated functioning, and not in terms of its original structure,⁵⁸ while Kantor criticizes Thorn-

⁵⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 105.

dike for doing just the opposite, arguing that Thorndike's neural interpretation of original tendencies led him to suppose that such tendencies function specifically as such in adult life.⁵⁹ The inclusion of particular alleged instincts or tendencies in the inventories of original nature drawn up by members of this party has been criticized and even ridiculed, and many other details of their work severely condemned. McDougall's theory of the emotions is of course a favorite target of attack for his critics.

A detailed examination of the views actually held by these psychologists, and the criticisms directed against these views,⁶⁰ or others imputed to them, is perhaps unnecessary for the purpose in hand. Some general observations regarding these matters must suffice us here.

We may admit that where there is so much smoke there is likely to be some fire. I am strongly of the opinion, however, that the smoke in the premises is out of all proportion to the fire that generates it. Any one can see for himself, by consulting McDougall's and Thorndike's books,⁶¹ that they do not assume fixed instincts or original tendencies, or at least that they allow for diverse syntheses thereof in behavior. McDougall defines four different types of modifications to which he believes instincts are subject,⁶² while Thorndike expressly allows for multitudinous combinations of original tendencies,⁶³ besides insisting on the multiplicity of responses to the same situation, and multiple causation of the same response.⁶³ Moreover, if one will read through the works cited, it will be seen that the part played in behavior by

⁵⁹ "A Functional Interpretation of Instincts," *Psych. Rev.*, Vol. XXVII, 1920, pp. 58 *et seq.*

⁶⁰ McDougall, *op. cit.*, Chap. II; Thorndike, *op. cit.*, Chap. II.

⁶¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 33 *et seq.*

⁶² *Op. cit.*, p. 10.

⁶³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 6-7.

habit, intellectual processes, pain and pleasure, language, customs, arts and other cultural factors is expressly recognized, though insufficient weight may be given to these factors. McDougall even allows for syntheses of the emotions into more or less stable sentiments, and more or less transient complex emotions, although maintaining in other passages that the various species of emotional excitement remain the same throughout development. Let it be observed, parenthetically, that McDougall says in so many words that emotional excitement, together with the accompanying nervous activities, is "the only part of the total instinctive process that retains its specific character" throughout development.⁶⁴

There is more room for controversy over the relation of the emotions to the instinctive impulses, but I am inclined to think that a strong case can be made out for McDougall's hypothesis that the various instinctive tendencies are associated with qualitatively different types of emotional excitement. Names have not been invented for all such types of emotional excitement, if there are such, but I believe one can distinguish, in his own experience, different types of emotional excitement associated with various sorts of activities in which different instinctive tendencies are distinguishable. To take some of the more obscure cases, the states of feeling experienced when participating in the activity of a group to which one belongs, or in the successful performance of some task requiring skill or ingenuity, or again in securing some coveted property or position, seem to have qualitative peculiarities which must be correlated with the specific tendencies expressed in these activities. But this position will be rejected by many, and as it is not central to the problem under consideration, we need not dwell on it longer. Of

⁶⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 35.

course the establishment of such a correlation between emotional excitement and instinctive impulse would by no means dispose of all problems pertaining to the nature and functions of the emotions. The bearing on the emotions of interruptions in activity, and of glandular secretions or other bodily changes would still require elucidation. Many other problems would also have to be dealt with.

Why, then, all this hue and cry after McDougall, Thorndike and other psychologists of their party? I for one am unable to find any just grounds for it. Much of the criticism directed against them is certainly based on reading them out of context, as the preceding considerations will have shown. Such criticism needs only to be exposed for what it is in order effectually to dispose of it. Again, it may be that the love of controversy is partially responsible. Controversy is likely to center around writers who have made a "killing," as have McDougall and Thorndike, especially when their analysis is both clear and cogent, as theirs is, and at the same time in conflict with current views on the topics considered, as theirs has been.

That there are many legitimate points for criticism in their work could scarcely be denied. It would be astonishing if such were not the case. McDougall has been weak, I think, in his treatment of cultural factors in social life, though he did not purport, in the work cited, to deal in a systematic manner with this group of factors. This defect, if such it be, has been made good, to a certain extent, in subsequent works. Many details of his analysis are likewise open to justifiable criticism. He has not given due weight, in my judgment, to the sex, gregarious and acquisitive impulses in social life, while overrating the part played by what he calls the extensions of the parental instinct.

Many details of Thorndike's analysis, and even some of his basic assumptions, are also open to criticism. His neural interpretation of behavior is open to serious question, on grounds indicated in a previous connection. This interpretation led him to define original tendencies in such a way that their influence on later behavior often appears insignificant and sometimes impossible of identification. His assumptions scarcely allow for infinitely diverse functional groupings of specific bodily activities, such as occur in adult behavior. Yet Thorndike's actual analysis is not overmuch hampered by these assumptions, since he is too acute an observer not to recognize the fact of such functional groupings and to deal with them more or less adequately on their own terms. Also, he has apparently overestimated the importance of some tendencies assumed by him, and underestimated the importance of others. This comes in part, I think, from a disposition on his part to place on the same level all the specific tendencies distinguished, without attempting to trace out in any detail their influences on adult behavior. We might, for example, be left to infer, for anything Thorndike says to the contrary, that acquisitive and hunting tendencies are of equal importance in social life, which is obviously not the case. Yet it does not seem to have entered into Thorndike's plan to analyze in any systematic way the social significance of man's original nature. If that be true, the particular criticism here offered only partially applies.

The Middle-of-the-Road Position.—We shall now deal with the fourth party to the controversy over our problem. Since the general position of this party is my own, and criticisms of this general position have already been rebutted, by implication, in the previous discussion, I shall limit the analysis to some of the more important controversies within the party itself. These concern two of the

three questions stated at the beginning of this chapter, which have not been dealt with so far, except incidentally. These questions pertain to the plasticity of hereditary mental traits, and the possibility of organizing these traits in a more satisfactory manner through a better adapted educational system and a more socialized environment generally. In order to economize space, I shall limit the discussion to the views of Dewey and Cooley on these questions, as expressed in single works of each recently published.⁶⁵ The major share of our attention will be given to Dewey's treatment of these topics.

Controversies Over the Possibilities of Intelligence and Education in Social Life. The Views of Dewey and His School.—Dewey concedes the importance of instinctive impulses in behavior, regards them as the pivots upon which the reorganization of human activities turns, and believes, consequently, that the understanding of social transitions requires the analysis of original tendencies involved therein.⁶⁶ He holds, moreover, that impulse is an indispensable source of liberation, though the liberation of *power* through impulse depends on the pertinence and freshness given to habits thereby.⁶⁷ It is pointed out, rightly enough, that a countless diversity of habits springs from practically the same capital stock of instincts, that "the same original fears, angers, loves and hates are hopelessly entangled in the most opposite institutions."⁶⁸ "Native human nature supplies the raw materials, but custom furnishes the machinery and the designs." War, for example, "would not be possible without anger, pug-

⁶⁵ Dewey, J., *Human Nature and Conduct*; Cooley, C. H., "Heredity and Environment," *Survey*, Vol. XLIX, 1923, pp. 454-456, 468, 469.

⁶⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 93.

⁶⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 105.

⁶⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 92.

nacity, rivalry, self-display, and such-like native tendencies," yet war is "a function of social institutions, not of what is natively fixed in human constitution." Social equivalents of war are possible, though these will be difficult to work out.⁶⁹ Such considerations lead Dewey to see in an understanding of habit the key to social psychology,⁷⁰ and to regard the primary facts of social psychology as centering about custom, or collective habit.⁷¹ "Man is a creature of habit, not of reason nor yet of instinct."⁷²

But while the direction of native activity is dependent on habit, the latter can be modified only by the redirection of impulses.⁷³ The way out of this vicious circle lies in education, the possibilities of which are not yet fully realized. "What is necessary is that habits be formed which are more intelligent, more sensitively percipient, more informed with foresight, more aware of what they are about, more direct and sincere, more flexibly responsible than those now current. Then they will meet their own problems and propose their own improvements."⁷⁴ The internal frictions involved in a complex culture also produce social changes. The need here is for an intelligent direction which will "modulate the harshness of conflict, and turn the elements of disintegration into a constructive synthesis."⁷⁵

Since impulse and habit are the primary determinants of conduct, the need is all the greater for the cultivation of thought.⁷⁶ Although "impulse is primary and intelli-

⁶⁹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 110-115.

⁷⁰ *Op. cit.*, Preface.

⁷¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 63.

⁷² *Op. cit.*, p. 125.

⁷³ *Op. cit.*, p. 126.

⁷⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 128.

⁷⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 128-129.

⁷⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 222.

gence is secondary and in some sense derivative thought is not the slave of impulse to do its bidding. . . . What intelligence has to do in the service of impulse is to act not as its obedient servant but as its clarifier and liberator. And this can be accomplished only by a study of the conditions and causes, the workings and consequences of the greatest possible variety of desires and combinations of desire. Intelligence converts desire into plans, systematic plans based on assembling facts, reporting events as they happen, keeping tab on them and analyzing them.”⁷⁷

Dewey anticipates a possible criticism of this program, to wit, that it is based on a romantic, idealistic view of the function of intelligence in conduct. It is conceded, in dealing with this criticism, that the work of the intellect in the field of social change has largely been in the nature of a *post-mortem* analysis, that sociological discussion, reporting and analysis have hitherto been impotent so far as modifying the course of events is concerned. But it is contended that a technic of observation and control in social matters should be possible. The differences between social interests and other interests in which intelligence is a directing factor do not justify the conviction that science cannot develop a technic for the intelligent direction of social interests. “Complexity of conditions render the difficulties in the way of the development of a technic enormous. It is imaginable they will never be overcome. But our choice is between the development of a technic by which intelligence will become an intervening partner and a continuation of a régime of accident, waste and distress.”⁷⁸

C. H. Cooley’s general position is much the same,

⁷⁷ *Op. cit.*, pp. 254-255.

⁷⁸ *Op. cit.*, pp. 275-277.

though not elaborated to the same extent in the article⁷⁹ to which we must here confine our attention.⁸⁰ Cooley, like Dewey, concedes the importance of hereditary impulses (or instinctive emotions, as he prefers to designate them) in social life, but insists that these are quite indeterminate,⁸¹ being "developed, transformed, and interwoven by social experience."⁸² Reason plays a large part in this development, and, in a large sense, is itself an instinctive disposition.⁸³ The mental outfit of the human child is above all things teachable, thus standing in marked contrast to that of the lower animals. "In the more general sense, it is a nature whose primary trait is teachability, and so does not need to change in order to be an inexhaustible source of changing conduct and institutions. We can make it work in almost any way if we understand it, as a clever mechanic can mould to his will the universal laws of mass and motion."⁸⁴

This general hypothesis respecting the teachability of human nature, and, more particularly, the possibilities of an intelligent direction of social change, deserves a much more extended consideration than can here be given to it. It is perhaps the most momentous hypothesis, considered from the standpoint of human welfare, that the history of thought records. Our condensed treatment of it will fail therefore to do it full justice, when considered from this point of view. The most that can be done here is to present some considerations respecting it

⁷⁹ *Op. cit.*

⁸⁰ For the fuller exposition of Cooley's views one should, of course, consult his larger works. These, in the order of their publication, are: *Human Nature and the Social Order*, *Social Organization*, and *Social Process*. The article here considered is taken from a new edition of *Human Nature and the Social Order*.

⁸¹ "Heredity and Environment," *Survey*, Vol. XLIX, 1923, p. 454.

⁸² *Op. cit.*, p. 456.

⁸³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 456, 468.

⁸⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 469.

which, as I think, should be allowed for in further discussions of it.

The Element of Faith in the Pragmatic Program.—

It is important to observe that the propounders of the hypothesis, Dewey in particular, do not claim that it is supported by historical facts. Rather, the claim is that the dynamic possibilities of certain factors stressed by the hypothesis have never been fully realized, and that a final appraisal of the hypothesis must wait on the more or less distant future, when the possibilities of those factors shall have been tested in the ways specified by the hypothesis itself. On another occasion, Dewey has admitted that the pragmatic program, thus conceived, rests on faith, not on demonstration. "Any such attitude," he writes, "is clearly a faith, not a demonstration. It too can be demonstrated only in *its* works, its fruits. Therefore it is not a facile thing. It commits us to a supremely difficult task. Perhaps the task is too hard for human nature. . . . If the course of history be run, if our present estate be final, no honest soul can claim that success exceeds failure. Perhaps this will always remain the case. Humanity is not conspicuous for having made a successful job of life anywhere. But an honest soul will also admit that the failure is not due to inherent defects in the faith, but to the fact that its demands are too high for human power; that mankind is not up to making good the requirements of the faith. . . ." ⁸⁵

That this is a noble faith cannot be gainsaid. It appeals to perhaps the highest aspirations which the human soul can cherish, aspirations which it seems irreverent or ungenerous to scrutinize too closely. Moreover, of all possible faiths, it is perhaps the one with the least possibilities of harm, and the greatest possibilities of good. The

⁸⁵ *The New Republic*, April 12, 1922, p. 186.

standard of conduct it enjoins, so far as mankind shall be able to live up to it, is a valid standard. It may lead to disappointments and disillusionments, but these are inevitable in any case, and this particular faith would be less guilty in this respect than many others that could be mentioned. Perhaps only a thoroughgoing pessimism would provide greater safeguards against disillusionments and disappointments, but such an attitude suffers in other respects, compared with the faith in the possibilities of education and intelligence.

Evidence Bearing on the Pragmatic Hypothesis.—

The question whether the hypothesis advocated by Dewey can now be tested with some approach to conclusiveness need not necessarily be answered by a negative, as Dewey answers it. Perhaps no conclusive test is now possible, but I am inclined to think that sufficient evidence is available to justify some more or less probable conclusions respecting the matter. I am going to indicate in the briefest possible fashion what I regard as some of the more significant evidence on the question, and the conclusions to which it points.

That intelligence is the differential factor in cultural evolution can hardly be questioned. Complex institutions, arts and sciences would not be possible without it. The human mind can and does think out complex practical problems, and the cumulative influence of such thinking on social life is profound and far-reaching. Moreover, no one can set any bounds to this process in the future, or to the final results in which it might terminate.

But I think it could be argued, and the argument supported by the facts, that the increasing complexity of social relationships produced by just this factor makes it enormously more difficult, and probably impossible, to

order social relationships in such a way as to obviate social conflict and disharmony, and on a vast scale at that.

In the first place, if habit is the crucial element in behavior, as Dewey claims, politics seems doomed to irrationality to the end of the story. For I do not see how any deliberately engineered changes in political habits and ideas can be made to match at all successfully the sum of the changes in other fields of which politics must, in some fashion, take account. Political habits are notoriously resistant to change, except under the stress of great social crises or upheavals (which are to be obviated by intelligence, according to the hypothesis), whereas changes in most other fields, especially those of which politics must take account, are facile and rapid by comparison. So far as we can see, it must always be so, and for the reason that the stimuli to changes in political habit are not so potent or persistent as are stimuli to change elsewhere, and failure to react to those stimuli in a truly adaptive fashion is not followed by such clearly felt penalties as are failures to react adaptively in other fields. In Dewey's terms, people do not get into trouble from voting as their fathers did, or from failure to think out complex political problems affecting their welfare, in the same sense that they get into trouble from antiquated methods in business or tactlessness in personal relationships. Not getting into such vivid trouble, or any recognizable trouble at all, they are not compelled to reflect, or reflect so effectively, over their political habits, and mend the latter in the way required. And I can see no way of making the consequences of maladapted political habits vivid enough, for the great mass of people, to provide the stimuli to the requisite type of reflection on political habits. The more impersonal relationships, the principal subject-matter of politics, are bloodless abstractions compared with the

immediate advantage anticipated from a strike or lockout, the profits promised by a successful conspiracy in restraint of trade, the situation created by an alleged insult to the national honor, or a riot started by an affront from a member of a race deemed inferior or insolent.⁸⁶

So long as society remains infinitely complex, with infinitely diversified occupations and interests, and the highly *selective* development of the individual which is inevitable because of that complexity, so long will there be barriers to sympathy, understanding and harmonious coöperation between groups with unlike occupations, interests and experiences, whether the bond of union in such groups be race, religion, nationality, economic status or other important differentiating factor. The ground is prepared for perpetual misunderstanding and conflict by just these selective developmental processes in different individuals and different groups. The day-after-day stimuli acting on the manufacturer and the wage-earner, for example, generate and stamp in divergent attitudes, ideas and sentiments that no available amount of harmonizing stimuli can possibly overcome. If the formation and strength of habit depend on the repetition of the same or similar reactions to like stimuli, the inevitable processes of habit-formation in a complex society such as ours must always keep it divided into more or less discordant groups. Those stimuli and reactions being what they are, it would contravene all the established principles of habit-formation, should the habits formed in diverse environments and diverse groups be found susceptible of anything like a harmonious coördination.

⁸⁶ However, popular sensitiveness to political ills has so greatly increased as to suggest that it may increase still further. And there is evidence that education of the right sort can make the demand for responsive adaptability in government and even the practice of independent voting habitual.—Ed.

It may be claimed, in rebuttal of this argument that many people, perhaps even a large majority, do take an interest in groups remote from or unlike their own. That is true: people in the United States, for example, do take an interest in European events, in distant conflicts between races, in struggles between capital and labor, where they, the people in question, are not immediately involved. But the significant phenomenon in all such cases is the *type* of interest manifested, not the bare fact of such interest. The whole world looked on, fascinated, at the events of the Great War; the invasion of the Ruhr several months ago thrilled enemy and neutral countries alike, though of course with varying emotions; all classes of people in the United States were deeply interested, a year ago, in the nation-wide coal and railroad strikes; the entire country follows eagerly the details of the latest race riot as these are reported in the daily press. But interest flags when the dramatic phases of such situations have been terminated, or even when they are so prolonged as to lose something of their sensational character. How many of the people aroused by these several situations made any serious attempt to understand the issues adjudicated at the Versailles Conference, or to master the reparations and other questions involved in the Ruhr invasion, or to get at the underlying causes of the coal and railroad strikes, or to consider measures for the improvement of race relations? But it is in just these features of such situations that interest and thought are most needed.

What is the explanation? The answer, I think, is that the members of the human species are immeasurably more interested—and for anything we can see to the contrary will always be more interested—in fairly direct or dramatic expressions of our instinctive impulses than in the more remote social or political expressions thereof. Compare

the all but universal interest in sex, offspring, scandal, prize-fights, sensational exploits, with the interest in international trade, the laborer's standard of living, the improvement of public education, the reform of the civil service, and the like. The contrast between the two types of interest could be elaborated indefinitely, and with substantially the same result.

The school of thought which Dewey represents might freely concede the facts thus barely indicated, but still argue that it need not always be so. If education can be made interesting and effective, and the requisite amount of time, talent and money devoted to it, so that native intelligence shall be utilized to the fullest extent, the divisive influences of diverse group associations and interests can be counteracted sufficiently to make a fairly harmonious and rational social organization feasible. The thing has not been tried as yet, so it might be argued, and we have no right to claim that it is impractical until it is tried.

There is little doubt that the possibilities of education have not yet been fully realized, that intelligence is not properly utilized, in the more rational organization of social relationships. This claim, true though it be, does not invalidate the evidence already indicated. This evidence need not be rehearsed anew, though its significance for the question under consideration could scarcely be overestimated. It will be more instructive to canvass other lines of evidence bearing on the same question.

Fallacious Assumptions Underlying the Hypothesis.

The hypothesis here rebutted rests on the assumption that the native impulses of men can be so organized that the more potent, by inheritance, can be subordinated to the less potent. It assumes, for example, that disinterested curiosity, secondary tendencies of the parental

instinct and the more altruistic impulses associated with the gregarious tendency can dominate fear and fighting impulses, the primary impulses of the sex and parental instincts, individual and group self-assertiveness, and so on. Translated into terms of concrete social situations, the hypothesis implies that individuals and groups can subordinate their desire for higher standards of living, their coveting of place and power, their fear or anger at the self-assertiveness of other groups or individuals, to an interest in the welfare of others, a willingness to share material wealth, place, power and other limited social goods, in an equitable fashion, with other individuals and other social groups. Not only do the facts of social life disprove any such proposition, but they afford no justification for the faith that any such régime can ever be inaugurated.

The same facts may be considered from the standpoint of habit or custom, and the factors operative therein. Institutions, traditions, ideals and other types of custom or collective habit are in the last analysis the product of hereditary traits and capacities working themselves out in particular environments, physical and social. However ancient the genealogy of the given cultural factors, they all bear the stamp of the hereditary characteristics which, operating in the associated environments, produced them. While institutions, traditions and other cultural factors, considered as a complex continuum, may be of very ancient lineage, they must, when traced back to their origin, be accounted for in terms of hereditary traits and capacities, together with the correlative factors of the *physical* environment.

Now, collective habit or custom so generated cannot nullify, reverse or wholly transform the hereditary characteristics and other factors which do the generating. Mar-

riage institutions may guide the sex impulses, but the latter will express themselves in one way or another, and, for a large proportion of people, in primitive biological fashion. Democratic traditions may set limits to class arrogance, oppression and inequality, but they cannot serve to do away with the more obnoxious types of self-assertion, the unjust use of political and economic power, or the pursuit of personal or class advantage. And so with other powerful impulses. These may be coördinated and harmonized to a certain extent, but they will always work themselves out, for anything we can see to the contrary, much as they have in the past. The evidence does not appear, then, to warrant the supposition that habit and custom are capable of socializing these impulses in the way desired. In technical terms, habits are functions of the hereditary mental outfit taken as a whole, including instinctive tendencies, native intellectual faculties and the capacity for habit-formation itself. It is unsound psychology to assume that habit is an exclusive function of any selection of traits from our hereditary mental equipment, or that habit can override the factors of which it is a function. The general point, which should not be lost sight of, is that hereditary mental characteristics taken as a whole, given the various sorts of physical and social environments in which they must operate, necessarily work out to produce conflict, inequality and a considerable degree of social disorganization generally.

Some Decisive Tests of the Pragmatic Hypothesis.—

But these are in the nature of deductive considerations, though based on inductive generalizations accounting for nearly all the relevant data at our disposal. It is important, therefore, to ascertain whether the hypothesis under consideration has ever been fairly tested and, if so, what the test revealed. I believe it has been tested, though

the results which can now be collated are not absolutely conclusive.

The hypothesis has been tested in the case of many individuals, though probably never for any considerable social group. Many individuals have certainly undergone educational training as effective, and as *socialized*, in some cases at least, as could be reasonably anticipated for society at large. What are the results? Does the political behavior characteristic of such individuals warrant the supposition that, with the best conceivable educational opportunities for the mass of people, subversive group conflicts, extensive social upheavals, large-scale exploitation, can be done away with?

Let us, in order to deal with concrete cases, limit our consideration to the political behavior of professional thinkers, and members of the professorial fraternity in particular. Although, so far as I know, no systematic study has been made of the matter, such facts pertaining thereto as have come to my attention do not support the hypothesis that their political behavior is of such a character that a society manned exclusively by such thinkers would represent a much closer approximation to social unity and social equality than does society today. Professional thinkers are apt to be pretty definitely aligned, in their thought and behavior respecting social questions, with the constituent groups of their society, in much the same ways as are farmers, manufacturers or wage-earners. Racial prejudice may be less intense, bias on economic questions less pronounced, national patriotism less rampant, and the like, but they are there nevertheless, and motivate much the same sort of behavior as in other strata of the population. College professors are apt to be strongly for or against socialism, pacifism, freedom of discussion and other principles or movements in which

controversy centers at the present time. More significant, perhaps, attitudes on these questions are apparently formed, in the large majority of cases, without going thoroughly into their merits, and examining the evidence bearing thereon. For many such questions are still unsettled, when considered from a truly objective point of view, and the scientific attitude toward them could be no other than an open mind ready to consider the evidence which alone can settle such questions in a scientific manner.

Any number of supporting illustrations could be cited. Professional thinkers are apt to prefer the institutions, traditions and ideals under which they have been reared to corresponding institutions, traditions and ideals prevalent elsewhere. German professors as a rule backed Imperial Germany in its fight for Kultur, while American professors applauded our official program to make the world safe for democracy (American brand); college professors in Western Europe and America have evinced no very strong interest in, or at least but little sympathy with, the Russian experiment, nor protested very much against armed interference with that experiment; professors in our Southern States appear to be loyal adherents of the Democratic Party, in the main, and fairly content with the status assigned the negro race down there; New England professors, on the other hand, seem content, for the most part, with the Republican Party and its sympathy with the colored race. And so on.

There are of course many instances where professional thinkers do largely emancipate themselves from class bias,⁸⁷ racial prejudice and other irrational attitudes, and

⁸⁷ The mathematicians, physicists, chemists and even historians and economists who (with their colleagues) compose our academic faculties are far from having received the kind of education in which Professor Dewey puts his faith. Those who are inclined to share that faith will say that the facts here cited only prove the need of that "reorganization of education around social objectives" which is the present aim of the most progressive educators.—Ed.

act politically with ~~some~~ reference to the major social interests of which politics must take account. A smaller number, probably, keep an open mind on political questions which are still unsettled, though their number may be larger than one would be inclined to suppose. Even such people would hardly act with strict impartiality where their own personal interests were involved. I have never heard of a state university that did not wish largely increased legislative appropriations, or of college professors who were not more solicitous over salary increases for themselves, than over higher wages for underpaid manual laborers. Nor have I heard of any college professors who were more concerned that academic advancement should have reference to academic merit alone than to their own personal fortunes. There may be such professors, but, if so, they have largely succeeded in keeping their light hid under a bushel. We cannot in any case use them as evidence on our question.

The evidence here adduced is fragmentary in nature, of course, but it ought to count for a good deal notwithstanding. It should be possible to collect a great deal more evidence of this general character, sufficient, I think, practically to settle the question at issue, so far at least as it refers to a scientific hypothesis, rather than to a faith exempted from scientific examination. Investigations could be devised which would determine with a fair degree of conclusiveness the influence of superior educational training on the political thought and behavior of the individuals who had undergone such training, and, through that, the possibilities of intelligence and education in the rationalization of social relationships. We may say, pending the outcome of exact investigations, that the evidence now available points to the conclusion that there are decided limits to the rationalization of social relationships

through the improvement of education and the better utilization of intelligence.

The Possibilities of Intelligence and Education.—When the faith in intelligence and education, as rationalizing factors in society, is reduced to the rank of a hypothesis and tested by the relevant data, it is seen to possess but a very limited validity. Yet the possibilities of intelligence and education should not be underrated. Exact investigations of the type just indicated, together with the “intelligence tests” now depreciated by many social philosophers, should enable us to determine with approximate accuracy just what these possibilities are. We should then be able to plan our social programs, educational and otherwise, with a good deal of confidence (confidence based on science, not on faith) that they could actually be carried out. We should at the same time guard ourselves, so far as humanly possible, against the bitter disappointments and disillusionments that await faith, or confidence, which has been exempted from the test of the facts.

A faith of any sort is apt to have its god and its devil, peculiar in some respects to the particular faith, but there nevertheless. Dewey's devil is sheep-like imitativeness, adult conservatism, demand for conformity, love of power, suppression of originality, rigidity of habit and custom, refusal to think out social and political problems.⁸⁸ His god is the opposite of all this—flexibility of habit, development of originality, cultivation of liberality, willingness to think out social problems, and so on. From the standpoint of objective science, such a devil challenges explanation, just as does the opposing god. And when we are asked to believe that the god can triumph over the devil, given the chance, we are justified in wanting to know

⁸⁸ Cf. his *Human Nature and Conduct*, pp. 95 *et seq.*

how it shall be done. Devils are pretty tough customers—that is why they are devils—and I have never heard of a god that succeeded in wholly exorcising its devil, and so of vindicating the faith that it could be done. I for one should like to believe that it could be done in the case before us. But I am anxious above all things not to be fooled in the matter.

The Concept of Limits Within Which the Social Process Develops.—I would substitute for the faith in the ultimate triumph of intelligence and education the concept of limits, upper and lower, within which the social process, given the determining factors, must take place, and which it is unlikely to transcend. These limits may be defined, if we set about it patiently and methodically, with some approach to accuracy. Within these limits, as they may be defined by such methods, lies the opportunity for a more competent political science and a more enlightened education to do their work in improving the lot of mankind. Working with such a concept, we could do something at least in the way of substituting scientific prediction for faith in matters social, a valid theory of social possibility for vain Utopias, and reasonable expectations of the future for the hopes and disappointments which beget optimism and pessimism.

This terminates the examination of problems stated at the beginning of this chapter, and treated in the body of the text in incidental fashion only. The assumptions there made seem to be fully justified by the outcome of this examination. Controversial questions there still are, of course, for the data bearing on many of the questions considered do not permit of definitive conclusions. Only more extensive data, and a more exhaustive analysis of all the obtainable data, can supply such conclusions. The

problems are still there, at any rate, and it is to be hoped that all competent investigators concerned over the future of our civilization will coöperate in their elucidation.

SUGGESTED READINGS

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Much of the literature bearing on the problems discussed in this chapter is to be found in the philosophical, psychological and sociological journals. A number of the important articles are cited in the text.

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